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Abstract
Most of the literature on joint ventures (JVs) in developing countries has been viewed
from the perspective of the foreign partners, ignoring the strategic imperatives and
goals of the host country partners. Additionally, there has been very little research on
international joint ventures (IJVs) in Thailand. Therefore, a study of the relationships
between bargaining power, trust and culture affecting negotiation behaviour and
outcomes (JV performance) could clarify and complement the results of past studies.
It could lead foreign and Thai investors to better understand what they should do
before and after entering into JVs, so as to achieve an effective performance
(outcome), the success of IJV, cost minimization and profit maximization.
This study examines the variables mentioned above in the context of service
industries (e.g. construction, leasing, gas distribution), within the confines of joint
venture theory and negotiation theory. The data was gathered using both
questionnaires and in-depth interviews with a number of MDs and senior managers of
JV firms. Both Thai and foreign parents were interviewed where possible. The result
of the study shows that relationships between bargaining power, trust, culture,
negotiation behaviour and performance (outcome) exist. A significant external factor
affecting JV performance was also identified. Case studies were used as a research
strategy for this study. 'Pattern matching logic' and 'explanation building' techniques
were used for the analysis of data. In addition, data display technique was added to
offer a clear understanding and picture of the results of the study.
Regarding JV management and negotiation, this study demonstrated that each JV
partner should pay attention and time to support the development of mutual trust and
cultural understanding in order to avoid conflict and enhance a successful JV
performance. This study also revealed the effect of bargaining power, trust and
culture on JV performance mediated by negotiation tactics. This has received little
attention in previous studies.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 An overview
In today's global business environment and dynamic markets, competitors are moving to
increase their profits and expand markets outside their home. They also seek to locate
their plant in developing countries to reduce their production costs (e.g. by employing
cheap labour) and thus gain competitive advantage. With this strong driving force, a new
competitive strategy should be implemented, if firms aim to become successful. As a
result, the focus of firms, with regard to strategies, has constantly changed and shifted
from an emphasis on competition to greater emphasis on strategic collaboration. Western
firms would like to increase their outcomes and their performance. In recent years, a
large number of firms have chosen to enter joint venture with Asian companies in
countries like Thailand. They hope that, at the end of the day, their benefits from
implementing this new strategy will be greater than by any alternative operating strategy,
such as take over, acquisition or green field investment.
One important reason for firms preferring to enter joint venture, rather than going alone,
is that there is an unclear picture of the problems attached to the formation of
relationships in respect to politics, culture, society and the environment. Another
significant reason for foreign companies tending to choose to enter joint business venture
in developing countries is because of the huge advantage from host governments who
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give promotional privileges to foreign firms who decide to make such an investment. For
example, in Thailand, the larger the investment and the more valuable the technology
transfer and training management made, the higher the benefits to Thailand, then the
greater the bargaining power foreign firms have to negotiate against the Thai government.
In addition, according to Thai regulation regarding the service sector, Thai nationals must
hold at least 51% of the registered capital but where large amounts of investment capital
(over 1,000 million baht) are paid, foreign investors may initially hold a majority of the
equity (The Board of Investment Announcement No. 1/1993).
Some other reasons that firms establish JVs in host countries are discussed as follows:-
The need for local markets and knowledge of the economy. According to Janger (1980),
nearly half of the companies in his sample formed JVs as a result of government
requirement. Also, Gullander (1976) found that the primary reason for MNCs to
establish JV was because of the inward investor's need for knowledge of politics.
Tomlinson's (1970) results supported Janger in that the MNCs' major reason for entering
IV was government pressure. Accordingly, joint ventures with local firms have increased
strategic importance and have become an important element of foreign firms'
international strategies (Geringer and Hebert, 1989). Porter and Fuller (1986) and
Harrigan (1987) view joint ventures as critical components of an organization's business
unit network and a strategic weapon for competing within their core markets and
technologies. Additionally, past studies have suggested that these trends towards the
increasing frequency and the strategic significance of joint ventures, especially
international joint venture, seem to continue in this decade (Anderson, 1990).
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However, the formation and operation of joint ventures do not arise without problems.
As firms desire to enter joint ventures, prospective partnering firms must enter into
negotiations. To reduce problems (e.g. psychic distance and cultural clash), it is
important for both negotiating parties to study and understand each other's needs. The
negotiation process has a significant influence on outcomes. To reach agreement,
partnering firms should place more emphasis on flexibility in their negotiation process.
A large number of factors have an impact on the negotiation process, but a few have a
major influence. This research aims to study the influence of culture, bargaining power,
trust on negotiation behaviour and negotiation outcomes. For example, the nature of
Western firms tends to place more emphasis on competitiveness, while Thai and Chinese
styles promote the importance of relationship building before negotiating any business.
Therefore, it is necessary for negotiating firms to try to bridge their psychic gap in terms
of cultural clash in order to get rid of any differences which might cause
misunderstandings in negotiating so that they can reach agreement easily, even when
facing time constraints.
A clear understanding of culture, bargaining power and negotiation tactics in Thailand is
of the utmost significance to foreign negotiating counterparts. A number of articles of
literature on the subject have evolved with little overview on the understanding of the
cultural impact on the negotiation process. This has never been examined in relation to
its influence on joint venture negotiation in Thailand. Most empirical studies have
generally tended to use quantitative research methods, based on statistical analysis rather
than examining and exploring in-depth details, using case studies which can produce very
21
valid results. Qualitative research (such as case study or participant observation) tends to
precede the discovery of natural laws, theory development and a field's evolution toward
maturity (Dubin, 1969; Parkhe, 1993). According to Bedeian (1989) in (Parkhe, 1993),
82% of papers used research approaches characterized as "theory-thin and method-
driven."
This research reviews the literature on negotiations between Asian and Western countries
as well as developing and applying these ideas into Thai markets. Particular emphasis
was given to the service industry (e.g. leasing, construction and oil storage firms) where
Thai firms have entered joint venture negotiation with foreign firms. The results should
lead both Thai and foreign firms to greater understanding of development of skill and
negotiating style and behaviour. They can experience the mystery of cultural differences
and misunderstanding and learn how bargaining power and trust are implemented and
taken into account accordingly, both before entering negotiations and after an agreement
has been reached. As a result, it is expected that both negotiating parties should be able
to improve the effectiveness of negotiation outcome.
1.2 Research problems and research questions
Joint ventures have received a lot of attention from researchers and academics over the
last few years, primarily because of their significance as a strategic alternative in coping
with the increasingly competitive challenge of the globalization of the world's
economies. There has been very little examination of the issues of international joint
venture business negotiation where its influence could lead to joint venture success or
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failure. As negotiation has become one of the significant factors influencing joint venture
business, one should place particular emphasis on some factors that might have an impact
on the negotiation outcomes. Nevertheless, despite their increasing importance and
popularity, IJVs are not without drawbacks and shortcomings. Some problems might
arise as business negotiation is underway. The presence of two or more negotiators
representing each parent creates a potentially significant source of complexity with
regards to the differences in both national and corporate culture; value; belief in strategic
goals; negotiating style; business system; resource contribution expected; emotional
behaviour; and in the degree of bargaining power and trust. These different factors could
lead negotiators or JV partners to diverging ideas and conflict, thus resulting in
negotiating difficulty and the eventual failure of business negotiation. Within this
perspective, an important determinant of joint venture negotiation outcomes appears to be
the level of understanding of each other's culture and values (such as cultural negotiating
style and business system) as well as the degree of bargaining power that the negotiating
parties have over one another and the level of trust between the parties.
In this study, bargaining power refers to the capability of the negotiating party to
favourably change the bargaining set (Lax and Sebenius, 1985) and to influence the
negotiation behaviour and outcome (Schelling, 1956). National culture refers to the
values, belief, and assumptions learned in early childhood that distinguish one group of
people from another (Hofstede, 1994). Trust is the negotiator's belief that his negotiating
partner is ready to perform actions, such as benefitting mutual relationships, that will
result in cooperative behaviour and successful outcomes. Rotter et al. (1972) argue that a
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generalized expectancy of trust or distrust can be an important determinant of negotiating
behaviour. Negotiation behaviour is a mixture of socio-cultural negotiating style and
belief. The business system affects negotiators in their performance of verbal and
nonverbal behaviours in the joint venture negotiating process. Negotiation outcome
refers to JV performance in the perspective of the achievement of partners' objectives
(e.g. profitability, market share, sale, technology and know-how transfer, learning,
business growth and creditability); IJV partners' satisfaction regarding overall JV
performance, JV agreement, JV relationships and JV partner's relationships. The
importance of negotiation behaviour and outcomes influenced by national, social, and
corporate culture and values; and the degree of bargaining power and trust, leads
researchers to expect that international joint venture commercial negotiation would be a
rich source of research.
Although there is considerable literature on international negotiation, those studies tend
to place emphasis on the issues of political negotiation rather than on business
negotiation. A few studies have examined business negotiation, such as Tung (1982);
Pye (1982); Eiteman (1990); Graham (1983); and Weiss (1990). Few have paid attention
to joint venture business negotiation, apart from the studies by Wagner (1990), Lin
(1996), Brouthers and Bamossy (1997), and Lin and Germain (1998). Studies have
touched on negotiations with companies from Asian developing countries. There has
never been any study into Thai-foreign joint venture business negotiation in Thailand.
The results of past research often conflict or are not significant. Furthermore, previous
research on business negotiation has lacked comparability and generality of results and
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ignores the importance of the strategic behaviour of host country negotiating parties,
especially in terms of cultural differences.
Western negotiators seem to negotiate on the basis of competitiveness rather than mutual
relationship building. Therefore, to improve and ease the outcome of international
business negotiations, emphasis should be placed on the role of trust which may have a
significant influence on negotiation behaviour and, thus, on outcome. This, in turn, might
lead to both negotiating parties' ability to reduce their transaction costs and negotiating
time. In comparison to Western negotiators always emphasizing short-term gain, Thais
tend to stress the long term in relationship building. Therefore, to negotiate successfully
with Thais, Westerners should adjust their negotiation behaviour and competitive
strategy, where possible. This does not mean to suggest that Western negotiators should
begin to use Thai negotiating style, but rather they should try to understand the logic of
Thai negotiation, in order to ease the negotiation process and improve the outcome. Due
to the scant evidence and conflicting results on the relationships between the above
factors, this research intends to study the relationships between negotiation behaviour,
culture, bargaining power and trust, and how these factors influence successful
negotiation outcomes by addressing the following research questions:-
1. How does bargaining power affect international joint venture negotiation
behaviour and outcome ?
2. How does mutual trust influence JV negotiation behaviour and outcome ?
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3.	 How does cultural difference and misunderstanding affect the negotiator's
behaviour and the JV outcome ?
1.3 The importance and benefits of studying IJV negotiation in Thailand
Thailand has had a distinguished economic performance during the past three decades,
with an average growth rate of 7 percent (BOI, 1993). In the late 1980s, it was the fastest
growing economy in the world, with a growth rate of 13%. By the end of 1995, 2,177
JVs, with total investment values of Baht 206,283 million had taken place. However, in
last a few years an unpredictable fluctuation in currency exchange has shaken Thai
economic stability and performance, resulting in an economic downturn. It should be
understood that business has not always succeeded without any difficulties. Now,
Thailand is facing economic and business difficulties and no one knows precisely which
direction changes will take. It is important to find out the implications of this disaster in
terms of joint venture business negotiation. When a good opportunity for investment
presents itself and international business negotiation begins again, negotiating partners
will better know how they should negotiate to reach a successful outcome at the right
time with minimum resource contribution.
Researchers, whose studies cover different countries, seem to face difficulties regarding
communication during the interview process and the formation of the questionnaires.
Much of the existing research seems to focus on Triad countries (U.S., Europe, and
Japan), where a large amount of literature exists. This can help researchers to understand
the myths and perceived differences in each business characteristic, culture and practice.
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Therefore, choosing Thailand as a target of study could benefit the business world's
academics and potential foreign investors investing in Thailand, as well as Thai
businessmen, to understand the unforseeable problems which could potentially obstruct
their business ventures. This study will assist both Thai and foreign partners to
understand how and when to improve the effective negotiation outcome within the
constraints of negotiating time and available resources.
Secondly, it will increase awareness of the impact of cultural difference and
misunderstanding on the negotiation process and behaviour. These are factors which
could potentially lead negotiating firms or the JV partners to negotiation failure.
Thirdly, it could enable negotiators or JV partners to cope with ambiguity and complexity
that might occur during business negotiation. This, in turn, may lead negotiating partners
to effectively use strategic negotiation in order to achieve their corporate goals and
objectives.
Finally, this research could serve as a spring board and foundation for future research into
successful joint venture business negotiation outcomes.
1.4 The purposes and objectives of the research study
The primary purpose of this study is to investigate how cultural difference and
misunderstanding influence joint venture negotiation behaviour which in turn influences
outcomes.	 According to Hawrysh and Zaichlcowsky (1989), "culture's casual
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significance to negotiations is not in defining ends or outcomes of action but in the
process or strategy of bargaining." Swidler (1986) suggests that culture influences
behaviour by shaping a "tool kit" of habits, skills and styles from which people construct
"strategies of action" or persistent ways of ordering behaviour through time. Tung (1982)
concludes that as a determinant of the success or failure of negotiations, culture played a
significant role. She found out that 80% of the survey respondents agreed with the
statement that the negotiating styles of Chinese and US executives were different.
However, she concluded that an awareness of cultural differences in bargaining styles
was necessary, but not a sufficient condition on its own, because executives perceive
negotiation style as a major cause of negotiation failure, rather than success. In contrast,
some empirical studies, such as Harnett and Cummings (1980), have failed to discover
major differences between cultural negotiating styles. Therefore, this study has tried to
prove whether the results from past studies with regard to negotiation between different
cultures are similar or different when applied to negotiation between Thais and their
Foreign partners. Additionally, study into the role of culture, as it affects behaviour
during negotiation could help Thai and foreign negotiators to be more aware, to
understand and to pursue negotiating style, tactics and strategy accordingly.
The second purpose is to examine the role of bargaining power as it affects negotiation
outcomes. Lusch (1976) defined two major sources of power: coercive and noncoercive.
Coercive power involves a potential punishment, as a result of which one partner
reluctantly yields power to another, while noncoercive power (expert, legitimate, reward
and referent) tends to lead to one partner willingly yielding power to another. When
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power is used in a negotiation relationship, it becomes bargaining power (Rojot, 1991).
The outcome of business and/or government negotiation is influenced by the bargaining
power of negotiating parties towards their strategic goals (Fagre and Wells, 1982;
Schelling, 1956; Rojot, 1991). Robinson (1969) points out that the outcome of
negotiation in the bargaining situation among joint business partners will be positively
favourable if there is a balance of resource contributions and expected benefits for each of
the joint venture partners. Bargaining power between negotiating parties is based on the
relatively urgent need for co-operation, available resources and commitment (Inkpen and
Beamish, 1997); the ability to secure another party's agreement on one's own terms
(Rojot, 1991) and the strengths and weaknesses between negotiating partners (Schelling,
1956). The result of Fagre and Wells' (1982) study shows that the MNC's percentage
ownership of foreign subsidiaries correlated with its level of technology, product
differentiation, product diversity and access to foreign markets. This, in turn, influences
the outcome of negotiations. Lecraw (1984) found that the bargaining power of MNCs,
over the host government, increases if they possess a proprietary product or technology,
and are able to provide output channels for the joint venture products.
The third objective is to explore the role of trust as it influences negotiation behaviour
and outcomes. As partners develop a positive collaborative relationship and trust over
time, this could block a shift in partner bargaining power which in turn eases negotiation
outcomes. Trust and relationship play important roles in Thai business venture and
negotiation while Western negotiators often think in terms of contract and/or short-term
gain. This mismatch should be unlocked in order to improve successful negotiation
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outcomes (e.g. profits, satisfaction, JV agreement). Trust could happen at many levels,
such as personal, corporate and organization. Inter-personal trust is quite significant to
joint business negotiation because if a trusted person leaves a firm, problems may start to
occur in the joint venture business or business renegotiation. Therefore, firms should try
to advocate business interaction on as many different levels of organization as possible so
that when someone leaves the organization, the level of trust that negotiating parties have
built between each other can be maintained. Larson (1992) observed that firms not only
rely on mechanisms of social control in the formation and maintenance of joint venture
businesses, but that such relational factors become increasingly important as the
relationships between joint venture firms develop over time. The frequency of similar
transactions or past business experience may affect the level of trust between negotiating
partners which, in turn, influences JV performance and agreement. Assuming a
management based on trust, JV firms could reduce risk and behavioural uncertainty, thus
resulting in bounded rationality which is less harmful and less salient (Chiles and
McMackin, 1996); and achieve improved behavioural and market performance (Aulakh et
al., 1996). Simiar's (1982) result shows that differences in culture and goal lead
negotiating partners to experience mistrust and conflict. Further study into the role of
trust, as it affects negotiation outcomes, could clarify and complement the past results of
Palay (1985) who found that relationships between rail-freight carriers and auto shippers
were overlaid with close interpersonal relations among members in organizations. Inkpen
(1992) found that trust was correlated with openness within the relationship and with
(negotiation) outcomes. Hebert (1994) found a positive correlation between mutual trust
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and JV performance outcome, as well as low opportunism in their exchange relationships.
Lin (1996) found a positive relationship between trust and problem-solving.
The fourth objective is to develop a theoretical framework combining elements of joint
venture theory and negotiation theory and applying this to the study of relationships
between bargaining power, negotiation behaviour, culture, trust, and negotiation
outcomes.
1.5 Organisation of the study
This thesis consists of nine chapters. This chapter starts with the overview followed by
an outline of the problems and research questions. Then the reasons for and importance
of studying IJV in Thailand will be explained. Finally, the objectives of the study will be
discussed in order to give direction and to describe the specific areas on which to focus
and the chosen methods of conducting this research.
The second chapter presents a review of literature. JV background will be explored- first
the conceptualization of international joint ventures, then common problems in joint
ventures, the instability of IJVs, strategic behaviour and joint venture motivations and
finally organization learning.
The third chapter provides the theories and conceptual framework of this study. The
study's theoretical framework, which draws from the following concepts, is developed
and discussed. First a review of prior research regarding the concept of bargaining power
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will be examined. Then, the concepts of trust, culture and negotiation, determinants of
negotiation behaviour, negotiation outcomes and determinants of JV performance
outcome will be discussed. Next, guidelines for achieving effective performance and
success will be set out. The chapter will end with a conclusion to chapters 1-3. Four
propositions developed from JV theory (chapter 2) and concepts discussed in chapter 1
will be presented.
The fourth chapter outlines the research methodology. However, before discussing
research methodology, the construction of the research models of bargaining power,
culture, trust, negotiation behaviour and outcomes (performance) are presented. In
addition, adaptation of the conceptual model on negotiation will be discussed. Then, the
research design used in this research, which will involve case studies method approach,
will be explored. Next, the unit and sampling frame employed in this study, data
collection planned, pilot study, the selected case samples, conducting case study
interviews, data coding, case analysis technique will be presented. The chapter ends with
a discussion of research reliability and validity which will be addressed in this study.
The fifth chapter presents the aggregate case studies of JV companies B, C, D and F.
First, the background of each company will be discussed. Then JV strategic objectives,
the Thai and foreign partners' reasons for entering IV, bargaining power of partners, trust
between partners, culture, negotiation behaviour, JV performance and finally factors
affecting JV performance.
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The sixth chapter presents a case study of JV company E. First the bargaining power
between JV partners will be explored. Then trust, culture and negotiation behaviour of
JV partners will be discussed. Next, factors affecting negotiation behaviour, JV
performance and finally factors affecting JV performance will be identified.
The seventh chapter presents a case study of JV company A. First the bargaining power
of the four JV partners will be examined. Then trust, culture and negotiation behaviour
of JV partners will be discussed. Next, factors affecting negotiation behaviour and JV
performance will be given. The chapter ends with an examination of factors affecting JV
performance (outcome).
The eighth chapter reports the results of the cross-case comparison of similarities and
differences between JV companies A and E. Then the four propositions will be tested,
company by company, regarding the relationships linking relative bargaining power,
trust, culture, negotiation behaviour and JV performance. Next, a summary of the results
of each proposition for all six case studies and an explanation of self-reference criterion
(SRC) - free approach will be included and, finally, an overview of the data coding and
coding scheme will be provided. The chapter will end with conclusions to chapters 4-8.
A revised conceptual model will also be included.
The ninth chapter provides insight into the research contribution. Then, limitations of the
study and directions for future research will be discussed. The chapter will end with a
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discussion of the conclusions of this study, including comparison of the research results
with those highlighted in the literature review.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review: Joint Venture Background
This chapter reviews existing literature on joint venture. First the conceptualization of
IJVs will be explored. This will be followed by an examination of the common
problems in joint ventures, the instability of IJVs, strategic behaviour and joint
venture motivations. The chapter will end with the discussion of organisation
learning.
2.1 Defining joint ventures and their benefits
There are many kinds of cooperative arrangements between firms of different
nationalities, serving many purposes and encompassing joint ventures, licensing
agreements, supply agreements, marketing agreements and a variety of other
arrangements (Glaister et al., 1994; Contractor and Lorange, 1988b). Accordingly,
joint venture is only a subset of total cooperative activity. Kogut (1988) narrowly
defines joint venture as when two or more firms pool a portion of their resources
within a common legal organization. According to Harrigan (1984), joint ventures are
separate entities with two or more active firms as parents, where the emphasis is on
the child. Geringer (1988) states that JVs involve two or more legally distinct
organizations (the parents), each of which share in the decision-making activities of
the jointly owned entity. Pfeffer and Nowak (1976) states that JVs are legally and
ecomomically separate organizational entities - created by two or more parent
organizations that collectively invest capital and other resources to pursue certain
strategic goals. Inkpen and Crossan (1995) define JVs as "a means of performing
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activities in combination with one or more firms instead of autonomously." Beamish
(1994) also define joint ventures as shared-equity undertakings between two or more
parties, each of whom holds at least five percent of the equity. Some differences
between equity joint ventures (EJVs) and non-equity joint ventures (NEJVs) are as
follows:- Killing (1988) views EJVs as traditional joint ventures which are created
when two or more partners join forces to create a newly incorporated company in
which each has an equity position. In contrast, NEJVs comprise an (contractual or
non-contractual) agreement (e.g. to provide technical assistance, distribution and
supply agreements) between partners to cooperate in some way, without the creation
of new firms (Tsang, 2000). It is considered to be an IN when business partnerships
are jointly owned by two or more firms from different countries, foreign multinational
firms and local governments, or foreign multinational firms and local business people
(Kahal, 1994). Yan (1998) contends that IJVs are "ventures in which the sponsoring
partners cooperate across national as well as cultural boundaries." Johnson (1996)
refers to an IJV as "a legal entity created by two or more organizations (the `parents'),
at least one of which is headquartered in another country." In general, each party
entering international joint venture contributes capital, assets or equity ownership.
This does not have to be on a 50/50 basis.
Joint venture is one of the significant strategies for foreign investors whilst
conducting business abroad. (Other examples of FDI include licensing, wholly-
owned subsidiaries and cooperative agreements.) Firstly, JV strategy reduces the time
spent by an investor in understanding culture, behaviour, values, religion,
management style, politics, economy and society in the host country and particularly
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it allows the company to enter the market quickly. Secondly, such a strategy
strengthens the competitiveness of both partners through cost reduction which can be
achieved by pooling resources in order to gain scale effect or by shifting
manufacturing to the lowest cost producer. Thirdly, risk is reduced, through sharing
the development costs for a new product, and also revenues are increased. Next, it
allows the partners to gain an understanding of each other ways of doing business.
Finally, it allows continuity of access to the parents' assets, brand equity, systems,
know-how, technology and services.
Joint ventures are often used by managers to build strengths for their firms' business
units. They can change industry structures to the disadvantage of competitors.
Moreover, joint ventures are assuming greater importance in global strategies because
technology changes rapidly (e.g. semi-conductors and computers), cost advantages are
becoming more pronounced, product lives are shorter, deregulation and trade
agreements open formerly closed markets to new competitors, they can influence
firms to find allies and so avoid being left behind, greater numbers of companies who
formerly operated only in domestic markets are becoming international competitors,
industry boundaries are blurring, and finally, parent firms must maintain a competitive
advantage. Some other reasons include larger capital requirements, market access,
industry and economic maturation in the Triad (USA, EU, and Japan) and improved
communications and computational power.
Nevertheless, some expatriate managers dislike joint venture because many problems
can occur between the expatriate manager and the local manager. Also, these
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problems happen because joint ventures involve a contract which reflects an
understanding of costs and markets and technologies at the time companies sign them.
As situations change, partners do not always want to compromise and renegotiate with
each other. Parent companies rarely give enough time for the new joint venture
companies to grow and they do not allow them to expand business into areas the
parents would like to keep for themselves (Ohmae, 1994). Moreover, some conflict
with culture, style, religion, politics and language can arise.
These difficulties can often end up in the termination of the venture for partnerships
which do not put enough effort into learning each other's culture and management
styles. Accordingly, achieving a successful fit in (international) joint venture in
Thailand requires constant energy and attention from both partners, as well as an
unusually high degree of flexibility from the foreign firms accustomed to signing a
contract and then fulfilling it to the letter. Thai sense of flexibility focuses on finding
the right partner rather than putting the right words on paper.
Some companies use joint ventures to relieve the pain of restructuring. They use each
other's experience and competency to develop their own companies. For example,
one might be good at R&D, another might be excellent at sales, then when their needs
match each other, they will join together. Normally they will not both participate
their core business activities. Some business issues need to be considered before they
try to run a business together. Firstly, when negotiating the transfer of an existing
business into a joint venture, the restructuring partner needs to inform the prospective
partner about the causes of the business' underperformance. Secondly, financial
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stakeholders need to ensure joint commitment. They can give the buying partner
management control by allowing that partner to bring his own capabilities and skills
to bear on the business quickly and efficiently. Lastly, when entering a traditional
joint venture, talking about planning for the termination of the venture is as
unthinkable as planning a divorce. However termination is a natural step in the
evolution of a restructuring joint venture and it really makes sense to plan ahead of
time (Nanda and Williamson, 1995).
A study of ownership patterns and trends by Christelow (1987) suggests that joint
venture enterprises account for around 20% of the assets of all international direct
investment enterprises and 30% or more in manufacturing. It appears that for all
industries combined, throughout the world, Dutch and French companies are most
likely to form joint ventures. For manufacturing, Japanese and French companies
were most inclined to use JV strategies while Canada and the UK were least involved
in JVs, followed by the Netherlands and Germany. From 1977 to 1984, the
importance of JV in US direct investment abroad has been falling. In 1984, US joint
ventures abroad were highest in Japan, the country with the highest level of joint
ventures in manufacturing. In the manufacturing sector, where both direct investment
and JV are most important, the joint venture share of gross national product ranges
from around 2% in the UK to 4 % or more in France and more in developing
countries. Glaister and Buckley (1994) analysed the formation of JV in a new set,
between UK firms and firms in Western Europe, USA and Japan during the 1980s,
and reported as follows:- almost half of the total joint ventures formed were grouped
in only four industries, i.e. financial services, other manufacturing,
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telecommunications and aerospace; the greatest proportion of JVs were formed for the
purpose of service provision; the clear majority of JVs involved only one foreign
partner; and equity JVs were formed more often than non-equity joint ventures.
2.2 Common mistakes of joint ventures
The tendency towards making mistakes derives from poor management, human
behavioural errors, unanticipated events or ineffective organizations. Lyles (1987)
remarks that mistakes often had little bearing on the success or failure of the joint
venture in meeting its objectives. However, they impact on what the companies have
learned from their joint venturing experience. One of the key distinctions of
successful companies involves learning from one's mistakes and taking corrective
action. The term 'learning' refers to the development of insights, knowledge and
associations between past actions, the effectiveness of those actions and application to
future actions.
Five common areas for error will now be highlighted. The first is 'future conflicts'.
At formation, both partners may have mixed motives and hidden agendas. For
example, one partner might form a JV to have its products manufactured and
marketed in a specific country. As time passes, parent companies acquire the skills
and knowledge to market the product themselves and as they desire to compete with
the JVs , this creates a conflict.
Secondly, partner rapport is important. Some issues need to be tackled to improve
partner relationship. It is recommended that if you have 51%, you should not try to
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behave as if you have 100%. You should treat partners as you would like to be
treated. The frequency of meetings between the firm's president and top partners
should be increased. The meetings should alternate between the offices of each parner
firm. Many firms make the mistake of setting the JV up as a direct competitor to the
parent company, selling in the same markets and producing the same products. This
leads to staff of the parent company withholding information or not cooperating with
the JV.
Thirdly, technology transfer is also an issue. Some firms form joint ventures because
of technical cooperation agreements (i.e. transferring technology and know-how).
Some firms view technology transfer as an area in which they make mistakes. This is
why firms try not to transfer technology in their core business areas.
Uncertainty of the future will also be a concern. The inability to predict the future or
the making of wrong predictions might create problems. Some firms make mistakes
in making decisions which rely on future legislation. The foreign partner could also
err in choosing to use its own name in setting up a foreign JV. This can lead to
problems, because the local people may perceive a large foreign firm taking profits
out of the country.
Lastly, equity issues can cause problems. Some firms found that allowing too much
equity to become public was a mistake because the JV management was forced to
focus too closely on short term returns.
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2.3 The instability of international joint ventures
Generally speaking, instability within an international joint venture represents
changes in the division of equity between the joint venture partners or major
reorganizations which were unplanned from the perspective of one or both partners.
However, instability does not necessarily indicate whether the performance of the JV
is good or not. One perspective of joint venture instability considers both a shift in JV
control and termination. Yan and Zeng (1999) divide instability into two approaches:
outcome-oriented and process-oriented. The former approach considers IJV instability
as the termination or change in the sponsors ownership structure. The latter approach
perceives IJV instability as major reorganization or contractual renegotiations.
Killing (1983) argues that a joint venture, structured with one dominant parent, is
more stable and more likely to survive than a joint venture in which management is
shared by the partners. However, research by Beamish and Banks (1987) shows a
different result. They argue that it will be more stable if partners have a shared-
management structure, perception of long-term need and satisfactory performance of
the JV. In addition, Reynolds (1979) found that the JV instability rate in LDCs is 45-
50%, whilst Killing (1983) and Franko (1971) show results of only 30% in developed
countries. Franko (1987) also found higher instability for organizations which had
divided departments into world regional areas. Moreover, Kogut's (1986) results do
not support Killing's idea and Kogut argues that the unstable character of joint
ventures results from both the structure of industrial competition and the relationship
between the partners. He also found that concentrated industry structures, ceteris
paribus, experience greater instability than fragmented industry structures. Kogut's
(1987) results show instability rates for domestic and international joint ventures in
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the United States to be roughly equivalent to those for LDCs in Beamish's study.
Park and Russo (1996) found an overall instability rate of 68% in the study of JVs in
the electronics industry. Hennart and Zeng (1997) studied Japanese IJVs in the US
and found the high ownership instability rate of 68%. On the other hand, the results of
Lee and Beamish's (1995) study into Korean joint ventures and of Beamish's (1993)
study into IJVs in China show a low instability rate.
Stuckey (1983) found that the instability rate of joint venture between foreign partners
and local government partners in the aluminum industry was 26% higher than those
with local private partners (30%). Beamish's result (1985) showed support for
Stuckey's. He found that the instability rate is 15% higher in joint ventures involving
local government partners than those with local private partners (43%). However, this
result seems to exclude the less developed countries from the sample. Additionally,
Gomes-Casseres (1987) finds that the instability rate of WOSs (wholly-owned
subsidiaries) is lower than that of IJVs. Therefore, one still cannot draw a practical
conclusion from the above studies.
Blodgett (1992) discussed that majority-minority joint ventures will experience
frequent renegotiation. Also JVs with slightly unequal ownership shares (51%-49%
or 49%-51%) will reveal this tendency to a lesser degree. Furthermore, joint ventures
with a 50%-50% division of equity will experience the lowest incidence of
renegotiation. In the LDC samples of Reynolds (1979), in a majority of cases (70%),
the foreign parents were in a minority equity position, with only a small proportion
(10-20%) of the JV being equally owned. This gave the opposite result to developed
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country samples, where half had 50-50 ownership. Therefore, Beamish (1985)
concluded that investments in the developing world are less stable than investments in
industrialized countries. An important factor which might influence this result is the
political uncertainties which coexist within economies in the early stages of
development.
In contrast, an open economy allows companies greater freedom to alter the terms of
their agreement. Therefore, JVs in open economies will be more unstable (as
measured by the shifting proportions of equity ownership) than joint ventures in
restrictive economies (Blodgett, 1992). Some factors which bear on the instability of
international joint ventures are as follows:- firstly, a joint venture partner is more
likely to assume control of the joint venture, over time, when the equity is divided
unequally at the start. Secondly, restructuring is more likely to occur if the joint
venture contract has been renegotiated before. Next, one partner is more likely to
make efforts to gain control, if the joint venture operates in a country that does not
restrict incoming foreign investment. Accordingly, restrictive regulations can be seen
as a stabilizing factor. Other factors include changes in partners' strategic mission,
changes in the importance of the joint venture to the parents, changes in the partners'
relative bargaining power and an increase in the competitive rivalry between partners
(Blodgett, 1992; Beamish and Inkpen, 1995). Yan and Zeng (1999) list five factors
which contribute to instability: conflicts in shared management; cross-cultural
differences; ownership structures; characteristics of the sponsors; and external
environmental forces.
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Beamish and Inkpen (1995) conclude that instability should be linked with unplanned
equity changes or major reorganizations, which result in premature joint venture
termination. Kogut (1989) examined IJV termination by concentrating on either
dissolution or acquisition. Of the 92 IJVs in his sample, 27 were terminated through
dissolutions and 37 through acquisitions. A study by Barkema and Vermeulen (1997)
on a longitudinal database of 228 IJVs set up between 1966 and 1994 shows 49% of
ventures terminated before 1994. The result of Park and Russo's (1996) research into
204 JVs in the electronics industry shows 27% of JVs terminating through liquidation
and 40% of JVs terminating through acquisition. In most international joint ventures,
the partners do not have a particular plan for the termination of their ventures.
However, the ventures always become unstable when, after venture formation,
partners' objectives diverge. Furthermore, as the foreign partner increases its
knowledge of the local market and political and cultural conditions, instability in the
JV will become more of a problem because of a shift in the foreign partner's
bargaining power. Yan (1998) argues that the 'imprinting effect' (the bargaining
power of each partner remains unchanged over time or the forces in organisations
which counter change and help retain certain organisational characteristics) of the
"initial equilibrium of bargaining power provides a reference point against which the
relative power positions of the partners are monitored and, when imbalance occurs,
adjustments made to achieve a new state of balance."
Killing (1983) studied instability arising from reorganizations and found that of 35
IJVs, 7 were terminated and 5 underwent a major reconfiguration of the control
structure as a result of poor performance. Yan and Zeng (1999) and also Yan (1998)
45
argue that unexpected environmental and organizational contingencies, undesirable
joint venture performance, obsolete bargains, and interpartner competitive learning are
major sources of IJV instability whereas the initial conditions of the venture i.e. the
local political and legal environments at the IJV's founding, partner initial resource
contributions, the balance of partner bargaining power and the pre-venture
relationship between the partners serve as stabilizing forces for IJVs. They also argue
that IJVs evolve under both driving and restraining forces from the structural
instability and the structural inertia perspectives. Treating all JV terminations as
unstable seems to be conceptually problematic because terminations of JV may
signify a successful completion of the joint partnership (Gomes-Casseres, 1987). In
addition, assuming all IJVs that have not terminated as stable seems to be equally
problematic because JV businesses do not change from stable to unstable the night
before their termination (Yan, 1998). As a result Yan (1998) points out that
understanding of the above driving and restraining forces for IJV restructuring is
extremely important to the study of the stability or instability of IJVs.
2.4 Strategic behaviour and joint venture motivations
Lin et al. (1997) classify the reasons for forming IJVs into three types: efficiency,
competition and learning. Kogut (1988) sees strategic behaviour, transaction cost
approach and organizational learning as the most significant explanations for the
existence of the joint venture and its behaviour. The competitive positioning of the
firms has been influenced by their strategic behaviour. Strategic behaviour states that
firms transact by the mode which maximizes profits through improving a firm's
competitive position as compared with rivals. The distinct difference between
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strategic behaviour and transaction costs is that strategic behaviour addresses how
competitive positioning influences the asset value of the firms whilst transaction costs
address the costs specific to a particular economic exchange, independent of the
product market strategy (Kogut, 1988). On the other hand, Varian (1984) argued that
profit maximization theoretically implies cost minimization. Many researchers have
tried to test whether joint ventures increase efficiency or enhance market power.
Tallman et al. (1997) noted that "market power considerations treat the IJV as a
second-best alternative to whole ownership when the latter is either forbidden or
involves high ownership risks". Shaw and Kauser (2000) as well as Parkhe (1993)
add one more approach - resource dependency theory, which attempts to explain joint
venture formation. No firm is self-sufficient enough with all the necessary resources
in order to compete effectively in the market. As a result, they need to create
dependencies between different organizations by acquiring the essential resources of
each other to reduce uncertainty (Pfeffer and Nowak, 1976; Shaw and Kauser 2000).
Previous industry studies have found some evidence to support the theory that JVs are
a form of strategic behaviour to increase market power. Fusfeld (1958) found 70 JVs
in the iron and steel industry, 53 of which were supply agreements among firms
within the industry (Kogut, 1988). Boyle's (1968) results also support the theory that
joint ventures are motivated by market power.
Stuckey (1983) investigated the aluminum and bauxite industry. He found a high
number of joint ventures between new entrants and other industry members. He also
noted that many of the joint ventures resulted in greater efficiency through achieving
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optimal scale economies. Therefore, he concluded that transaction cost explanations
appear more relevant to aluminum production. In addition, Pfeffer and Nowak
(1976a) investigated more directly the motivation of market power by analyzing
transaction patterns across industries and the degree of industry concentration. They
found that parents from industries which have a high exchange of sales and purchase
transactions, and which are technology-intensive, tend to have more JVs. They also
found that joint ventures occur more often when both parents are from the same
industry of intermediate concentration.
2.5 Organisation learning effects on IJV
In the academic and applied discourse on organisations, the twin concepts of
organisational learning and learning organisations are currently vague ( Popper and
Lipshitz, 2000). Easterby-Smith (1998) views organisational learning as the process
and the learning organisation as the outcome of that process. Senge (1992) describes
learning organizations as the only survivors of the future. Dodgson (1993) refers to
learning organisations as "firms that purposefully adopt structures and strategies to
encourage learning." Pedler et al. (in Hawkins, 1991) define a learning organisation as
one which facilitates the learning of all its members and continuously transforms
itself. Popper and Lipshitz (2000) describe learning organisations as "organizations
that embed institutionalized learning mechanisms into a learning culture."
Organisational learning evolves through modifications, additions and deletions of
existing routines (Albert, 1992). It (organisational learning) tends to be
overoptimistic as regards "the weakness of barriers to learning, so it underemphasizes
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the difficulties involved in mitigating them (Brown and Starkey, 2000).
Organizational learning is one explanation why IJVs exist. It has been recognized as
a process associated with IJVs (Kogut, 1988; Tiemessen et al., 1996) and with long-
term competitive advantage (Hedlund, 1994). Kogut (1988) and Hamel (1991) view
organizational learning of firms as a means to acquire new skills and routines as well
as internalizing the skills of their partner. According to Antal et al. (1999),
organisational learning tends to require a harmonious combination of structure,
culture, leadership and human resource.
Edmondson and Moingeon (1998) define organisational learning as "the process in
which an organisation's members actively use data to guide behavior in a way as to
promote the ongoing adaptation of the organisation." Crossan et al (1999) view
organisational learning as "a principal means of achieving the strategic renewal of an
enterprise." Their organisational learning framework contains four related processes-
intuiting, interpreting, integrating and institutionalizing which occur through three
levels: individual, group and organisation. Inkpen and Crossan (1995) suggest that
organisational learning "involves the basic elements and processes of organizational
development and growth." Popper and Lipshitz (1998) propose that organisational
learning is mediated by the learning of individual organisational members. They also
claim that organisational learning is composed of two facets- "a tangible "hardware"
facet that consists of learning mechanisms and an intangible "software" facet that
consists of shared values and beliefs".
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Corporate learning strongly influences the ability of JV partners to achieve and sustain
competitive advantage internationally in their chosen market (Faulkner, 1995). The
benefits to IJVs of increased knowledge through learning include the reduction of
costs and uncertainty (Buckley and Casson, 1988). Because of difficulties involved in
the transfer of organizationally embedded (tacit) knowledge (e.g. know-how) which is
a critical resource and cannot be easily blueprinted or packaged through licensing or
transactions, IJVs may be an alternative choice (Kogut, 1988; Tiemessen et al., 1996).
IJV firms can gain competitive advantage by learning through the development of
unique competencies (Hamel, 1991; Ghoshal, 1987).
Ghoshal (1987) argues that the "one key asset of the MNC (is) the potential for
learning from its many environments." Accordingly, the management of learning and
the continued acquisition of knowledge are important management processes in IJV
(Tiemessen et al., 1996). Although organizational learning is important to IJVs, it
lacks consensus about what it is or how it occurs in three dimensions:- learning as a
change in cognition/behaviour, the tightness of coupling in learning-performance
outcomes and the level of analysis-individual, group, organizational and inter-
organizational (Tiemessen et al., 1996).
Organizational learning differs from individual learning which may be rational and
intuitional. Individual learning adds to the competencies of the organization, but is
easily appropriated as individual employees leave for another firm (Grant, 1993;
Faulkner, 1995). The efficiency of learning depends critically upon the quality of
coordination between individuals within each routine and between various routines
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(Grant, 1993). On the other hand, organizational learning develops beyond that of the
individual and becomes embedded in its culture - the rituals, routines and systems of a
firm. The abilities of firms to learn depend on the type of learning and the
relationship between the nature of the learning and the condition of the would-be
learner (Faulkner, 1995).
Organizational learning of IJV is divided into two main streams:- economies of scale
and the experience curve. Firstly, the experience curve and increasing accumulated
production provides a suitable introduction into the sources of potential cost
advantage. For example, as experience increases through the learning process, BCG
observed extraordinary reductions in costs and prices, which accompanied increases in
cumulative production. Pennings and Harianto (1992) show that a firm's growing
volume of interfirm experiences increases its chances of entering strategic alliance,
e.g. JVs, in the future. The slope of an experience curve is based on company
learning, technological improvements in product redesign, production and operation.
To achieve cost advantage through the experience curve, it is not necessary for firms
to have a long history of conducting businesses but they will need to have the ability
to innovate and the will to improve. For example, Nucor and Chaparral, who are
recent entrants can achieve lowest cost steel production against giants like USX
(formerly US Steel) (Grant, 1993).
Secondly, economies of scale reflect the natural efficiencies associated with size
(Aaker, 1992). They exist "wherever proportionate increases in the amounts of inputs
employed in a production process result in a more than proportionate increase in total
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output. Economies of scale are conventionally associated with manufacturing
operations. They are also significant in non-manufacturing operations e.g.
purchasing, R&D, distribution and advertising (Grant, 1993). As an example,
McDonalds achieves economies of scale through its brand name, reputation, know-
how, concentration in use of the same recipe, advertising scheme and promotion
throughout the world. However, economies of scale are constrained by several
factors, e.g. product differentiation, dynamic factors and problems of motivation and
coordination (Grant, 1993).
First-time investors are likely to face high information costs and considerable
uncertainty (Li, 1995). Kogut (1983) states that (IJV) firms benefit from increased
learning and experiences during their previous operations and build upon the existing
network of value-added activities. Newbound et al. (1978) argue that small British
MNCs are more successful in foreign investments if the companies precede those
investments with other activities that give them familiarity with foreign markets.
When foreign partners enter joint venture with Thai firms, the structure might not
have been set up to facilitate communications between the international joint venture
firm and the foreign parent. In subsequent ventures, the foreign parent is likely to
have gained more knowledge and experience during its previous foreign operations.
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Some significant IJV past studies are shown in table 2-1 below.
Table 2-1
Selected IJV studies: 1970-2000
Researcher Type and Form of LW Study
Tomlinson (1970)
Franko (1971)
Friedman & Beguin (1971)
Curhan, Davidson & Suni (1977)*
Asheghian (1982)
Fagre & Wells (1982)
Killing (1983)
Lecraw (1984)
Reynolds (1984)
Beamish (1985)
Harrigan (1985 & 1986)
Franko (1987)
Habib (1987)
Lorange & Probst (1987)
Shenkar & Zeira (1987)
Buckley & Casson (1988)
Hennart (1988)
Kogut & Singh (1988)
Franko (1989)
Kogut (1989)
Gomes-Casseres (1989)
Contractor (1990)
Blodgett (1991, 1992)
Geringer (1991)
Geringer & Hebert (1991)
Hennart (1991)
Shan (1991)
Inkpen (1992)
Shenkar & Zeira (1992)
Parkhe (1993)
Lyles & Baird (1994)
Yan & Gray (1994)
Cullen, Johnson & Sakano (1995)
Lee & Beamish (1995)
Madhok (1995)
Buckley & Casson (1996)
Lyles & Salk (1996)
Makino & Delios (1996)
Pan (1996)
Pan & Tse (1996)
Barkema & Vermeulen (1997)
Brouthers & Barnossy (1997)
Inkpen & Beamish (1997)
Luo (1997)
Mjoen & Tallman (1997)
Lin and Germain (1998)
Two partner JVs, examined control issues
Two partner JVs, examined control issues
Studied Foreign-Local partner JVs. Possible to have more than two partners
Principally two partner JVs defined as majority, minority or co-owned JVs
Two partner JVs formed with a local partner
Principally two partner JVs. Ownership structure was defined in terms of actual,
firm-corrected, and country-corrected ownership
Developed framework for management of two partner JVs
Two partner JVs formed with a local partner
Two partner JVs formed with a local partner
Two partner JVs formed with a local partner
Developed framework for management of two partner JVs
Two partner JVs defined as majority, minority or co-owned JVs
No indication of number of partners or nationality of partners provided
Development of two partner JV research framework
Discussed human resource management issues in both two-and multiple-partner
JVs
Developed a theoretical framework of two partner JVs
Theoretical development of transaction cost theory of JVs allows for multiple and
non-local partners
No indication of number of partners or nationality of partners provided
Two partner JVs defined as majority, minority or co-owned JVs
Multiple partner JVs (including domestic JVs) formed by at least one American
firm
Principally two partner JVs formed with a local partner
Two partner JVs defined as 50.50 and minority JVs
Two partner JVs defined as majority, 51:49, 50:50, 49:51, and minority
Multiple partner JVs, identifies partner selection determinants
Two partner JVs formed with a local partner
Multiple partner JVs in the USA formed by at least one Japanese firm
Two partner JVs formed by firms with different countries of origin
Two partner formed with a local partner
Multiple partner JVs treated as two partner JVs, management oriented study
Two partner JVs formed with at least one U.S. partner
Multiple partner JVs formed with a local partner
Two partner JVs formed with a local partner
Multiple partner JVs treated as two partner JVs with a foreign and local partner
Two partner JVs formed with a local partner
Developed a theoretical framework of principally two partner JVs
Developed a theoretical framework of two partner JVs
Multiple partner JVs and two partner JVs defined as dominant and 50:50 JVs
Multiple partner JVs formed with local and or non-local firms
Two partner JVs defined as majority, minority or co-owned JVs
Two partner JVs formed by firms with multiple countries of origin
JVs formed by at least one Dutch firm. No indication of number of partners
Multiple partner JVs formed between Western and Central/Eastern European
enterprises
Developed a theoretical framework of two partner JVs
Two partner JVs formed with a local partner
JVs formed by at least one Norwegian firm. No indication of number of partners
Two partner JVs formed with a local Chinese partner, examined conflict
resolution
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Researcher	 Type and Form of IJV Study
Brannen and Salk (2000) 	 Two partner JVs, examined cultural negotiation issues
*Note: Other studies that have utilised the Harvard Multinational Database for the study ofJVs have used a
classification scheme similar to that in Curhan, Davidson and Sun i (1977)
Source: Adapted from Makino and Beamish (1998) "Performance and survival of joint
ventures with non-conventional ownership structures." Journal of International Business
Studies, London, Fourth Quarter
54
Chapter 3
The Theories and Conceptual Framework
The preceding chapter presents a review of previous studies into JV operations.
Building from this review, a model integrating bargaining power, trust, culture,
negotiation behaviour and performance has been developed and presented in this
chapter. The model involves linking the relationships between a number of variables.
The completed model can be seen in figure 4-1. The chapter commences with an
examination of the concept of bargaining power, followed by the concepts of trust,
culture and negotiation, determinants of negotiation behaviour, negotiation outcomes
and determinants of JV performance outcome. Next, a discussion about the guidelines
for achieving effective performance and success. The chapter will end with the
concluding section covering chapters 1-3. Additionally, the author reviews
transaction cost theory to help build an understanding of the existence of JV and its
behaviour. This theory has not been taken further in the application of this research
study because it is not relevant to the main body of the study. The literature review of
transaction cost theory can be seen in appendix F.
3.1 The concept of bargaining power
Very little empirical research has been conducted, particularly into the use of power in
negotiation (Lewicki et al., 1994). Power is often used to change control and to
overcome resistance in order to achieve desired objectives. Lusch (1976) defines two
major sources of power: coercive and noncoercive. The coercive source involves a
potential punishment, as a result of which one partner reluctantly yields power to
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another. On the other hand, noncoercive sources, which are expert, legitimate, reward
and referent, tend to lead one partner to willingly yield power to another. Lewicki et
al. (1994) describe five sources of power: information, expert, resource control,
location in the structure and personal power. Williams and Wilson (1997) describe
three dimensions of power: perceived power, participation power and position power.
Lewicki et al. (1994) suggest power is one of the repertoire of tools available to
induce or persuade another party to do something.
When power is used in a negotiation relationship, it becomes bargaining power
(Rojot, 1991). Bargaining power refers to the capability of the negotiating/bargaining
partner to favourably change the bargaining set (Lax and Sebenius, 1985) and to
influence the outcome of negotiations (Schelling, 1956). Argyres et al. (1999) define
bargaining power as "the ability of one party to a contract to be able to influence the
terms and conditions of that contract, or subsequent contracts, in its own favor."
Generally speaking, bargaining power between JV firms is based on the relatively
urgent need for cooperation, `coopetition', available resources, commitments (Inkpen
and Beamish 1997; Nalebuff and Brandenburger, 1996), the ability to secure another
party's agreement on one's own terms (Rojot, 1991) and the strengths and weaknesses
between partners (Schelling, 1956). However, elements of bargaining are lacking in a
situation where one party assumes total control over the other one (Rojot, 1991).
Robinson (1969) noted that the joint venture relationship cannot be a zero-sum game
and each partner must expect to gain from the other. This means the benefits of the
contribution ratio must be greater than one.
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Scholars have taken different approaches to the study of bargaining power within JV
firms. These can be divided into two main streams, i.e. context-based and resource-
based power.
In context-based components, the stakes of partners and the availability of alternatives
can be used as a source of power by each joint venture partner to improve its
bargaining position (Bacharach and Lawler, 1984). A stake is a partner's level of
dependence on a negotiating relationship and on its outcomes. Yan and Gray (1994)
used the perceived strategic importance of the joint venture to the overall business of a
parent as the measure of stakes. Yan and Gray (1994) also found a negative
relationship between stakes and bargaining power. Bargaining partners, who have
many alternative choices for achieving the same goals, seem to have more power
because of their ability to walk away from the current bargaining and exercise their
best alternative to a negotiated agreement (Fisher and Ury, 1981). According to Yan
and Gray (1994), the power of a partnering firm is a function of the number of
alternatives which they can use to form an alliance. Rao and Schmidt (1998) contend
that potential partners tend to rely more on the other during alliance negotiation, when
they have fewer strategic options and alternatives open to them. Although the sources
of context-based bargaining power seem to be important, they are indirectly related to
the dynamics of the UV relationships (Inkpen and Beamish, 1997).
In another stream, resource-based components are of more interest to scholars.
Pfeffer and Salancick (1978) contend that the possession or control of critical
resources constitutes power to inter-organizational relations. They (the resources) are
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a significant factor in determining the initial balance of power (Inkpen and Beamish,
1997). According to Robinson (1969), the outcome of negotiation between joint
venture partners will be favourable if there is a balance of resource contributions and
expected benefits for each of the joint venture partners. These contributions of
resources are either clearly identified in the joint venture agreements, e.g. contracts,
memorandums, and licenses or verbally recognized between trustworthy partners
during negotiations (Yon and Gray, 1994). The joint venture partner who can
contribute more critical resources, especially intangible resources such as reputation,
information, know-how and technology, will be more powerful and advantageously
competitive than its partners who might have contributed greater monetary value (Yan
and Gray 1994; Grant 1993). Lecraw (1984) found that the bargaining power of
MNCs over the host government increased if they possess a proprietary product or
technology and are able to provide markets/channels for the joint venture products.
In general, the relative bargaining power of joint venture partners is determined by
who contributes what and how much to the joint venture firm (Harrigan, 1986). Lin
(1996) noted that relative power is "the extent to which one party is more powerful
than the other, results from the comparative levels of resources brought into the
alliance by a partner." The gain in bargaining power to the contributing partner
happens whenever the IJV depends significantly on resources that are "costly or
impossible for other partners to replace" (Root, 1988). Expertise in the knowledge of
the local market, politics, economy and cultural conditions, of which foreign partners
are likely to be uncertain, can be seen as a significant resource contribution by the
local partners. Resource contributions in the areas of technology (e.g. product design,
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manufacturing know-how, and special equipment) and global support (e.g. technical,
marketing, and maintenance services) are mainly committed by foreign partners (Yan
and Gray, 1994). Resource contribution by partners may be equal at the beginning
of the joint venture operation. As partners gain experience (i.e. technology, local
knowledge, government connection, financial resource, man power-labour force, land,
expertise), they may have less need for the other partner's contribution. As a result,
the bargaining power might shift towards one or other of the partners over time. This
could influence the stability of the UV.
The case study research of Yan and Gray (1994) into U.S.-China manufacturing joint
venture used both analytic and enumeratic induction into seven components of
bargaining power: technology, management expertise, global service support, local
knowledge, product distribution, material procurement and equity. They found that
those components had a favourable impact on the partners' bargaining power. In their
study, the relative bargaining power of the partners in two joint ventures (OfficeAid
and Daily Product) was unequal. They found that the U.S. parent had greater
bargaining power than the local parent at the management level. However, there was
a balance in bargaining power at the Board of Director level. In another two joint
ventures (IndusCon and BioTech), they found an even bargaining power within the
joint venture.
Joint ventures have always changed over time, due to the learning process, growing
independence from parents, increased localization and environmental changes
(Vernon 1980; Porter 1990). These changes can shift the bargaining power between
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the partners (Yan and Gray, 1994) and create instability (Inkpen and Beamish 1997).
When bargaining power changes, one could expect to see a concomitant change in
control. Stinchcombe (1965) and Scott (1987) posit that organizations are
"imprinted" at birth, that is, they retain certain features acquired at the time of their
founding that give them a unique character. According to this 'imprint' theory, the
joint venture's structure tends to remain immutable, resisting change.
Gray and Yan (1997) studied llVs from the perspectives of both partners in Office
Aid and Bio Tech. In Office Aid, they found that the U.S. partner consistently
increased its power by increasing knowledge about Chinese operational systems and
continuously updating its technology transfer, whilst the Chinese partner expanded
additional bargaining power by learning management expertise, operational skills and
production know-how. Because these changes in bargaining power offset one
another, they found the relative bargaining power of both partners remained
unchanged.
At Bio Tech, as a result of the reformation of the Chinese economy 1985-1986, the
original distribution channels collapsed, leading the U.S. partner to build a new
distribution network and train the venture's marketing staff, thus increasing its
relative bargaining power. However, the national bureau responsible for that product
sector joined the local bureau as a minority shareholder in the JV. Therefore, the
Chinese partner's bargaining power was increased enough to offset the countervailing
changes in the bargaining power of its U.S. partner.
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Based on the literature above, the author applies the concept of bargaining power to
the study by examining the influence of bargaining power on negotiation behaviour
and JV (performance) outcomes. Yan's writing (1993; p.82), whose case study model
traced the direct relationship between bargaining power (both context-based and
resource-based components) and performance as well as the indirect relationship
through management control, was especially useful. This study follows Yan (1993;
p.92) and Yan and Gray (1994; p.1491) who used both context-based and resource-
based components as indicators of (overall) bargaining power.
Table 3-1
Prior research: Bargaining power
Division of equity Alternative choice Stake
(Strategic
important)
Resource-based
components
Fagre and Wells (1982)
Lecraw (1984)
Blodgett (1987,1991)
Kogut (1988a)
Woodcock and Geringer (1990)
Yan and Gray (1994)
Fisher and Ury (1981)
Yan and Gray (1994)
Rao and Schmidt (1998)
Bacharach and Lawler (1984)
Yan
and
Gray
(1994)
Pfeffer and Salancick (1978)
Inkpen and Beamish (1997)
Robinson (1969)
Yan and Gray (1994)
Lecraw (1984)
Source: Adapted from Hebert , Louis (1994) Division of control, relationship dynamics and
joint venture performance (Ph.D. thesis)
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3.2 The concept of trust
Different streams of research investigate trust in different ways, depending upon the
relationship under consideration (Ross and Croix, 1996). Volery and Mensik (1998)
claim that there is a lack of agreement on a suitable definition of trust; the relationship
between trust and alliance; and the confusion between trust, its antecedents and its
outcomes. Ring and Van de Ven (1994) noted that the concept of trust has become a
more significant issue for the study of inter-organisational relationships. Morgan and
Hunt (1994) conceptualize trust in a partnership as the degree of confidence that each
partner has on the integrity and reliability of one another. Zand (1972) refers to trust
as the willingness of one person to become vulnerable to the actions of another person
whose behaviour he or she could not control, thus the party is confident that the other
will not exploit the party's vulnerabilities (Ross and Croix, 1996). Blau (1964) sees
trust as "essential for stable social relationships." Sabel (1993) defined trust as the
mutual confidence that no party to an exchange will exploit another's vulnerabilities.
Barney and Hansen (1994) further developed Sabel's definition and claimed that an
exchange partner is trustworthy when it is worthy of the trust of others. Madhok
(1995) states that "trust is especially important in situations of uncertainty since, in its
presence, less stringent contracting can occur in the expectation that the social
dimensions of the relationship will occasion mutually desirable behavior." Ross and
Croix (1996) treated trust as either a personality trait or as a temporary state and
summarized the state of trust in three perspectives; motivational orientation
influencing trust, predictable behaviour engendering trust and trust consisting of a
problem-solving orientation. They further suggest that the short-term benefits of
mutually upholding trust usually outweigh the short-term losses if one party does
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violate trust. A minimal level of trust appears to be necessary for any negotiated
transaction to take place.
Ring and Van de Ven (1992) claim that relational norms (e.g. continuity expectations,
flexibility and information exchange), considered equitable by the partner firms, lead
to future expectations of trust. Trust may also reduce risk and opportunistic behaviour
between JV partners (Hebert , 1994; Chiles and McMackin, 1996; Beamish and
Banks, 1987). According to Choi and Lee (1997), risk can be covered by the use of
intermediate forms of governance based on interparty trust instead of market or
hierarchy modes, whilst industries are in a formative stage or the changing business
environments are blurred. Aulakh et al. (1996) suggest that trust, in inter-
organisational exchanges, is an important deterrent to opportunistic behaviour, a
substitute for hierarchical governance and for the achievement of behavioural and
market performance. For transactions involving long-term relations and social
embeddedness, the hybrid mode of JV control could be superior to hierarchy in
generating trust and discouraging opportunism (Granovetter, 1985), thus favouring
efficiency of JVs (Beamish and Banks, 1987). Based on trust, JV firms could reduce
information costs and time as well as the relaxation of controls between them.
In contractual relations, trust may reduce behavioural uncertainty, with the resulting
bounded rationality less harmful and less salient (Chiles and McMackin, 1996).
Additionally, contracts may be impossible to write in the absence of trust (Macaulay,
1963). Barney and Hansen (1994) classify three types of trust: weak form, semi-
strong form and strong form. The idea is that as trust emerges from prior contracts,
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through ongoing interaction, partners will learn and develop trust around norms of
equity, or "knowledge-based trust" (Shapiro, Sheppard, and Cheraskin, 1992).
Macaulay (1963) observed how close personal ties emerged between individuals as
organizations interacted with one another. These relationships, on the basis of trust,
in turn exert pressures for conformity to expectations. Similarly, Palay (1985) found
that relationships between rail-freight carriers and auto shippers were overlaid with
close interpersonal relationships among members in organizations. Then, he suggests
that these interpersonal relationships were a significant factor leading JV partners to
shift from the use of formal contracts to informal contracts, thus resulting in JV firms
experiencing lower transaction costs. Because of the development of these
relationships, such as forming an alliance of firms, formal contracts hardly spell out
every contingency (Koot, 1988). Parlche (1993) observed that the presence of a prior
history of cooperation between (JV) partners limited their perception of expected
opportunistic behaviour in new alliances, thus lowering the need for contractual
safeguards. Additionally, Frazier and Summers (1984) suggested the use of legalistic
measures may lead to higher conflict and termination of the partnerships eventually.
The results of an interview in the study by Frazier and Summers (1984) shows that
frequent reference to legal contracts by partners was perceived as a use of coercive
force, which in turn shows a lack of trust between the partners. The Chinese perceive
a legal approach for resolving conflict, as a relationship's failure and they object to it.
As a result they tend to be less trustful of legal documents but, instead, prefer personal
contacts (Lin 1996). Relational norms, e.g. flexibility, have been considered as an
alternative to "legalistic documents of organizing transactions" (Gundlach and Achrol,
1993).
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In a strong relationship, based on trust, partners tend to willingly negotiate to resolve
their conflicts or disagreements (Lin 1996; Anderson and Narus 1990). As partners
develop a positively collaborative relationship over time, and trust along with it, this
could block a shift in one partner's bargaining power. This could also alleviate the
dependency as one partner acquires more knowledge and skills. Larson (1992)
observed that firms not only rely on mechanisms of social control (as opposed to
formal contracts) in the formation and maintenance of JV, but that such relational
factors become increasingly important as the relationships between firms develop over
time. As firms enter long-term relationships such as joint venture, they tend to make
more use of the norms of sharing and commitment based on trust rather than resource-
based dependencies in order to exert authority (Lin, (1996). Inkpen's (1992) results in
Hebert (1994) showed that trust was correlated with openness in the relationship and
outcomes.
A good example of a stable and long-lasting relationship can be found in Toppan
Moore, a JV between Toppan Printing of Japan and Moore Corporation (Moore) of
Canada. Moore contributed manufacturing and product technologies whilst the
Japanese partner was responsible for sales, distribution and local marketing support.
Over time, the Japanese partner acquired the knowledge of production and was able to
develop the product itself This resulted in the Japanese company becoming less
dependent on its partner. With the intention of developing a long-term relationship on
the basis of trust, the joint venture business is still running smoothly, regardless of
which party holds power over the other. Granovetter's contention (1985) seems to
support the relationship of the above parties. He noted that for transactions involving
65
long-term relations and social embeddedness, the hybrid mode of JV control could be
superior to hierarchy in generating trust and discouraging opportunism.
Zand (1972) treated trust as stemming from past experience, mutually-compatible
goals and rewards and mutual fate if negotiations failed. Consistently, Zucker (1986)
indicates one factor which consistently results in trust, i.e. prior alliances between
firms. Saxton (1997) noted that "recent empirical work examining alliance dynamics,
links the extent to which firms have a prior relationship, to the trust between partners,
the propensity to continue to engage with that firm and the structural mechanisms
used to control behavior." Ring and Van de Ven (1989) and Gulati (1995) further
support the view that two firms with prior alliances are likely to trust each other more
than other firms with whom they have had no alliance. Parkhe (1993) found that a
prior history of co-operation limited partners' perception of expected opportunistic
behaviour in new alliances. Strong and Weber (1998) noted that trust develops as a
positive attitude about partners' behaviour, which will be influenced by positive
experience. Glaister and Buckley (1999) discuss that "experience can thus engender
trust among partners, which in turn can limit the transaction costs associated with
future alliances." Additionally, the frequency of similar transactions may affect the
level of trust between JV partners, which in turn influences their performance.
Nevertheless, without past business experience, trust between partners early in a joint
venture relationship is quite difficult to achieve and not to be expected. Therefore,
firms' reputation will be an important consideration in selection of prospective JV
partners, as well as an effective check on likely ex-post opportunism and overcoming
the temptations to renege or renegotiate (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). Strong and
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Weber (1998) noted that in deciding whether to trust someone, individuals tend to
gather information about the reputation, history and values of the person they are
judging before making a judgment. This also applies to the methods used by either
JV partner to enhance trust between one another at the formation of JV and its
ongoing negotiation.
Hosmer (1995) stated that individual trust can aggregate into an organizational
variable that influences the social and ethical behaviour of firms. He also developed
four behavioural definitions of trust, namely: individual expectation, interpersonal
relationships, economic transactions and social structures. Trust, with reciprocal
expectation of behaviour, exists between individuals and can be extended to
exchanges between organisations, as inter-organisational relationships are managed
by individuals in each organization (Hosmer, 1995).
Simiar (1982) studied the causes of failures, problems and mistrust in 29 Iran-based
IJVs. His results show that cultural differences and goal incongruence (e.g. the desire
of JV partners to assume dominant control) lead partners to experience mistrust and
conflicts. Sullivan and Peterson (1982) indicate that Japanese managers perceived
greater future trust in Japanese-American JVs when they (the Japanese) were in
charge of the venture; when interpersonal relationships between parent-firm managers
were good; when the JV was profitable and when they assume a dominant power
position and control over partners in strategically important decisions. These findings
suggest that the local partner tends to exhibit high levels of trust. Nevertheless, the
study ignored perceptions in the perspective of American managers.
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This study attempts to place the concept of trust into a comprehensive framework as it
relates to negotiation behaviour and outcomes (see the description of the relationships
between these variables, under the heading of trust as a determinant of negotiation
behaviour and outcomes). Building upon previous models of trust, two significant
factors were proposed to create and indicate the levels of trustworthiness between
joint venture partners, namely: firm's reputation and past experience.
3.3 The concept of culture
Lin (1996) points out that although a few studies have been undertaken on the subject
of cultural negotiation, a consensus on its definition has not yet been reached. He
further suggests that past research has not been able to construct a systemic
framework of national cultural dimension, as it affects the negotiation process.
According to Hawrysh and Zaichkowsky (1989), culture means different things in
different contexts. Ajiferuke and Boddewyn (1970) define culture as the "attitudes,
beliefs and values of a society" or "customs, laws and traditions of society".
Gudykunst (1991) refers to culture as the "system of knowledge". Lewicki et al.
(1994) posit culture as "the shared values and beliefs of a group of people." Culture
seems to become problematic when business is negotiated across borders. Lewicki et
al. (1994) describe culture as a critical factor JV partners face when negotiating across
borders. In the past, most literature on cross-cultural studies seems to focus on
national culture. National culture refers to the values, beliefs and assumptions,
learned in early childhood, that distinguish one group of people from another
(Hofstede, 1994). Kozan (1997) notes that culture is not treated as a unique case but
belongs to either a broader cultural category or multi-dimensional culture space.
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Bleeke and Ernst (1993) find that cross-border joint ventures are not as problematic as
joint ventures between companies with strong and weak cultures or with asymmetric
financial ownership. Hofstede (1994), whose works significantly influence a pattern
of cultural study, represents culture in four derived dimensions: power distance,
individualism/collectivism, uncertainty avoidance and masculinity/femininity. He
later included a fifth dimension, long-term orientation.
Power distance means the concentration of "authority, influence power and equality in
the culture" (Swierczek and Hirsch, 1994). According to Hofstede (1994), cultures
with greater power distance tend to have decision making concentrated at the top of
the organization. Furthermore, all strategically important decisions will be finally
decided by the leader. In organisations, power distance is related to the amount of
formal hierarchy or level of the involvement with management decision-making
(Swierczek and Hirsch, 1994). The result of Hofstede's (1994) study shows that
USA, Great Britain, Germany, Netherlands, New Zealand and Australia are the
countries with the lowest power distance whilst Thailand, Belgium and Japan have
high power distance values. Therefore, small power distance countries like USA
prefer to work with each other, rather than working with larger power distance
cultures, like Thailand, where some degree of arbitrariness regarding authority,
hierarchy, special privileges and power are accepted as a fact of life and are often
personalised (Komin, 1995).
Uncertainty avoidance refers to the tolerance or acceptance of ambiguity and risk, or
the reduction of chance factors. It is related to the need for stability, conflict
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reduction, formalization, standardization and time horizon. People preferring high
levels of uncertainty avoidance tend to avoid tense situations. They might set up
formal bureaucratic rules or rely on rituals and standards and trust only friends and
family. Low uncertainty avoidance people are comfortable with ambiguous situations
and accept more risk (Hendon et al., 1998). According to Barkema and Vermeulen
(1997) "people from low uncertainty avoidance countries feel more attracted to
flexible, ad hoc structures which leave lots of room for improvisation and
negotiation."
Individualism/collectivism is related to the individual's own needs, goals,
achievements and satisfactions, as opposed to the social group's norms and benefits.
More description on individualism and collectivism will be given under the heading
of Thai vs. Western culture, below.
Masculinity is related to the basic dichotomy between the rational, achievement,
independence, aggressive, success driven task orientation. It represents the degree to
which people prefer values of success and competition over modesty and concern for
others (Barkema and Vermeulen, 1997). On the other hand, femininity involves the
emotional, affiliation, passive, relationship orientation. Long-term oriented culture is
associated with a concern for patience, perseverance, thrift, future, having a sense of
shame, a sense of obedience and duty towards the larger good and respect for one's
elders and ancestors. Barkema and Vermeulen (1997) describe people from a long-
term oriented culture as "knowing many truths and having a thrift for investment."
Therefore; they tend to be dynamic in their thinking. Alternatively, short-term
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oriented culture stresses small savings with little for investment, reciprocal favours
(Swierczek and Hirsch 1994; Hofstede 1994; Newman and Nollen 1996; Hendon et al
1998.; Ross 1999). Barkema and Vermeulen (1997) found the effect of long-term
oriented culture was stronger than any other cultural dimensions. Lewicki et al.
(1994) summarize four additional approaches to explain the way that culture
influences international negotiation; culture as learned behaviour, as shared values, as
dialectic and culture in context.
Barkema and Vermeulen (1997) separate culture into two critical functions. One is to
solve the problems of external adaptation, which are influenced by attitudes of
uncertainty avoidance and long-term orientation. The other is to solve problems of
international integration, influenced by attitudes towards power distance,
individualism or masculinity. Morris et al. (1998) claim that members of the same
culture tend to share a set of values acquired in the process of socialization. Cultural
distance can be defined at national and corporate levels (Makino and Beamish, 1998).
At the corporate level, cultural distance has often been investigated in terms of
difference in core business, management practices, decision making process, need and
learning capabilities between alliance partners (Killing, 1983).
Sawyer and Geutzkow (1965) note that bargainers from different nations have
different negotiation styles. Lewicki et al. (1994) argue that people from different
cultures negotiate differently and suggest culture as one explanation of differences in
cross-border negotiation. According to Robert and Paul (1995) cultural dissimilarity
can produce "divergent negotiating styles shaped by each nation's culture, geography,
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history and political system". They also suggest that no one can negotiate without
bringing along cultural assumptions, images, prejudices or other attitudinal baggage.
Hendon et al. (1998) argue that negotiations can easily break down because of cultural
misunderstanding. They then suggest eight more factors (in addition to Hofstede's
(1994) cultural dimension) leading to understanding of the negotiating styles of
partners, namely: purpose, issues, protocol, communications, arguments, trust, time
and decision making. Tung (1982) argues that culture plays a significant, dual role in
the determination of success or failure of commercial negotiation. The results of her
survey show that Chinese and Japanese negotiators have a considerable difference in
negotiation style and behaviour to that of US executives. Moreover, her survey
showed that an awareness of cultural differences was not thought to be an important
factor in influencing successful negotiation, even though a number of senior
executives perceived that differences in negotiation styles were a major cause of
negotiation failure. Therefore, she concluded that an awareness of cultural differences
in bargaining styles was necessary, but not a sufficient condition on its own, for a
successful commercial negotiation. Similarly, Graham and Sano (1984) found that
the Taiwanese and the Americans have similar cultural traits, both quite different from
the Japanese. Executives from US and Japan share the same agreement that
preparation and planning skill, integrity and the ability to perceive and execute power
are important negotiator traits.
Western negotiators have recently paid much more attention to the cultural mystery of
Asian countries. Its significant influence on the business negotiation process has
existed since trade between East and West began. Naturally, negotiators from East
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and West tend to stress their own cultural traits and to evaluate and judge the
behaviour of other parties by their own value yardsticks and the way they themselves
may respond in a similar situation (Gudykunst, 1991). They don't recognize how a
difference in culture could affect their joint venture business negotiation. Historically,
many joint venture businesses have failed because cultural misunderstanding has
blocked their business path. Hall (1959) noted that "culture hides much more than it
reveals, and strangely enough what it hides, it hides most effectively from its own
participants". A lack of awareness as regards negotiators acting naturally according to
the dictates of their own cultural premises can be linked to the Western view of the
cultural unconscious (Barnlund 1989; Hall 1976). Accordingly, it would be a
significant step forward in reducing a shortfall of successful businesses, if one could
be aware and understand the role of culture.
Generally speaking, firms do begin expanding business internationally in countries
that are psychically close before venturing to more distant countries (Johanson and
Vahlne, 1992). If this description is accurate, then British companies would be
expected to begin their negotiation ventures first in European countries, due to
similarity in their business culture before moving forward into Asian countries or
America. Developed from Hofstede's (1980) study, Swierczek and Hirsch (1994)
claim that Japan, USA, UK, Germany and France would be the most likely joint
venture partner in Asia due to their cultural compatibility. According to Anderson
and Weitz (1989) cultural similarity promotes communication between business
partners. Therefore, it tends to be easier for partners who come from the same region
or use the same language to better understand the logic and style of strategic
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negotiation. This may, in turn, lead negotiating firms to be able to reach an agreement
more quickly and with lower transaction costs. On the other hand, the presence of
dissimilarities between parent firms' national and corporate culture may be more
likely to influence the difference in parent firms' objectives and issues for an
international joint venture negotiation. Difference also influences their approaches to
coordination, conflict resolution, negotiating tactics and strategy implementation
(Sullivan and Peterson, 1982; Geringer 1988). Glaister and Buckley (1999) note that
similar cultural values can reduce misunderstanding between partners whilst the
culturally distant alliance experiences greater difficulty in their interactions and
communications. In contrast, Park and Ungson (1997) find that cross border JVs with
partners from culturally distant countries last longer and are less likely to be
terminated than are domestic joint ventures partnerships. Many researchers have
suggested that operating and negotiating business with countries which are
psychically close can reduce the level of uncertainty firms face in the new market
(Johanson and Vahlne, 1992). This implies that there exists a greater chance of
achieving successful outcomes for firms starting their business operation abroad in
psychically close countries. Psychic distance or cultural distance has become more
and more important in recent years and is one of the major concerns of firms
negotiating and operating business abroad. Psychic distance can also include factors
preventing or disturbing information exchange between parties at the negotiating
table, including differences in the level of education; business language; cultural and
local language; negotiating style and skill and business practices (Nordstrom and
Vahlne, 1992). For example, because of an understanding of the importance of
'cultural equidistant', top managers of Japanese firms, such as Casio, always gather
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information directly from each of their primary markets and discuss together monthly
to revise and adapt strategies for global product development (Ohmae, 1994).
Later studies by Kogut and Singh (1988) rely on Hofstede's (1980) research and then
cultural distance was used as a synonym and proxy for psychic distance. Cultural
distance refers to "the extent to which a culture is seen as different from one's own"
(Rao and Schmidt, 1998). Later, Nordstrom and Vahlne (1992) view psychic distance
as cultural, structural (e.g. legal and administrative systems) and language differences.
In contrast to other studies, O'Grady and Lane (1995) suggest that entering a country
which is psychically close to home, may result in poor performance, outcome and,
possibly, failure. They refer to this as the psychic distance paradox. The results of
Kogut and Singh's (1988) study showed that the greater the cultural distance between
the home country of the foreign investor and the host country, the more likely it was
that the firm would choose a joint venture to reduce its uncertainty in those markets.
As joint venture business becomes a more and more significant and popular strategy
choice by partnering firms, it is therefore strategically important for negotiating
parties to try to recognize and understand each other's cultural traits as well as
accepting them where necessary. Moreover, misunderstanding of culture can lead to
negotiation conflict, e.g. U.S. managers err in reading silence, (an indirectly expressed
objection) from Asian partners, as an indication of consent (Graham and Sano 1984).
As a contrast, Asian partners interpret the direct adversarial argument of the U.S.
counterpart as indicating unreasonableness and lack of respect (Morris et al. 1998).
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According to Johnson and Scholes (1993), the cultural web is a useful conceptual tool
for analysing culture through the separate elements of the web and understanding the
way in which core beliefs and assumptions - the paradigm [or ideational culture; a
mind set; an interpretative scheme; a recipe], linked to political, symbolic and
structural aspects of the organisation, guide and constrain the development of strategy.
They separate the cultural web of an organisation into six aspects, namely: rituals and
routines, stories, symbols, power structures, control systems and organisational
structures. The routines of an organisation are the value activities conducted in
delivering the organisation's strategies. Rituals are the special circumstances through
which the organisation stresses something important. Symbols are an important
means of understanding the types of behaviour which are expected in the organisation.
Organisational structures preserve the core beliefs of the organisation and are
important to the successful implementation of strategy. Control systems help to
understand an organisation's paradigm. Power is a key force which shapes
organisatino culture and accrues to those perceived able to reduce uncertainty in the
organisation.
However, the cultural web seems to explain links between organizational culture and
the development of (new) strategy, managing strategic change, and sustaining the
paradigm of organisation, rather than clarifying how cultural differences and
misunderstandings could affect JV partners whilst negotiating joint business at
formation stage and carrying out day-to-day management. As a result, cultural web is
less relevant to the study of the influence of culture on negotiation behaviour and
(performance) outcomes and is not taken into consideration on this research study.
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Table 3-2
Model of national cultural dimensions
Disciplines Authors Dimensions
Sociology Parsons & Shils
(1951)
Affectivity versus affective neutrality
Self versus collectivity
Universalism versus particularism
Ascription versus diffuseness
Anthropology Kluckhohn & Strodbeck
(1961)
Man and nature
Man and himself
Ralationship between humans
Time
Human activity
Social psychology Inkeles & Levinson
(1969)
Relation to authority
Conception of self
Primary dilemmas of conflict
Organization study Hofstede
(1980,1994)
Individualism
Power distance
Uncertainty avoidance
Masculinity
long-term	 orientation	 (or	 confucian
dynamism)
Cross-cultural psychology Chinese culture connection
(1987)
Moral discipline
Integration
Human heartedness
Confucian work dynamics
Source: Adapted from Lin, Xiaohua (1996) "Joint venture ongoing negotiation: Approaches,
relational antecedents, and influence of national culture." Ph.D. thesis
3.3.1 Thai vs. Western culture
To understand how Thai and Western cultures may differ in their outlook and
perception, one should start by investigating the family and socialization process of an
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individual. The fundamental differences in the ways of life and negotiating styles
between Thai and Western negotiators could shed some light on inter-cultural
communication in the negotiation process. It is common in Thailand for a
businessperson to ask a new graduate during a job interview about his or her family
background, for example "Who is your father?" or "What is your surname?". If it is
ascertained that the father of the new graduate is a senior government officer who
works in a powerful department, is a big businessman or celebrity, it is likely that this
new graduate will have a better chance to get a job offer than others who have the
same qualification. This confirms that the identity and status of the family play a
significant role in Thai society. This, in turn, may have an impact on business
negotiation at the work place. Whereas in the West a new graduate is of primary
importance due to his own capability and ability. A child in the west is normally
trained to make his or her own decisions and often does not have to consider other
than immediate family whilst a child in Thai and Chinese societies tends to rely on
parents and have to consider extended families, religions, communities and social
classes when he or she is growing up. Thais and Chinese are protected by the group
and are expected to act in the group's best interests.
For Thais and Chinese, homocentric conception, characterized as collectivism, plays
an important role, whilst egocentric conception known as individualism dominates
Western society. According to Newman and Nollen (1996), individualism-
collectivism is "the extent to which identity derives from the self versus the
collectivity". Lodge and Vogel (1987) argue that individualism is closely associated
with the idea of equal opportunity and the notion of contract, which are used to bind
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firms together as partnerships. At the organization level, the individual Westerner is
manifested as autonomous, with individual responsibility for results, individual job
design and individual-level performance rewards (Swierczek and Hirsch, 1994).
Collective management practices concentrate on work unit solidarity and team-based
rewards. Newman and Nollen's (1996) results show that in individualistic national
cultures, performance was higher when managers emphasized individual employee
contribution, whereas in collectivistic cultures, performance was higher in work units
with less individual employee emphasis. The performance of firms will be more
interesting for research when both individualistic and collectivistic partners work
together through a joint venture.
Chen (1996) observes that in individualistic culture, initiative is admired, while
conformance is expected in collectivistic culture. Kozan (1997) argues that
individualistic culture, which is high in uncertainty avoidance, tends to rely on
bureaucratic means to reduce disagreement or conflict. According to Gudykunst
(1991), "People in individualistic cultures are likely to be universalistic and apply the
same value standards to all". Hendon et al. (1998) argue that people in individualistic
cultures tend to put tasks before relationships and to value independence highly.
People in collectivistic cultures, in contrast, tend towards a particular type of
behaviour (particularistic behaviour) and, therefore, apply different value standards
for members of their ingroups and outgroups. Ingroups represent a group whose
norms, goals, and values shape the behaviour of its members, whilst outgroups are a
group whose goals are unrelated, inconsistent or opposed to those of ingroups (Chen,
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1996). Hendon et al. (1998) note that collectivist cultures maintain the integrity of
groups and incline to cooperation. Conflict avoidance and conformity dominate the
culture. Similarly Chen et al. (1998) state that collectivistic members have a stronger
group identity, more group accountability, better communication, work more closely
with one another and aim to achieve collective objectives and goals. There seems to
be more cooperation among collectivists than individualists.
As each culture develops different value norms, the Thais and Chinese tend to place
emphasis on tradition and stability, whereas Westerners cherish creativity and change.
Komin (1995) suggests that Americans appear to focus on self-actualization, ambition
and achievement. Thais downplay personal values, as self-control and politeness
place an emphasis on relationships and `other-directed' social interaction values. In
Japan, people who are collectivistic tend to be highly creative but on the whole are
culturally oriented towards group behaviour rather than individual eccentricity (Chen,
1996). The guiding norm for individualistic society is competition, while mutual
dependence is emphasized in homocentric society. The social unit of egocentric
society is the person, while of homo centric society it is the group, the guild, the tribe,
the city and the organization. As the goal of an individual in an egocentric
environment is to find true self-creativity in the enhancement of material welfare,
therefore, an individual is likely to fight for his own rights in pursuit of justice, not to
focus on mutual interests. Because individualism places emphasis on independence
and self-reliance, people can be isolated, lonely and alien as well as resisting the
formation of inter-personal relationships. Collectivists in homocentric society prefer
to be preoccupied with 'high-context communication' (widely shared information
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dependant on non-verbal communication) while the individualist in egocentric society
is more attuned to low-context communication' (information communicated
verbally) (Gudykunst and Ting-Toomey 1988; Hofstede 1994). This implies that the
collectivist is sensitive to situational features and explanations and tends to attribute
the behaviour of others to the context, situation or other factors external to the
individual whilst the individualist is sensitive to dispositional characteristics internal
to the individual (Chen, 1996). In addition, Hubbard (1999) notes that high-context
culture negotiators tend to negotiate indirectly, relying on cues in the social context to
communicate important messages whilst low-context negotiators find this confusing
and tend to negotiate in a direct manner and deal with conflict through direct
confrontation.
In short, although the negotiating approach of Thai and Western negotiators is
different, communicative processes and behavioural patterns can change in
accordance with their goal orientations. This implies that one-off business negotiation
of Thais is prone to the transactional approach. Western negotiators will also move
towards the relational approach if they appreciate and recognize the value of
relationships. However, it is noteworthy that if one party tries to change its behaviour
to be like the other party, the process is likely to fail. Cross-cultural negotiators
should not aim to reverse role play but rather experience and make allowances for
cultural nuances at play (Chen, 1996).
The present study is built on Hofstede's (1994) study of the cultural dimensions which
affect negotiation behaviour and outcomes. He emphasized four cultural dimensions
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which influence negotiation behaviour and outcomes. These are power distance, the
cultural differences where individualism and collectivism predominate, uncertainty
avoidance and masculinity/femininity. Yeh and Lawrence (1995) propose that a fifth
cultural dimension, labelled long-term orientation (or confucian dynamism) by
Hofstede (1994), should be included within the descriptive and explanatory power of
the original four dimensions above. Yeh and Lawrence (1995) argue that the fifth
cultural dimension reflects the same underlying cultural values as individualism and
should therefore not be treated as a separate dimension. As a result, the long-term
orientation is excluded from this study.
Although each cultural dimension has an impact on negotiation behaviour and
outcomes, individualism/collectivism and power distance dimensions are more
relational than others. Strong and Weber (1998) argue that uncertainty avoidance
tends to be an individualized cognitive attribute and not necessarily related to attitudes
about the role of self and group. They also suggest that gender identity is related to
the types of rewards but not to distribution of rewards.
3.4 The concept of negotiation
3.4.1 Negotiation definition
Rubin and Brown (1975) claim that negotiation is "a process whereby two or more
parties attempt to settle what each shall give and take, or perform and receive in a
transaction between them". According to Pruitte (1981), negotiation is a process of
moving toward agreement by searching for new alternatives and making concessions.
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Pruitt and Carnevale (1993) argue that negotiation is a way of dealing with social
conflict. Cohen (1980) contends that negotiation is a process whereby parties try to
achieve respective desires through discourse and interaction. Chen (1996) suggests
that "negotiation is an aspect of human activity influenced by the cultural behaviour
of societies". Hodgetts and Luthams (1994) posit that "negotiation is the process of
bargaining with one or more parties for the purpose of arriving at a solution that is
acceptable to all". Thompson (1990) states that "negotiation is a pervasive and
important form of social interaction". Mintzberg (1973) refers to negotiation as one
of the primary decision-making managerial roles. Robert and Paul (1995) refer to
negotiation as "the process by which at least two parties try to reach an agreement on
matters of mutual interest." Pruitt (1981) also argues that negotiation involves joint
actions where negotiating partners need to act on certain social norms that prescribe
appropriate behaviour in this social encounter. Negotiations are two-way
communications involving exchange of information (Gulliver 1979).
3.4.2 Negotiation process
Basic steps that can be used in managing the negotiation process are planning,
interpersonal relationship building, exchanging task-related information, persuasion
and agreement. First, planning concerns the identification of objectives and
exploration of the possible options by negotiators. Research shows that the more the
number of options, the higher the chances of negotiation success. Negotiators should
also place emphasis on the setting of limits on single-point objectives, dividing issues
into short and long term considerations and determining the sequence in which to
discuss the various issues. Secondly, the negotiation process involves getting to know
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negotiating partners in order to decide who is reasonable or who is not. Third is task-
related information. Each negotiating group sets forth its position on the crucial
negotiation issues. These positions, however, might change later during the
negotiation process. It is important for negotiators to find out what their counterparts
want to attain and what they are prepared to give up. Fourth, the persuasion step.
Successful persuasion depends on how well negotiators understand each other's
position, the ability of each to identify areas of similarity and differences, the ability
to create new options and the willingness to work toward a solution. Lastly, the
agreement stage is the granting of concessions and the hammering out of a final
agreement (Hodgetts and Luthams, 1994).
A number of joint venture negotiations fail during the negotiation process or shortly
after an agreement has been reached. Misunderstanding of business culture and
unclear communication, as well as the cultural style of negotiation, are some of the
reasons for failure. To enhance an effective outcome, each negotiating party is
recommended to do their homework by studying each other's ways of doing business,
culture, negotiating style and background. Also, during the negotiation process,
negotiating parties should aim to compromise and anticipate possible conflict so that
progress may be agreed earlier, rather than trying to win every point and achieve their
own goals without listening to the other party. Performance outcomes of negotiation
are rarely noticeable soon after an agreement has been reached. Accordingly, Western
partners should not fully expect that agreements will result in positive outcomes
during the early stage of joint venture business. Instead, they should prepare to be
more flexible within an agreed contract. Thais believe that dynamic change in
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business could make an agreed contract out of date. Therefore, trust seems to be an
important factor as a means of entering business with Thai firms. Thais belief that
once a relationship is built strongly, then conflict between partners can be solved
easily. This may in turn result in IJV firms reaching a more successful outcome.
3.4.3 The psychology of Thai negotiation
Chen (1996) point outs that the purpose of negotiating parties is to reach an
agreement. Negotiators may be more able to use and adopt methods, negotiating
strategy, tactics, behaviour and style, if they share a similar culture. To be able to
achieve effective outcomes, they may need to understand how their counterparts
negotiate and perceive diverse cultural backgrounds and norms. Thai negotiating
style may be an enigma to Western parties who tend to judge and perceive on the
basis of their own value norms. The Chinese art of negotiation plays a significant role
when Thais negotiate with their Western counterparts. It would be useful and wise for
Western negotiators to learn Thai beliefs, thought, ways of doing business, cultural
traits and taboos. Chinese and Thai geomancy have a psychological influence on
some Thai partners in their business negotiations. Westerners tend to believe in the
basis of scientific proof rather than superstition. However, to reach an agreement and
effective outcome with the Thai partner, it is recommended that Western negotiators
should appreciate and understand Thai cultural traits and beliefs. The Confucian and
Buddhist views tend to shape Thai behaviour according to the bases of harmony,
honesty and patience in any inter-personal relationships. Accordingly, confrontational
behaviour is not likely to be a first option implemented during the negotiation process.
These views have also been shared by Japanese and Chinese. Thais and Chinese view
business relationships as a means of reciprocity of right and mutuality of obligations
rather than trying to gain advantage at the expense of the other. Westerners normally
tend to make a deal on the short-term benefits and think about business as competition
while Thais believe that inter-personal relationships or connections should be
cultivated while dealing with business negotiation. This relational style of negotiation
on the long-term basis is opposed to Westerners who prefer the transactional
approach. Following the relational approach to negotiation, negotiators tend to form
friendships or relationship first and leave the goal of striking or finalization of a deal
for the next step. Therefore, it is not uncommon to hear Thai negotiators asking after
the other negotiators' health or well-being, children's education, community
happenings or general welfare before moving to the issues of negotiation. Negotiating
in Thailand can be comparable to getting married. It involves the whole range of
relationships, not just transactions. When negotiating on the basis of the long-term
business relationship in the Thai or Chinese style, it is not so much the winning and
losing which are important, but the giving and taking. According to this Thai view,
current loss could be regained and offset in the future when the business
transaction/negotiation is repeated.
Thais prefer to compromise rather than dispute in an issue which produces
disagreement. Because Thais place great emphasis on the long-term business
relationship, mutuality, reciprocity and inter-dependence, they prefer to sacrifice
whenever possible for mutual benefit. In other words, preserving a friendship and
relationship is more significant than short-term gains. As the Western negotiator is
generally trained in terms of winning concessions, with the spirit of competitiveness
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dictating against compromises or close relationship, it is recommended that both
parties should adapt their negotiating strategies to be more rationally flexible, while
discussing cross-cultural negotiation. The Thai strong belief in flexibility leads them
to prefer changeable terms and conditions in the dynamic and changing environment.
There is a similarity between Thais and Chinese styles in contractual matters. They
both prefer to agree on the general principles and broad terms rather than on rigid and
specific details. Therefore, a "memorandum of understanding" or a "document of
intent" seems to be a preferable choice for Thais and Chinese. Western negotiators
should also understand that a firm agreement, providing too rigid a contract, could
lead to commercial negotiation failure because Thais often view written contracts as a
lack of trust. Japanese have a similar perception as Thais in this respect. Thais believe
that as long as the relationship and friendship exist, most things could easily be
negotiated and adjusted. Thais and Chinese share a similar cultural belief that the
contract is only a piece of paper, rather than an important document that can be used
to sue their counterparts in the courts for justice, when things go wrong. Western
negotiators have suggested that, as long as the regulations and legal system in
developing countries like Thailand is not so strong as in Western countries, recourse
to law will cost them a lot in terms of time and money if they have to enforce a
contract against their Thai counterparts. The Thai view is that they should place
greater stress on ethic, morals and a relationship based on trust so that they don't have
to resort to enforcing a contract.
There are limitations on human rationality, called "bounded rationality" by
Williamson (1975)). As a result, negotiating firms could reach an agreement more
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easily if they would stop thinking about writing every possible detail into a
contractual agreement. This, in turn, could result in lower transaction costs and less
negotiating time. This does not mean that negotiators should reach an agreement
without signing any contracts but that the negotiator should place more emphasis on
the relationship and, in doing so, leave the contract to one side.
The Language that is most often used in international business negotiation tends to be
English. Because of the fear of losing face, avoiding offence, trying to please and not
rocking the boat, according to the Thai concept of "Krieng Jai", Thais tend to say
"yes" even if the communication was not understood or when Thais mean "no" or
"uncertain". Therefore, to avoid any misunderstanding between negotiating parties
that might lead them to frustration, irritation, bruised feelings and annoyance, Western
negotiators should be patient and put greater effort into trying to interpret the real
meaning and open more cross-cultural communication at the negotiating table with
Thais. It is also important for both negotiating parties, during business conversation,
to be mindful of the underlying cultural factors (e.g. language) and nuances lest they
distort reality. Chen (1996) suggests that the best guidance to interpret the meaning of
ambiguous and indirect behaviour in the communication process is to rely on the
negotiators' intuition. Alternatively, the use of a trusted third-party is perceived as
one of the best ways.
3.4.4 Negotiation in the Thai network
The role of connections and inter-personal or inter-firm relationships greatly influence
joint venture business negotiation through their affect on trust. Western negotiators
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should understand that people who belong to the same club will be given direct credit
and benefit. However, if the relationships breaks down, the loss can have a snowball
effect. This can result in cheaters being expelled from the club. As relationships also
exist between club members, therefore, it is difficult for cheaters to enter business
negotiation with others club members. It also takes a lot more time and effort to try to
gain a positive relationship. If this relationship breaks down, it might never be
regained. Western negotiators should recognize the importance of these network
relationships to Thais in order to understand the hidden dimension with regard to the
existence of inter-personal relationships during the negotiation process.
It is difficult to do business with Thai people, using transactional approach. A
Western negotiator, who thinks that he can just move to another partner if negotiation
with one Thai partner goes wrong, will have to revise his strategy. In Thai business
society, school and business ties are cohesive and play a significant role within and
between networks. Some of them possess a characteristic of family business. In
business networks, looking closely, all the big players may be found to have known
and operated business with each other for a long period of time. For example, in one
family, parents at the centre of the web, do business with their children and relatives,
then extend the business network to include friends. Relationships within webs are a
tool for business expansion. Once difficulties occur and negotiations fail, the story
spreads within and between the clubs/webs. As a result, having problems with one
partner is perceived and deemed to be against them all. Although this does not apply
to all networks in Thailand, Western negotiators should take this example into
consideration when negotiating or operating business with Thais. For foreign
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negotiators who have very little experience in relation to the business network in
Thailand, it is difficult to know whether or not the party that they negotiate with will
have a strong relationship with other potential negotiating parties.
3.4.5 Negotiation behaviour
A significant study of negotiation was carried out early on by economists and game
theorists Luce and Raiffa (1957) who developed mathematical models of rational
behaviour. However, the models still have limitations. They can be applied and used
only to a narrow set of tactics. Some general information and advice on negotiation
can be found in well-known books by Fisher and Ury (1981). Schelling (1960) and
Raiffa (1982) are widely recognised as having introduced a rational analysis, covering
a wide range of tactics, often used by negotiators and third parties. A further area of
kudy into negotiation behaviour and its outcomes has been developed by Pruitt
(1981).
Researchers of negotiation behaviour, e.g. sociologists, focus on describing how
negotiators or joint venture managers make decisions, how they behave, how they
think and how they rationalize choices to themselves. Thompson (1990) affirms that
such descriptive approaches explore the influence of individual characteristics and
styles, motivations and cognitive processes on negotiation behaviour and outcomes.
Researchers in more analytic fields, e.g. economics, advocate prescribing the way in
which negotiators or joint venture managers should improve decision making and how
they should behave, rather than how they actually do behave (Raiffa, 1982). Neale
and Bazerman (1992) suggest that very little interaction has occurred between both
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the descriptive and the prescriptive approaches and then argue that a useful model of
negotiation must include both description and prescription. According to past
research into two-party negotiations, negotiators are likely to be inappropriately
affected by the positive or negative frame in which risks are viewed (Neale and
Bazerman, 1985).
Negotiator behaviour (or conflict management style) is tactical. Partners attempt to
achieve objectives by gaining the other's compliance through the use of influencing
tactics. There are various tactical and strategic behaviours to handle conflicts of
interest or disagreements when negotiation take place. Deutsch (1973) focuses on a
single dimensional model ranging from selfishness (concern on self-oriented
outcomes) to cooperativeness (concern on the other partner's outcomes). Blake and
Mouton (1964) propose a two-dimensional model based on concern for people and
concern for production in order to resolve conflicts or disagreements. Partners'
behaviour can fall into two categories: cooperativeness and assertiveness (Kozan,
1997). Five distinct negotiation behaviours, or conflict styles, often used by
negotiating partners are collaboration, competition, accommodation, avoidance and
compromise.
JV partners use collaborative strategy (high in both cooperativeness and assertiveness)
to work for an integrated solution, considering the other's needs without
compromising one's own. Competing strategy (high in assertiveness) is used when
partners aim to dominate and attain their own needs without concern for the other's
needs. Catering for the needs of the other party whilst sacrificing one's own is
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perceived as an accommodating tactic (high in cooperativeness). Avoiding strategy
(low in both cooperativeness and assertiveness) is used to refrain from confrontation
between partners, thus disregarding the need of both self and other. The two values
most important to the Japanese are avoiding strategy and promotion of harmony
(Graham and Sano, 1989). Morris et al. (1998) note that Asian managers prefer to
avoid explicit discussion of negotiation conflict whilst U.S. managers tend towards
assertively competing styles. Partners implement compromising strategy (mid-point)
when searching to meet the other halfway (Thomas 1976; Rahim and Bonoma 1979;
Ritov and Drory 1996; Rao and Schmidt 1998; Kozan 1997). Kipnis and Schmidt
(1985) classify partner influencing tactics into three meta-categories, namely: hard;
soft; and rational. Pruitt (1983) suggests that integrative bargaining situations require
problem-solving behaviours (cooperation) to gain profit maximisation. Parkhe (1993)
claims that a significant behaviour in IJV management is conflict resolution.
According to Thompson (1990), cognitive reasoning ability may be necessary for
partners to reach integrated outcomes when using problem-solving behaviour. Pruitt
and Carnevale (1993) suggest three procedures to deal with the conflict of interest:
joint decision making; separate action; and third party decision making.
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Assertive
•
Unassertive
Competitive	 Collaborative
Sharing
(Compromising)
Avoidant	 Accommodative
The following figure 3-1 presents an illustration of negotiation strategies or tactics
used during partner's negotiation.
Figure 3-1
Kilmann-Thomas Conflict Orientations
Uncooperative .41__Ø, Cooperative
Source: Lewicki et al. (1994) Negotiation, IRWIN, Second Edition
Table 3-3
Categorizations of negotiation behaviour
Source Dimension Description
March & Simon
( 1958)
Problem solving
Persuasion
Bargaining
Politicking
Shared goals; mutual satisfying solution; information exchange
Attempt	 to	 alter	 other's	 perspective;	 moderate
	 information
exchange
Divergent objectives; Zero-sum orientation; gamesmanship
Signal of failure of interpersonal means; third party intervention
Blake & Mouton
(1964)
Problem solving
Smoothing
Forcing
Withdrawal
Sharing
Search alternatives acceptable to both by information exchange
Attempt to lessen degree of disagreements to prevent confrontation
Use power to make the other party comply
Avoid conflict by leaving the relationship
Give and lose by identifying a middle ground
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Source Dimension Description
Filley
(1975)
Win-Lose
Lose-Lose
Win-Win
Exercise of authority, power, majority rules, etc.
Compromise, arbitration, etc.
Consensus, integrative decision-making
Thomas
(1976)
Competitive
Collaborative
Sharing
Avoidance
Accommodating
Implicit or explicit use of threats and persuasion arguments
Develop solutions that integrate requirements of both parties
Develop a middle ground between initial positions of both parties
Ignore the existence of conflicts
Make adjustments to the other party's position
Frazier & Summers
(1984)
Promise
Threat
Legalistic Plea
Request
Information exchange
Recommend
Certify	 to	 extend	 specified	 reward	 contingent	 on	 target's
compliance
Inform target that failure to comply will result in negative sanctions
Contend that target compliance is required by formal agreement
Ask target to act without mention of subsequent sanction
Supply information with no specific action requested
Stress that specific action is needed
Pruitt & Carnevale
(1993)
Concession
Contending
Problem solving
Inaction
Withdrawal
Reduce one's goals, demands or offers
Persuade the other to concede or resist similar efforts by the other
Try to locate and adopt options that satisfy both parties' goals
Do nothing or as little as possible
Drop out of the negotiation
Source: Lin, Xiaohua (1996) "Joint venture ongoing negotiation: Approaches, relational
antecedents, and influence of national culutre." Ph.D. thesis
3.5 Determinants of negotiation behaviour
Bazerman and Carroll (1987) suggest three approaches which determine negotiation
behaviour, namely: individual differences; motivational and cognitive models. The
individual differences approach is an attempt to identify the stable characteristics of
partners which reliably affect their negotiation behaviour and performance. He also
claims that individual differences directly influence social behaviour. Past negotiation
literature considers individual differences in relationship orientation; cooperative and
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competitive behaviour; and gender role (Thompson, 1990). Staw and Ross (1985)
propose that individual differences in relation to negotiation behaviour may yield
more reliable relationships. Motivational models are the impact of aspirations and
goals on negotiation behaviour and outcomes. The cognitive approach suggests that
choices among alternative behavioural courses of action are determined by the
partners' judgement of the complex decision-making task (Bazerman and Carroll,
1987).
Thompson (1990) suggests that trait machiavellianism may not directly influence
negotiation behaviour but may instead interact with situational and task constraints to
influence performance. Neale and Bazerman's results (1983) show that negotiators
with high perspective-taking ability can persuade their opponents to settle close to
their reservation price and claim most of bargaining benefit for themselves.
In previous studies, many scholars in this field have identified several sets of factors
affecting negotiation behaviour that are different from those mentioned above,
including the issues of conflict; reciprocity - the reaction of partners to each other's
behaviour; nature of relationship; relational norms; relational commitment; relative
power; trust; and cultural distance. According to Lin (1996), all variables observed do
not equally influence partner's behaviour, as circumstances change. He claims that
the relationship, norms, commitment, power, culture and trust are perceivably more
critical and have a greater effect on negotiation behaviour and outcomes than
psychological factors, such as motivation and cognition. Lin and Germain (1998)
identify three determinants of negotiation behaviour to resolve conflict as follows:
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cultural similarity; relative power; and relationship age. Rao and Schmidt (1998) also
found that trust, cultural distance, time horizon, the absolute power of negotiators and
their conflict frames have an impact on or influence the tactics used in alliance
formation.
In order to clarify and complement the results of Lin (1996) and Lin and Germain
(1998) derived from statistical analysis of negotiation behaviour, as well as the past
results of many scholars, the present study has used qualitative case studies as the
method to examine the impact of trust, culture and bargaining power on negotiation
behaviour.
3.5.1 Bargaining power as a determinant of negotiation behaviour
Studies of negotiation behaviour, in relation to power, examine how two or more
parties try to resolve the conflicts of interest, by managing interdependencies or
allocating scarce resources among themselves, and how they implement their
negotiating tactics (Bacharach and Lawler, 1981). Mayer et al. (1995) argue that there
can be cooperation without trust, especially when one partner holds power over the
other. In contrast, Ganesan (1993) notes that a retailer (as client) is not likely to
implement a problem-solving strategy when s/he holds more power than a vendor (as
supplier). According to Friedmann and Beguin (1971), the greater the power JV
partners have, the more that lengthy problem-solving processes can be avoided and
the less likely partners are to implement compromising behaviour (Schaan, 1988). As
the relative power of one partner increases, compromising strategy, as conflict
resolution behaviour, becomes less important. Therefore, the partner who holds more
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power is less likely to propose middle ground or intermediate solutions, to implement
give and take strategic behaviour or to select alternatives that offer a fair combination
of gains and losses (Lin and Germain, 1998). According to Rubin and Brown (1975),
partners who possesses more power tend to implement hard tactics, e.g. sanctions,
threats or demands for concessions in negotiations.
Lin (1996) suggests that the restricted use of power may change as the long-term
relationship becomes a central concern. Rojot (1991) argues that "a balance of power
strongly in favour of one party will generally drive it towards a conflictual attitude".
However, the opposite view was given by Lin and Germain (1998), i.e. that an
imbalance of power encourages less integrative behaviour between partners when
disagreements need to be resolved. Dwyer and Walker (1981) found that an
imbalance in power leads the more powerful partner to engage in high demand,
coercive behaviour and less forthright communication, whilst a balance in power
induces partners to implement coordinative behaviour. Additionally, Frazier and
Summers (1986) note the favourable relationship between dealer dependence and
noncoercive behaviour, used by the manufacturer. This relationship became negative
when coercive strategy was implemented.
3.5.2 Trust as a determinant of negotiation behaviour
Scholars widely recognize the significance of trust, as an immediate antecedent to
cooperation (Kramer and Tyler, 1996). Trust is viewed as a determinant of the
functionality of conflict between partners (Morgan and Hunt, 1994). Pruitt and
Carnevale (1993) argue that trust is an aspect of relationships that constitutes another
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important antecedent to the negotiation process and behaviour. Rotter, Chance, and
Phares (1972) posit that "a generalized expectancy of trust or distrust can be an
important determinant of behaviour". Ross and Croix (1996) note that trust, as a
personality trait, was shown to be related to negotiation behaviour and should be
considered for empirical investigation. They also suggest that risk-taking behaviour
in a bargaining context is usually cooperative behaviour. Later, they conclude that
trust can become an antecedent for further risk-taking behaviour.
Although there have been numerous empirical researches, investigating the role of
trust on negotiation behaviour, little is known of how trust affects negotiation (Ross
and Croix, 1996). Unlike the laboratory-based work on negotiation, negotiation in
real business is often embedded in ongoing interpersonal and inter-group relationships
(Kramer and Messick, 1995). Kimmel et al. (1980) define trust (mistrust) as the belief
of involvement of partners in cooperative (not self-centered) behaviour. Madhok
(1995) proposes that bilateral adaptation in JVs provides incentive for partners to act
for mutual interest rather than self-interest. Cummings and Bromiley (1996) refer to
trust as 'self-interested behaviour' and belief in the social good of others. Jones states
that trustworthiness was developed as partners tend not to act opportunistically for
their own self-interest. Strong and Weber (1998) define trust as "actions and
behaviours that do not promote individual interests over the interests of the group,
accompanied by a positive attitude about the social behaviour of others." Pruitt
(1981) suggests that trust relationships encourage problem-solving and exchange of
information. Hofstede (1980) argues that even though trust may form in a variety of
ways, whether and how trust is established depends upon the societal norms and
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values that guide people's behaviour and beliefs. According to Greenhalgh and
Chapman (1995), negotiation behaviour is significantly influenced by the
characteristics of the relationship between partners. Therefore, a trusting relationship
between partners provides a fundamental context, in relation to conflict resolution and
negotiation behaviour, which should be treated as one of the focal concepts in
understanding negotiation. Past research shows a favourable relationship between
trust and the negotiation behaviour of partnering firms in the form of information
exchange, self-disclosures and cooperative problem-solving (Zand 1972; Pruitt 1981;
Lin 1996).
The concept of trust/distrust as an individual difference factor has a close likeness to
the concept of social value orientation (cooperation), defined as a predisposition to be
cooperative or competitive (McClintock 1978; Ross and Croix 1996). The trusting
partner may use a frame of mutual gain whilst the distrustful partner may use a frame
of individualistic losses. This is closely related because partners who view mutual
gain from negotiation tend to make more concessions whilst partners who view
negotiation in terms of losses will be more competitive (Neale and Bazerman 1985;
Ross and Croix 1996). Butler (1999) argues that integrative orientations towards a
win-win strategy tend to be stimulated by trust, as opposed to distributive orientations
(win-lose strategy) that are likely to be motivated by mistrust. He further suggests
that opportunistic behaviour, striving for competitive advantage, is likely to be
motivated by mistrust and accompanied by the distributive assumption of zero-sum
games; whilst cooperative behaviours tend to be stimulated by trust and the
integrative assumption of positive-sum games. Ross and Croix (1996) note that low
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trusters are highly sensitive to competitive messages from partners but insensitive to
cooperative messages.
According to Pruitt (1981), cooperative behaviour by partners tends to be an
important source of trust. Kinmel et al. (1980) found that a high incidence of
competitive behaviour existed with a combination of high limit and low trust.
Partners with highly competitive behaviour tend to devise more effective negotiation
tactics when the other is predictable, than when the other uses unpredictable
behaviour (Ross and Croix, 1996). This is viewed as a form of trust, grounded in
predictability (Shapiro et al., 1992). Ross and Croix (1996) further suggest that less
trust between partners results in the uncooperative partner turning to uncooperative
behaviour when receiving an uncooperative signal from the other.
Tjosvold and Sasaki (1996) in Ross and Croix (1996), found a positive relationship
between trust and the problem-solving approach. Friedman (1993) notes that without
trust, the parties tend not to be able to achieve successful integrative bargaining. He
also found that trust is correlated with the problem-solving approach which in turn is
useful for successful integrative bargaining. Ross and Croix (1996) later suggest that
trust is not necessary but is desirable for integrative bargaining to occur and also trust
may be necessary to conclude an agreement.
3.5.3 Culture as a determinant of negotiation behaviour
According to Barkema and Vermeulen (1997), "an international joint venture implies
that a firm has to cooperate with a partner with a different cultural background."
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Moore and Spelcman (1994) claim that partners' behaviour is expected to be
developed on the basis of high quality communications, joint problem solving,
coordination, relational commitment, trust and time. Each element is in turn
influenced by the various dimensions of culture. Lin (1996) lists four dimensions of
national culture that appear to have a major impact on negotiation behaviour. These
dimensions include ambiguity tolerance, humanism, long-term orientation and
collectivism. Parkhe (1991) notes that national culture influences managerial
behaviour and moderates the relationship between structural variables and JV
performance. According to Park and Ungson (1997), the influence of national culture
on behaviour and management systems can be rather inconspicuous but can still
destabilize joint ventures. Rosenweig and Singh (1991) argue that multinational
business strategy research has recognized the importance of national culture as a
determinant of management behaviour. Chen et al. (1998) believe that culture may be
a behavioural determinant which encourages would-be IJV partners to work together
cooperatively.
Lin (1996) suggests that variability in information processing or communication style
leads partnering firms to handle the negotiation conflict differently. Rahim (1986)
suggests conflicts should be maintained at a moderate level in order to stimulate
productivity, creativity and innovation. Conflict from misunderstanding of partners
during the negotiation stems not only from ambiguous communication but also from
the different conceptualizations of reality. One reason for these varying concepts is
cultural differences (Lin 1996; Litmaye and Victor 1991). Lin and Germain (1998)
claim that cultural similarity has an impact on the strategy or tactic used to resolve
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disagreement. They also argue that cultural similarity between partners encourages
the use of problem-solving approach to resolve disagreements. According to
Campbell et al. (1988), similarity encourages partners to implement a more
cooperative and integrative behaviour. In contrast, partners who believe the other side
holds dissimilar views, in terms of understanding, signalling and interpreting, may
hesitate to openly communicate and exchange information (Geringer, 1988). Lin and
Germain (1998) note that lack of cultural similarity is an important factor, explaining
why the partners need to rely upon legalistic strategy for their interaction. The lack of
common ground, due to cultural dissimilarity, may lead to a high degree of perceived
behavioural uncertainty between partners. As a result, partners tend to place their
trust on written and legal documents for resolving conflicts (Lin and Germain, 1998).
Chen et al. (1998) argue that culture not only causes individuals to be more or less
cooperative but also has an impact on the selection and the effectiveness of
intervention mechanisms aimed at increasing cooperation. Fedor and Werther (1996)
suggest that partners, whose scores differ significantly on the cultural dimension of
individualist-collectivist, require a considerable cultural understanding to build
cooperation in culturally responsive international alliances. Morris et al. (1998) note
that country difference in conflict style should be mediated by individual differences
on measures of Individualism-Collectivism. Thompson (1990) suggests that "it is
only reasonable to assume that individual characteristics influence bargaining
behaviour." According to Triandis et al. (1988), the cultural dimension of
collectivism influences overall conflict during the negotiation process, as well as
specific conflict and negotiation style. Kozan (1997) notes that concern with the other
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party's face, normally found in collectivistic cultures, translates into a high degree of
cooperativeness (e.g. accommodation and avoiding) and a lower degree of
assertiveness (e.g. competing). Ting-Toomey (1988) argues that partners from
collectivist cultures tend to implement a smoothing and avoidance-oriented approach
whilst individualistic members prefer to assume a greater degree of control and
solution-oriented tactics. Strong and Weber (1998) suggest that individualistic
cultures place a high value on individual rewards and the individual ownership of
property. This encourages individualistic partners to act in a self-interested manner.
However, this manner may decrease as JV partners have a partic,nial concern Cm Cong-
term relationships and mutual benefits.
Strong and Weber (1998) argue that reliance on the less-structured control system of
partners from cultures with small power distances allows for a greater expectation of
self-interested behaviour. Whereas, partners from large power distance countries,
which have a strong social and bureaucratic control, tend not to be able to exercise
autonomy and independent decision making. These differences in power distance of
partners tend to affect their negotiation behaviour, the tactics used during JV
negotiation and also the JV outcomes.
Lin (1996) states that tolerance or avoidance of ambiguity influences communication
and negotiation behaviour. It also seems to be directly related to the preference for
compromise strategy in negotiation. According to Lin (1996), the cultural dimension
of time orientation influences negotiation behaviour. Americans tend to focus on an
immediate consequence of negotiation, whilst Japanese look forward to long-term
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reciprocity (Graham and Sano, 1989). Ross (1999) suggests that assertive behaviour
may be fostered by the masculine dimension of culture but obstructed in the feminine
dimension.
Different results found by Brehmer et al. (1970) show that there were no differences
in bargaining behaviour between Czechoslovakia, Greece, Japan, Sweden and the US.
Harnett and Cummings (1980) found that the influence of the country to bargaining
behaviour accounted for a 5% variance and more variance was attributable to factors
such as age and sex rather than nationality. On the other hand, Drucicman et al.
(1976) studied bargaining behaviour in relation to culture in India, Argentina and the
United States. The results show that Indian negotiators tend to spend more time in the
bargaining process and are more concerned with profit maximization compared with
their US and Argentine counterparts. Ting-Toomey et al. (1991) found that partners
from collectivistic cultures tend to handle negotiation conflict using accommodating
and avoiding behaviour rather than the competing style often used by individualists.
Morris et al. (1998) found that U.S. managers tend to use a competing strategy to
resolve conflict more than Indian managers. They also found more use of avoiding
behaviour from Chinese managers than U.S. managers. Strong and Weber (1998)
found that managers from individualist cultures have a higher degree of self-interest
than those of collectivist cultures but found an insignificant relationship between low
power distance culture and self-interest behaviour. Lewis (1990) discovered that the
degree of cultural distance between the host and home countries directly affects the
level of confusion or conflict between joint venture partners.
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3.6 Negotiation outcomes
There are two measures of negotiation behaviour and outcomes. One is an economic
measure, focusing on the outcomes and products of the negotiation. The other is a
social-psychological measure, focusing on both process and the outcomes of
negotiation (Thompson, 1990). Economic measures represent the most well-
formulated specifications of optimal negotiation performance (Thompson, 1990).
Nash (1953) suggests three measures of performance in normative bargaining models,
namely: mutual agreement; integrative bargaining (i.e. joint profit) and distributive
bargaining (individual outcome). Negotiating partners should reach a mutual
agreement if the disagreement outcome is worse than what they could achieve through
agreement with the other party (Raiffa, 1982). The negotiation of partners involved
not only dividing resources but also identifying additional value, benefits and
resources. In general the negotiation outcomes are summed to form a measure of joint
profit which is used as a measure of integration (Thompson, 1990). Logrolling is one
strategy which partnering firms use to reach an integrative agreement. In this
strategy, partners make trade-offs between issues but ignore unimportant or little
issues (Thompson 1990; Pruitt 1983). Without compatible interests between
negotiating partners, all negotiation involves a distributive component reflecting the
maximisation of the partners' own gains (Lax and Sebenius 1985; Thompson 1990).
According to Allport (1995), in social-psychological measures, the concepts of social
perception are used to measure negotiation performance. Partners actively perceive
their social organisation by selecting, categorizing, interpreting and inferring
information. They sometimes do not know, but guess, the interests of the other
105
partner. Thompson (1990) describes the three most significant elements of social-
psychological perception that can affect partner's negotiation behaviour and
outcomes. These are the perceptions of the negotiation situation, the other partner and
the partner itself. Perceptions of negotiation situations involve judgements that
partners make about the negotiation process and outcomes (Thompson, 1990). The
perceptions of partners in the negotiation situation include the views of the structure
of the bargaining task regarding competition, cooperation or integration (Thompson
and Hastie, 1990). Pinkley (1990) notes that the perceptions of negotiating partners
regarding conflict or disagreement are multidimensional and may be characterized
into three conflict frames: relationship-task; emotional-intellectual and compromise-
win. An important aspect of partner perception is evaluation or liking (Osgood, Suci,
and Tannenbaum, 1957). Other aspects include partners' liking and attraction to the
other, trustworthiness and fairness of one partner to another, partner's trait inferences
regarding intelligence, sociability, expertise, skill, ability, cooperativeness,
competitiveness and partners' behavioural intentions e.g. willingness to interact with
another partner in the future (Thompson, 1990). Perceptions of partners themselves
include partners' judgements of their own interests, values, goals, risk preferences,
partners' judgements in relation to the other (partner) in terms of skill,
cooperativeness, and fairness (Thompson, 1990).
Outcomes of joint venture business negotiation are difficult to measure. Different
studies seem to operationalise the outcomes of joint business negotiation in many
different ways. Satisfaction is used as a significant measure of success for
interorganisational transactions (Adler, Nancy et al. 1987). Thomas et al. (1978)
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include decision quality, resource consumption, effects on individuals and effects on
relationships, as the outcomes. Whilst participant satisfaction, efficiency and
effectiveness are the outcomes which concern Sheppard (1984). Lin (1996) describes
three consequences of interactive negotiation: high likelihood of win-win resolution,
significant role of shared rules and norms and critical function of communication and
information exchange.
The purpose of the present study is to use performance as a measure of JV negotiation
outcome. This study intends to measure performance in the perspective of the
achievement of partners' objectives (e.g. profitability, market share, sales (turnover),
technology and know-how transfer and learning); partner's satisfaction with the
overall JV performance and JV agreement; and JV partners' relationship because of
its significant influence on the JV negotiation outcome.
3.6.1 JV performance as a negotiation outcome
Improving business performance is an implicit goal of strategic management research,
but considerable ambiguity persists in strategic management literature as to what
performance is and how it should be measured (Venkatraman and Grant, 1986;
Johnson, 1996). According to Hatfield et al. (1998), there is a shortage of theory of
joint venture performance and also a considerable conflict as to the comparability of
alternative JV performance measures. Parkhes (1993) also notes that consensus about
the appropriate definition and measurement of JV performance is still not available.
The limited literature on joint venture suggests that performance problems arise
because each partner tends to adopt idiosyncratic criteria (Yan and Gray, 1994).
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These problems are more acute in developing rather than in developed countries
(Janger, 1980). Also, performance difficulties are costly for the MNE, in terms of
time and capital. In Beamish's (1984) sample, managers of MNEs from developed
countries assess the performance of their joint ventures in LDCs (Less Developed
Countries) as unsatisfactory more frequently than those in DCs. Most studies where
the data was collected prior to 1989 found satisfactory JV performance. However,
studies since then have found a large increase in performance problems (Beamish,
1993).
Dussauge and Garrette (1998) note that inductive studies have assessed the outcome
of strategic alliances from the long-term strategic position of the parent firms rather
than the performance of the JV itself. Yan and Gray (1994) point out three major
areas used inconsistently in cross-study comparisons and generalizations of JV
performance: which is the appropriate perspective (that of one parent, two parents or
the JV management); variation in performance measures ranging from subjective
judgments (e.g. managerial assessment, goal attainment, satisfaction) to objective
judgments (e.g. termination, duration, financial indicators) (Park and Ungson 1997);
and variation in the appropriateness of different performance measures as a venture
matures. Hatfield et al. (1998) describe three of the most popular measures of JV
performance: managerial assessment; JV duration and IV survival. Killing (1983)
categorizes JV's as failures when they are liquidated or undergo major reorganization
because of poor performance. Beamish (1987) refers to performance as a mutual
satisfaction of the partners.
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Firms tend to evaluate the venture using the standard operating procedures that
corporate headquarters applies to wholly owned divisions with conventional business
objectives. However, conflict can occur because of the different or competitive
interests between the joint venture and the parents. Early studies by Tomlinson
(1970) used a variety of financial indicators, e.g. profitability, growth or cost position,
as indexes of performance. For many businesses, profitability seems to be an
excellent index of performance. However, joint venture is different. Joint ventures
are quite popular in risky, uncertain situations and when risk and uncertainty are high,
profitability will be a poor measure of the joint venture's value. In general, an
organization's overall performance must be compared and evaluated before decisions
can be made. Without explicit ranking and rating, firms cannot decide where to invest
and whom to reward.
Beamish's results (1988) show a positive relationship between financial and
subjective measures in market economy LDCs, whilst Geringer and Hebert (1991)
found similar results in developed countries. Others have used objective measures of
performance such as the survival of IJV (Franko 1971; Killing 1983; Geringer 1990;
Harrigan 1986), its duration (Kogut 1988; Harrigan 1986) and the instability of its
ownership (Frank° 1971; Gomes-Casseres 1987). Geringer (1991) found a positive
correlation between JV performance, duration and survival.
However, these financial and objective measures have limitations in the evaluation of
UV performance (Geringer and Hebert, 1991). Financial data are not always reported
and are often unavailable. Moreover, IN parents commonly distribute financial
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returns through mechanisms other than dividends, including management fees,
technology licensing, transfer pricing, supply contracts and royalties. Many IJVs also
operate in contexts where measures of short-term financial performance might suggest
that the venture is performing poorly. For example, IJVs formed to develop new
technologies or new markets are unlikely to generate a financial profit for many years.
In such situations, neither a financial, nor an objective, measure is likely to accurately
capture the IJV's relative performance measured against it's own objectives (Geringer
and Hebert, 1991). According to Glaister and Buckley (1999), "In high risk or
uncertain settings, short-term financial measures would tend to indicate poor
performance, although the venture may be making satisfactory progress towards long-
term goals, or achieving current non-financial goals." On the other hand, although
IJVs are experiencing good financial results and continued stability, it may be viewed
as an unsuccessful result because IJVs might look for other goals such as attaining
increased sales or market share. Barkema and Vermeulon (1997) suggest that
"dissolution may not always imply failure and longevity does not signal success,
particularly in the case of IJVs." Additionally, Hatfield et al. (1998) note that
financial measures cannot reflect the non-financial goals pursued. Financial data is
often unavailable for JVs because partners report JV financial information separately
from their consolidated financial statement.
Given these problems, Anderson (1990) summarizes the experts' judgment into the
three following aspects: stability versus flexibility; well-being of individuals versus
well-being of the organization; process versus outcome. It is difficult to judge the
short-term result (outputs) without considering how these results are being achieved
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(inputs). At the output extreme are the "results", measures that most people use to
assess current performance. The input extreme represents variables that should
determine measurable results. Poor inputs will show up in poor outputs, therefore,
input measures should be considered to assess longer-term effectiveness.
Later, scholars found that even though duration and survival have a significant
correlation with the overall partner selection (Geringer and Hebert , 1991), they did
not measure the extent of performance (Hatfield et al., 1998). Hatfield et al. (1998)
suggest that they appear to be unacceptable measures of performance because JV
termination may result from success, failure or an inability to adapt to changes in the
environment. Concerned about the ability of financial and objective measures to
effectively gauge JV performance, JV researchers have turned their attention on
partner satisfaction (Beamish 1987; Killing 1983). According to Parkhe (1993) and
Hatfield et al. (1998), JV researchers currently turn their attention to partner
objectives and goal achievement as more accurate managerial assessment of JV
performance than partner satisfaction. A recent JV study by Lin (1996) included the
personal relationship between JV partners, and the overall IJV relationship, as
indicators of performance, in addition to the traditional measures of financial
performance.
Beamish (1994) investigated the effect on JV performance in LDCs of two variables-
(mutual long-term) need and commitment. He divided partner needs into five groups:
items readily capitalized; human-resource needs; market access needs;
government/political needs and knowledge needs. Furthermore, he classified the
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groups into 16 partner contribution factors, in order to find out major factors of low
and high-performing firms establishing joint ventures. These factors include faster
entry into local markets, local political advantages, inexpensive labour, raw material
supply, local business knowledge, better market access, satisfaction of expected
government requirement for local environment/avoidance of political intervention,
general managers, capital, general knowledge of the local economy, politics and
customs, to meet existing government requirement for local ownership or import
substitution, technology or equipment, functional managers, better access to the local
market for goods produced outside, better export opportunities and general knowledge
of the foreign economy. Results showed that executives in high-performing ventures
required specific partners to attain desired partner contributions, whilst executives in
the low-performing ventures were satisfied with any partner as long as he was a
national of the local country. These results were similar to Beamish and Banks'
(1987) study, which found that greater need between partners resulted in more
satisfactory performance.
Beamish (1988) found a strong commitment-performance relationship in JVs, noting
that most of the commitment characteristics in the high-performing ventures were
related to the MNE's willingness to be involved: adapt products, increase employment
of nationals, visit and offer assistance or supply special skills. According to Beamish
and Banks (1987), high satisfaction levels in JV performance promotes a long-term
joint business operation. In addition, Lee (1989) in Lee and Beamish (1995), found
that mutual confidence and close business relationships between Korean investors and
local partners significantly influenced the level of satisfaction that Korean
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management felt about the performance of their ventures. Nevertheless, this contrasts
with the results of Lee and Beamish (1995) which show that, in a Korean joint
venture, commitment has no correlation with performance. Hatfield et al. (1998)
found a positive relationship between partners' goal achievement, JV duration and JV
survival. Glaister and Buckley (1999) detected a highly significant relationship
between satisfaction and 'depth of analysis', other long-term relationships, partner
views and attitudes to the management of the alliance and behaviour/performance of
the partners. Lin and Germain (1998) observed a significant correlation between IJV
age and JV performance.
Table 3-4
Prior research: JV performance variables
Objective measures Perceptual/Subjective measures
- Financial indicators
Tomlinson (1970), Good (1972), Dang (1977),
Renforth (1974), Rafii (1978),
Bearnish (1984,1988)
- Survival
Franko (1971), Raveed (1976), Killing (1982,1983),
Harrigan (1986), Blodgett (1987),
Beamish (1984), Kogut (1988a),
Woodcock and Geringer (1990), Geringer (1990,1991),
Geringer and Hebert (1991), Hatfield et al. (1998)
-Duration
Blodgett (1987), Harrigan (1986,1988a),
Kogut (1988), Geringer and Hebert (1991),
Geringer (1991), Subieta (1991),
Hatfield et al. (1998)
-Management's assessment/ Satisfaction
Killing (1982,1983), Schaan (1983),
Beamish (1984,1987,1988), Hill (1988),
Geringer and Hebert (1991,1992)
Hatfield et al. (1998),
Lin and Germain (1998)
Glaister and Buckley (1999)
- Composite measures
(including financial, non -financial and industry-oriented measures)
Awadzi (1987), Subieta (1991)
- Multidimensional scales
Blumenthal (1988), Hill (1988)
Roos (1989), Tillman (1990)
-Goal attainment
Beamish (1988)
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Objective measures Perceptual/Subjective measures
- Instability
Franko (1971), Gomes-Casseres (1987),
Beamish (1984,1993), Geringer and Hebert (1991)
-Partners' relationship
Lin (1996), Lee (1989)
Lin and Germain (1998)
Source: Adapted from Hebert, Louis (1994) "Division of control, relationship dynamics and
joint venture performance." Ph.D. thesis; Geringer, J. Michael and Louis Hebert (1989)
"Control and performance of international joint ventures." Journal of International Business
Studies, Summer
3.7 Determinants of JV performance outcome
According to Glaister and Buckley (1999), there is no consensus and and there is a
lack of clarity between indicators of performance and determinants of performance.
Firms engage in JV because of the need to cooperate. However, the opportunities for
conflict and disagreement cannot be avoided because of divergent goals and
objectives, incompatible management styles and approaches, sharing of power and
differences in national and organisational culture. This in turn has an impact on joint
venture performance (Killing 1983; Lewis 1990). According to Lin and Germain
(1998), successful IJV relationships and the performance of partners rely not only on
equity structure, cultural similarity and past relationship but also on managing day-to-
day business operations, conflict resolution and formulating long-term strategies.
Lewicki et al. (1994) suggest that the culture of the negotiating partners appears to be
a critical factor in how negotiation strategies/behaviours affect negotiation outcomes
in different cultures. Additionally, Fry (1985) argues that personality may not directly
affect negotiation performance but rather interacts in a complex way with situational
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factors and the characteristics of the particular task. According to Hamner (1980), the
correlation between personality and negotiation outcomes is insignificant.
Olson and Singsuwan (1997) found that mutual trust, mutual commitment, quality of
communication, mutual information sharing and joint problem solving have a
considerable impact on the success and performance of strategic alliances for
American executives. Lin and Germain's (1998) result shows a direct relationship
between three context variables (culture, relative power and relationship age) and JV
satisfaction. Furthermore they found a positive correlation between a problem-
solving (cooperative behaviour) and partner's satisfaction and an inverse relationship
between legalistic strategy and partner's satisfaction. Their study does not show a
relationship between compromising and forcing strategy and JV performance.
3.7.1 Bargaining power as a determinant of performance outcome
Negotiating partners often use an advantage derived from power over the other to
secure a greater share of the outcomes or derive the preferred solution (Lewicki et al.,
1994). Williams and Wilson (1997) define power as "the ability to influence decision
outcomes." According to Dwyer (1980), relative power is often related to
performance, especially in marketing channels, where self-control over the
management decision-making process associates with the level of partner's
satisfaction. Power relationships may be balanced where both partners have the same
capability for affecting the outcomes of the other. According to Robinson (1969), the
outcome of the bargaining situation among joint venture partners will be favourable if
there is a balance of resource contributions and expected benefits for each of the joint
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venture partners. Littler and Leverick (1995) suggest that equality in power or
dependency between partners is a significant factor to successful or less successful
ventures. Power asymetry leads one partner to greater control of a range of outcomes
than the other (Lin, 1996).
Morgan and Hunt (1994) claim that power should no longer be a central concept if
one attempts to understand successful relational exchanges. Lin (1996) suggests that
even though power has been focused as a central concept of negotiation research,
there are few studies examining the power used in sustaining relationships. Harrigan
and Newman (1990) propose that distribution and use of power appears to be a
significant factor affecting the ongoing interaction of partners based on a long-term
relationship. Because it is inevitable for partners to have their own self-interests,
firms need to keep insisting on ongoing negotiation with their partners (Dabholkar et
al., 1994). The outcome of negotiations between multinational companies (MNCs),
local companies and the host government in developing the JV is influenced by the
bargaining power of negotiating parties towards their own goals (Fagre and Wells
1982; Schelling 1956; Rojot 1991). The results of the study (1982) of a U.S.-based
MNC in Latin America by Fagre and Wells showed that a MNC's percentage
ownership of foreign subsidiaries correlated with the MNC's level of technology,
product differentiation, product diversity and access to foreign markets which in turn
influenced the outcome of negotiation. Therefore, they recommended MNCs and
government should consider joint ventures that • do not evenly split ownership. Lin
and Germain (1998) found the overall correlation between relative power and
performance is not significant.
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A shift in the balance of bargaining power which can change the outcome of the
negotiating process, during a joint venture negotiation, can be influenced by a key
stakeholder. Key stakeholders, e.g. government; negotiators- senior managers; third
party or shareholders, can approve or disapprove the previously negotiated agreement.
Also, they can demand changes in the resource commitments, equity and control
issues, as well as providing or withholding requisite government controlled resources.
Shifts in bargaining power and an effective negotiation outcome tends to depend on
how much knowledge, skill, experience and understanding of the objectives a key
stakeholder has and the importance of these outcomes to the stakeholder during the
negotiation process (Raiffa, 1982; Tung, 1982; Brouthers and Bamossy, 1997).
3.7.2 Trust as a determinant of JV performance outcome
Existing literature on trust indicates a wide variety of organizational and social
settings and is conceptualized in different ways (Hosmer, 1995; Aulalch, Kotabe, and
Sahay, 1996). Few empirical studies have considered the interpersonal relationship
dynamics between partners on the issue of trust as it affects JV outcomes (i.e.
performance). Butler (1999) argues that the influence of trust on managerial
outcomes is not obvious. Trust has been fundamentally developed from norms, where
partnering firms expect to share values and beliefs. Norms could not work well if
partner firms do not trust each other. Therefore, the role of trust could be given as a
critical variable of interpartner relationship dynamics, which is likely to make a
positive impact on JV performance and success (Peterson and Schwind, 1977; Hebert,
1994). Saxon (1997) notes that "Research on alliances has focused increasingly on
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relationship characteristics, and on trust in particular, as an important consideration
for explaining alliance behaviour and success."
According to Gulati (1995), trust is a significant component of successful strategic
alliances. Powell (1996) contends that trust is neither calculated nor embedded, but
rather is learned and reinforced over successive repetitions of business operation.
Building on the concept of Blau (1964) and Pruitt (1981), as well as Anderson and
Narus (1990), Hebert (1994) defined trust as the parent's belief that its JV partner is
ready to perform actions that will result in positive outcomes and will avoid any
actions leading to negative outcomes. Hirsch (1978) stated that trust was a "public
good, necessary for the success of economic transactions."
Butler (1999) states that "a climate of trust enables negotiators to risk making simple
agreements without resorting to complex, expensive, monitoring measures such as
contracts and expensive delivery arrangements." Surprisingly, Butler (1999) found
that outcome inefficiency (cost) increased as trust increased. Fisher and Ury (1981)
noticed that trust is not necessarily beneficial but concluded that an alternative
position, between trusting and mistrusting (soft and hard), is likely to result in more
positive outcomes for the negotiator than does either extreme trusting or mistrusting.
In contrast, Kimmel et al. (1980) recognise that trust or distrust make no significant
difference in joint payoff. Therefore, Ross and Croix (1996) suggest that trust tends
to influence the process of negotiation rather than the joint venture outcomes. They
also argue that efficient agreements result from the presence of trust and the
willingness of partners to engage in risktaking.
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3.7.3 Culture as a determinant of JV performance outcome
Regarding JV performance, internationalisation theory suggests that the greater the
cultural distance or cultural dissimilarity between the home base of the partners, the
higher the chance of a failed alliance (Glaister and Buckley, 1999). Johnson et al.
(1996) discovered that foreign assignments often fail as a result of expatriate
managers' inability to adjust to the local culture. According to Makino and Beamish
(1998), evidence suggests cultural distance influences the alliance performance. Tung
(1982) found that the attitude (i.e. patience, sincerity, preparation) of Americans
towards their Chinese partner has a significant impact on the outcomes of negotiation.
Ding (1997) suggests that ignoring the cultural expertise of the local partner could
adversely affect the joint venture performance. Dymsza (1988) states that to be able
to achieve an effective and viable relationship, a greater effort on management should
be made. Parkhe (1991) suggests that diversity in national contexts, as well as in the
corporate culture of alliance partners, may obstruct effective inter-partner
collaborations and negatively affect the longevity of alliances. Pierre-Xavier (1997)
states that, "Just as an individual's personality will influence his behaviour, national
and organizational cultures will influence the operational performance of a company."
Lin and Germain (1998) note that the greater the cultural similarity between partners,
the higher the expected satisfaction level. Dabholkar et al. (1994) argue that cultural
similarity promotes a similar role of partners' expectation as well as a reduced role of
ambiguity and disagreement which therefore lead to satisfactory interaction outcomes.
Lin and Germain (1998) suggest that "cultural similarity between partners is a critical
antecedent for IJV success." Pierre-Xavier (1997) notes that congruence between
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cultures constitutes a major element in the success of an IJV. The presence of major
cultural differences between partners can lead to IV dissolution if such differences are
not rapidly assessed and controlled (Pierre-Xavier, 1997). Killing (1983) found
cultural dissimilarities/distance had an impact on the success of joint venture. He also
found that U.S. and Japanese joint ventures failed as a result of cultural differences.
Gugler and Dunning (1993) indicate that cultural differences, disagreements about
objectives, poor communications and partner's opportunism are the fundamental
causes of outcome failure. Olson and Singsuwan (1997) found that Thai respondents
did not believe partners need to have a perfect cultural similarity for the success of
business alliances, whilst American respondents perceived the cultural similarity as an
extremely significant factor for the success of business alliances. Park and Ungson
(1997) remark that larger cultural distances relate to a lower IV dissolution rate.
Makino and Beamish's (1998) results suggest that local access and management
complexity stemming from inter-partner cultural distance may have a significant
impact on both IV performance and survival. Kogut and Singh (1988) argue that
cultural distance or the extent to which cultural norms in one country differ from
another country may influence the success of the business. Pierre-Xavier (1997)
found a correlation between longevity and cultural difference in IJVs and suggests
that national distance will vary more over time than organizational distance. Barkema
and Vermeulen (1997) noticed that cultural distance has a negative impact on IJV
survival. They also found that the 'incidents' within IJVs increase with cultural
distance.
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According to Ross (1999), partners from highly collectivistic cultures tend to rely on
connections to establish and maintain relationships. He further contends that
performance and success may be important goals in masculine cultures whilst
feminine cultures place greater emphasis on welfare and happiness. Pierre-Xavier
(1997) notes that IJVs tend to generate individual and collective conflicts that can
ultimately jeopardize the JV's durability.
Likewise, Asian firms that first invested in Thailand found the cultural environment,
traditions and behaviour patterns to be similar to their own. Asian firms entering joint
venture with Thai partners do not have to face as large a foreign knowledge gap in
relation to the economic situation. They may not have the same level of hesitancy in
entering joint venture as has been observed elsewhere (Agarwal and Ramaswami,
1992), and they do not perceive as much risk as other foreign investors (Lee and
Beamish, 1995). Therefore, the similar cultural systems might lead Asian firms to
perform better than Western firms with Thai partners.
3.7.4 Negotiation behaviour as a determinant of JV performance outcome
The outcome of negotiation is rarely achieved without any disputes or conflict
between international joint venture partners, e.g. government and foreign partner,
foreign partner and local partner. Disputes or conflict could be more efficiently
reconciled if the negotiators are skilled and knowledgeable (Raiffa, 1982). The effect
of disagreement or conflict over the performance of business alliances was recently
studied by Olson and Singsuwan (1997). They claim that more successful outcomes
are expected to be characterized by higher levels of constructive negotiation tactics.
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Friedmann and Beguin (1971) suggests that open problem-solving and compromising
strategies enable negotiating partners to get away with deadlock or conflict situations
which, in turn, lead to successful a JV operation. Similarly, Campbell et al. (1988)
suggest that problem-solving behaviour e.g. cooperative strategy, tends to lead JV
partners to achieve successful relationships and outcomes. Neale and Bazerman
(1983) indicate that perspective taking ability (PTA) is a useful component for the
problem-solving approach towards conflict resolution. This is also related to
concession making tendencies, probability of agreement and outcomes. According to
Ross and Croix (1996), one partner engaging in cooperative behaviour may lead to an
enhanced relationship with the other. According to Pruitt and Carnevale (1993),
negotiators aim to achieve a win-win solution by escaping social conflict and locating
an acceptable outcome. According to Ganesan (1993), positive evaluations of overall
performance are more likely to ensue as partners strive to balance the needs and
concerns of both parties. Butler (1999) contends that "purely competitive behaviours
can lead to isolation and further mistrust, which in turn can undermine long-term
performance." Perlumutter and Heenan (1986) propose that competitive/forcing
behaviour signals an inherently weak ongoing relationship.
Ding (1997) found that conflict between partners was consistently negatively
correlated to joint venture performance. According to Killing (1983) and Lewis
(1990), severe conflict between partners is more likely to result in misunderstanding,
distrust, anxiety, reduction in cooperation and less efficient integration of activities,
which in turn lead to deteriorating joint venture performance. If one partner tends to
dominate the conflict resolution process, the other may be confused and more rigid.
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This reduces the chances of resolving JV conflict or disagreement and may also
enhance the likelihood of future conflict (Cadotte and Stern, 1979).
Constructive communications and regular information exchanges, as regards day-to-
day management operations promote highly successful international alliances (Olson
and Singsuwan, 1997). Boyle and Dwyer (1995) note that open information exchange
leads partners to make internal attributions of positive outcomes.
3.8 Guidelines for achieving effective performance and success
The following are some guidelines for MNEs establishing W with local partners.
These must be considered in order to achieve high performance and success:-
Firstly, selecting a partner. Harrigan (1984) said that similarity of experience of
collaboration has a favourable impact on collaboration outcome. This was also
supported by Littler and Leverick (1995). The results of their study show the
importance of collaborating with an organization which has both compatible culture
and mode of operation, with complimentary areas of strength and expertise and with
mutual understanding existing between partners. For example, Comtel faced
difficulties in doing business with ATN. Comtel considers itself as marketing led and
flexible, whilst ATN is seen as engineering orientated, rigid and inflexible, and
excessively formal. Comtel always found that it was quite difficult to negotiate with
AIN staff as they tended to adhere rigidly to formal procedures. Therefore,
differences in culture and operating styles between the two organizations, resulted in
slow progress in their collaboration.
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Secondly, establish the ground rules. Partners should make sure that there are clearly
defined goals, objectives and responsibilities for the collaboration. Also, limits to the
collaboration needs to be establishing in order to avoid leakage of the firm's skills and
experience. Shaughnessy (1995) shows that a shared external goal is not necessarily
the same as shared objectives. It is easy to identify and share a goal but quite difficult
to match the objectives of two or more firms. Shared ground should be utilized in a
way that guarantees a profitable outcome. Sometimes when objectives appear to be
matched, errors can still be made, as in the example of CC Bank Belgie. The Royal
Bank of Scotland and the Spanish Banco Santander have been collaborating for a
number of years. Both share an innovative approach to product and service
development. One of their interesting strategies is entering third markets by focusing
on the need for a new bank, offering services to members of the international business
community - people who work in two separate geographical locations, where he or
she would wish to conduct financial transactions (their home base and their new
temporary place of work).
However, some errors arose because CC Bank Belgie employed mostly French
speaking Belgians in its front of house positions. Consequently, there was a low level
of competence in the respective languages required to target British and Spanish
expatriates. Also, neither bank thought through the strategy of targeting a specific
niche market. Customers were confused because by its name, it identified as a
Belgian Bank, whilst the company tried to position itself for the wider international
customer base. As is clearly seen from the example above, lack of effective strategic
planning by both partners, resulted in an unsuccessful joint venture. However,
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Lorange and Probst (1987) advocate that the use of strategic planning and other
management processes will result in success if the joint venture possesses four self-
organizing properties. These include self-reference, autonomy, complexity and
redundancy. Self-reference refers to the ability of its management to develop its own
plans and processes, the ability to monitor progress and take the necessary corrective
and innovative action. Autonomy refers to the ability of the joint venture to have
control of its destiny. Complexity refers to a matter of understanding the nature of the
relatedness between parents when putting together a highly interrelated network.
Lastly, redundancy refers to the ability of the joint venture to have alternative ways of
carrying out its functions (Kukalis and Jungemann, 1995).
Moreover, Lorange and Probst (1987) emphasize that a management process (strategic
planning) is important to strengthening self-organization. They view strategic
planning as differing from one joint venture to another, depending on the type of
relationship existing between the joint venture and its parents. The first type refers to
a JV in which both parents are actively engaged in the same business. In this
situation, the strategic planning process seems to be complex and very difficult to
work out. The second type refers to a JV in which one parent is highly active in the
same business. Here, the strategic planning process seems to be less complex. This
type of relationship was particularly supported by Killing (1983). The last type refers
to a joint venture in which none of the parents is active in the same business. In this
situation, the strategic planning process is simple as it reflects an autonomous
company. The pressures to change and demands imposed by the parent companies
and other involved organizations make planning a difficult task. However, some
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factors can relieve these pressures as follows: delegating more responsibilities;
correcting structural inconsistencies as measured against counterparts in the industry;
providing on-the-job training opportunities; improving communications between top
management and the work force; meeting the demands of parent companies;
recognizing and rewarding those whose good work enable the company to stay on top
of the situation.
Thirdly, setting up a task force. The success of a collaborative venture is dependent
on the individuals involved in the project. Accordingly, there must be considerable
attention to the selection and roles of personnel.
Fourthly, managing the process. Many factors need to be identified to achieve
collaboration success, e.g. regular monitoring of progress, the need for frequent and
open communication, degree of trust between partners, ensuring collaborators deliver
as promised and flexibility must be maintained (the danger of sticking rigidly to initial
aims and objectives is that profitable opportunities could be lost).
Next, ensuring equality. Inequalities seem to lead to dissatisfaction, resentment, and
dissolution. Therefore, partners should be concerned more about equality in their
benefits, contributions and power if they want to be successful.
Lastly, maintaining an external focus. External -factors also influence the outcome of
collaborations e.g. market preferences, economic factors, the role of government
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agencies, the availability of alternative technologies and changes in the competitive
field.
3.9 Conclusion to chapters 1-3
The number of joint venture businesses has increased dramatically over last decade.
As competition in the domestic market has become more fierce, firms look for more
opportunities to increase their profit and international market. One competitive
strategy is to enter joint venture with local firms in order to shorten teaming time with
regards to the knowledge of politics, culture and economy. However, managerial
problems seem to arise in the operation of joint ventures, where the administrators
normally come from both parent firms and are likely to bring different culture, style
and mindset. To reduce problems, i.e. cultural clash, it is important for both joint
venture partners to recognise and understand their differences and each other's needs.
This research aims to study the impact of culture, bargaining power and trust on
negotiation behaviour and outcomes of international joint venture in Thailand, where
study into this issue does not currently exist. The research strategy of this study uses
qualitative case studies. To address the research problems of international joint
venture, as regards the specific issues targetted in the study above, the research
questions are drawn as follows.
1. How does bargaining power affect international joint venture negotiation behaviour
and outcome?
2. How does mutual trust influence JV negotiation behaviour and outcome?
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3. How does cultural difference and misunderstanding affect the negotiator's
behaviour and the JV outcome?
The literature review in chapter 2 provides a guideline for understanding the
importance and benefit, to both foreign and local partners, of establishing joint
venture business. The review also explains the existence of IJVs through strategic
behaviour and organizational learning. An example of the benefit of entering JV is
that foreign partners could access the local market faster than if they operate alone.
The local partner could also learn new and up to date skas fmat the foItiga past.neI,
such as provision of marketing service and management of finance. Both partners
could also reduce their risk and strengthen their competitiveness through cost
reduction. The theory building draws largely from bargaining power, trust, culture,
negotiation behaviour and (performance) outcomes given in chapter 3. These
concepts generate and support four propositions which could answer the research
questions above. The relationships between the variables studied are depicted in the
conceptual model in figure 4-1. The development of propositions to the present study
on JV is given as follows. The propositions will be examined later in the data analysis
section of this study.
Lusch (1976) defines two major sources of power: coercive and noncoercive. The
coercive source involves a potential punishment whilst noncoercive sources are
expert, legitimate, reward and referent. When- the power is used in a negotiation
relationship, it becomes bargaining power (Rojot, 1991). Bargaining power refers to a
capabilty of the negotiating partner to favourably change the bargaining set (Lax and
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Sebenius, 1985) and to influence the (performance) outcome of negotiation
(Schelling, 1956).
The past study of bargaining power can be divided into two streams: context-based
and resourced power. Bacharach and Lawler (1984) divide context-based power into
two components: stakes and the availability of alternative choices of entering JV. Yan
and Gray (1994) used the perceived strategic importance of the joint venture to the
overall business of a parent as the measure of stakes. Bargaining partners who have
more alternative choices (the availability of alternative partners and/or arrangments)
seem to have more power because of their ability to walk away from the current
bargaining and exercise their best alternatives to the formation and operation of JV
(Fisher and Ury 1981; Yan 1993). Resource-based components have been widely
used by scholars, i.e. Inkpen and Beamish, 1997; Lin (1996) and Lin and Germain
(1998); Mjoen (1993) as only a measure of relative bargaining power. These
resources include both tangible resources (i.e. expertise and equity share) and
intangible resources (i.e. information, know-how, technology). The relative
bargaining power of JV partners and the extent to which one partner is more powerful
than the other, result from the comparative levels of resource contribution to JV firm
(Harrigan 1986; Lin 1996).
However, it would be more valid to the research study if both context-based and
resource-based components are used as measures of relative bargaining power. Yan
(1993) and Yan and Gray (1994) use two context-based and seven resource-based
components as indicators of overall (relative) bargaining power for their case studies
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examining the manufacturing industry. The two context-based components are stake
and alternative choice. The seven resource-based components include technology,
management expertise, global service support (i.e. technical and marketing services),
local knowledge, product distribution, material procurement and equity.
This study follows Yan (1993) and Yan and Gray (1994) in the use of both context-
based and resource-based components to measure the overall (relative) bargaining
power. Context-based components include alternative choice and strategic
importance (stakes). Resource-based components, however, need to be applied
further from Yan (1993) and Yan and Gray (1994) to the study of firms in the service
industry. They include know-how, information, technology, trademark, management
expertise, technical personnel, non-technical personnel, marketing skill, marketing
service, local knowledge, government connection and market access.
Hatfield et al. (1998) noted that there is a shortage of theory of JV performance and
also a considerable conflict as to the comparability of alternative JV performance
measures. The early studies by Tomlinson (1970) used financial indicators such as
profitability, growth and cost position as an index of performance. Then, objective
measures of performance such as survival, duration and instability are now more
commonly used. However, due to some limitations in the evaluation of IJV
performance (Geringer and Hebert, 1991), JV researchers have turned their attention
towards partner satisfaction (Beamish 1987; Killing 1983). Currently, JV researchers
consider that partner objectives and goal achievement are a more accurate managerial
assessment of JV performance. In addition, a recent JV study by Lin (1996) included
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the personal relationship between JV partners and the overall IJV relationship as
indicators of performance. This study intends to measure performance from the
perspective of the achievement of partners' objectives (e.g. profitability, market share,
sales (turnover), technology and know-how transfer and learning); partner's
satisfaction with the overall JV performance and JV agreement; and JV partners'
relationship because of its significant influence on the JV negotiation outcome.
Dwyer (1980) notes that relative bargaining power is often related to performance,
especially in marketing channels, where the control over the management decision-
making process associates with the level of partner's satisfaction. Robinson (1969)
notes that the (performance) outcome of negotiation, in the bargaining situation
between JV partners, will be favourable if there is an equal balance of resource
contributions and expected benefits for each of the JV partners. Littler and Leverick
(1995) suggest that equality in power or dependency between partners is a significant
factor to the level of success of ventures. The (performance) outcome of negotiations
between multinational companies, local companies and the host government in
developing the JV is influenced by the bargaining power of negotiating parties
towards their own goals (Fagre and Wells 1982; Schelling 1956; Rojot 1991).
According to Mjoen (1993), the relative bargaining positions of the partners can
influence the final outcome of the negotiations. Lee and Beamish (1995) argue that
IJV partners may be more satisfied with an IJV's performance when they perceives
themselves to be in possession of the greater ability to influence the manner in which
the IJV is coordinated. Lin and Germain (1998) set out the overall relationship
between relative bargaining power and performance but found that it is not
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significant. Based on the discussion above, the following proposition relates relative
bargaining power to UV performance.
Proposition 1: JV performance is positively related to symmetric bargaining power.
Volery and Mensik (1998) claim that there is a lack of agreement on a suitable
definition of trust and confusion between trust, its antecedents and its outcomes.
According to Zand, trust can be defined as the willingness of one person to become
vulnerable to the actions of another person whose behaviour he or she could not
control (Zand, 1972), thus that party is confident that the other will not exploit the
party's vulnerabilities (Ross and Croix, 1996). In a strong relationship, based on trust,
partners tend to willingly negotiate to resolve their conflicts or disagreement (Lin
1996; Anderson and Narus 1990). Zand (1972) treats trust as stemming from past
experience. Zucker (1986) indicates one factor which consistently results in trust, i.e.
prior alliances between firms. Ring and Van de Ven (1989) and Gulati (1995) agree
that two firms with prior alliances are likely to trust each other more than other firms
with whom they have had no alliance. Strong and Weber (1998) note that trust leads
to development of a positive attitude regarding partners' behaviour, which will be
influenced by positive experience. Glaister and Buckley (1999) suggest that
"experience can thus engender trust among partners." Milgrom and Roberts (1992)
argue that firms' reputations will be an important consideration in the selection of
prospective JV partners. Strong and Weber (1998) note that in deciding whether to
trust a business, individuals tend to gather information about the reputation of that
business. Building upon previous models of trust, two significant factors were then
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proposed to indicate trustworthiness between JV partners, namely: firm's reputation
and past experience.
Hebert (1994) defines trust as "the parent's belief that its partner is ready to perform
actions that will result in positive outcomes for the JV." Hebert (1994) notes that "it
is expected that the presence of high levels of trust in a JV will be a factor of higher
performance for that venture." He further suggests that high levels of trust will ensure
that the JV is managed in ways consistent with the parents' goals, which in turn
results in higher mutual satisfaction. Beamish and Banks (1987) claim that mutual
trust will be more likely to lead partners to work together for the successful
achievement of the JV's performance objectives. Inkpen's (1992) results in Hebert
(1994) show that trust is correlated with openness in the relationship and
(performance) outcomes. Williamson (1975) states that trust is expected to have a
positive consequence for performance and satisfaction outcomes in JVs. According to
Peterson and Schwind (1977), the role of trust could be given as a critical variable of
interpartner relationship dynamics, which is likely to make a positive impact on JV
performance and success. Therefore, based on the discussion above, the following
proposition is formulated.
Proposition 2: JV performance is positively related to trust.
Lewicki et al. (1994) posit that culture is defined as "the shared values and beliefs of a
group of people." Culture seems to become problematic when partners negotiate and
manage JV business across borders. Hofstede (1994) claims that national culture
133
refers to the values, beliefs and assumptions, learned in early childhood, that
distinguish one group of people from another. Scholars define the dimensions of
national culture differently. Some dimensions appear to be similar to others'
classifications, i.e. individualism and collectivism. The present study is built on
Hofstede's (1994) study of the cultural dimensions which affect negotiation behaviour
and outcomes. His concept of cultural dimensions is one of the most comprehensive
treatments of cultural research which addresses not only the extent to which cultures
are different but also in which respects they differ. He emphasizes four cultural
dimensions which influence negotiation behaviour and outcomes. These include
power distance, individualism and collectivism, uncertainty avoidance and
masculinity/femininity. Hofstede (1994) proposed a fifth cultural dimension, labelled
long-term orientation (or confucian dynamism). Yeh and Lawrence (1995) suggests
that this should be included within the descriptive and explanatory power of the
original four dimensions above. They argue that the fifth cultural dimension reflects
the same underlying cultural values as individualism and should therefore not be
treated as a separate dimension. As a result, long-term orientation is excluded from
this study.
Morris et al. (1998) claim that members of the same culture tend to share a set of
values acquired in the process of socialization. Foreign firms seem to enter JV with
local partners where there are significant differences between the national cultural
characteristics or cultural norms of the home and the host countries (Hennart 1998;
Kogut and Singh 1988). Kogut and Singh (1998) were the first combine Hofstede's
four cultural dimensions into one aggregate measure of cultural distance between
134
countries. These differences are termed cultural distance. Cultural distance has often
been investigated in terms of difference in core business, management practices and
decision making processes (Killing, 1983). Differences in culture between JV
partners may create ambiguities in the relationship which may, in turn, lead to JV
conflict and result in JV termination (Barkema, Bell and Pennings, 1996). IV
Partners from different nations have different negotiation styles (Sawyer and
Geutzkow, 1965). Negotiations can easily break down because of cultural
misunderstanding (Hendon et al., 1998). Graham and Sano (1989) note that cultural
misunderstanding can lead to negotiation conflict. Naturally, each partner tends to
stress their own cultural traits and to evaluate the behaviour of other parties by their
own value yardsticks (Gudykunst, 1991).
Makin° and Beamish (1998) suggest that cultural distance influences the alliance
performance. Pierre-Xavier (1997) suggests that national culture will influence the
operational performance of a company. Lin and Germain (1998) note that the greater
the cultural similarity between partners, the higher the expected satisfaction level.
Dabholkar et al. (1994) argue that cultural similarity promotes a similar role of
partners' expectation as well as reducing ambiguity and disagreement which therefore
lead to satisfactory outcomes. Tung (1982) found that the attitude and trait of
American partners towards their Chinese partners influenced the (performance)
outcomes of JV negotiation and operation. Ding (1997) suggests that ignoring the
cultural expertise of the local partner could adversely affect the JV performance. JV
partners who manage their business and make decisions based on their own cultural
values could end up in misunderstanding if they do not understand and accept the
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differences of their partner's culture. This, in turn, may lead the JV to achieve a lower
performance than it would if the JV partners understand and are able to accept these
cultural differences. The above discussion suggests the following proposition.
Proposition 3: The understanding and acceptance of each other's cultures will lead
fl/ partners to achieve a successful JV performance.
The five distinct negotiation strategies used by negotiating partners are collaborating,
competing, accommodating, avoiding and compromising. Bazerman and Carroll
(1987) suggest three approaches which determine negotiation behaviour, namely:
individual differences, motivational and cognitive models. Thompson (1990)
suggests that trait machiavellianism may not directly influence negotiation behaviour
but may instead interact with situational and task constraints to influence
performance. Lin (1996) claims that the relationship, norms, commitment, relative
power, culture and trust are perceived as being more critical and have a greater effect
on negotiation behaviour and outcomes than psychological factors, i.e. motivation and
cognition. Lin and Germain (1998) used cultural similarity, relative power and
relationship age as determinants of negotiation behaviour. Rao and Schmidt (1998)
also found that trust, cultural distance, time horizon, absolute power of negotiators
and their conflict frames have an impact on the tactics used in alliance formation. The
present study uses trust, culture and relative bargaining power as determinants of
negotiation behaviour. These seem to be the Critical factors used in most previous
research on negotiation behaviour.
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Lin and Germain (1998) suggest that the partner who holds more power is less likely
to propose middle ground or intermediate solutions. Rojot (1991) argues that "a
balance of power strongly in favour of one party will generally drive it towards a
conflictual attitude". However, the opposite view was given by Lin and Germain
(1998), i.e. that an imbalance of power encourages less integrative behaviour between
partners when disagreements need to be resolved. Dwyer and Walker (1981) found
that an imbalance in power leads the more powerful partner to engage in high
demand, coercive behaviour and less forthright communication, whilst a balance in
power induces partners to implement coordinative behaviour.
Pruitt and Carnevale (1993) argue that trust is an aspect of relationships that
constitutes another important antecedent to the negotiation process and behaviour.
Rotter, Chance and Phares (1972) posit that "a generalized expectancy of trust or
distrust can be an important determinant of behaviour". Ross and Croix (1996) note
that trust, as a personality trait, was shown to be related to negotiation behaviour and
should be considered for empirical investigation. Kimmel et al. (1980) define trust as
the belief of involvement of partners in cooperative behaviour. Pruitt (1981) suggests
trust relationships encourage problem-solving. Past research shows a favourable
relationship between trust and the negotiation behaviour of partnering firms in the
form of cooperative problem-solving (Zand 1972; Pruitt 1981; Lin 1996). Butler
(1999) argues that cooperative behaviour tends to be stimulated by trust. Ross and
Croix (1996) note that low trusters are highly sensitive to competitive messages from
partners but insensitive to cooperative messages. Pruitt (1981) states that cooperative
behaviour by partners tends to be an important source of trust. According to Kinmel
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et al. (1980), a high incidence of competitive behaviour was found with a combination
of low trust. Ross and Croix (1996) suggest that less trust between partners results in
the noncooperative partner turning to noncooperative behaviour when receiving an
uncooperative signal from the other.
Lin (1996) proposes that four dimensions of national culture appear to have a major
impact on negotiation behaviour. These dimensions include ambiguity tolerance,
humanism, long-term orientation and collectivism. Rosenweig and Singh (1991)
argue that multinational business strategy research has recognized the importance of
national culture as a determinant of management behaviour. Chen et al. (1998)
believe that culture may be a behavioural determinant which encourages would-be IJV
partners to work together cooperatively. Lin (1996) suggests that variability in
information processing or communication style leads partnering firms to handle the
negotiation conflict differently. Conflict arising from misunderstanding of partners
during the negotiation stems not only from ambiguous communication but also the
different conceptualizations of reality. Lin and Germain (1998) claim that cultural
similarity has an impact on the strategy used to resolve disagreement. Cultural
similarity seems to assist partners to understand the way and mindset of the other side
in managing and negotiating JV business. Campbell et al. (1988) suggest that
similarity encourages partners to implement more cooperative behaviour. In contrast,
partners who believe the other side is very dissimilar, in terms of understanding, may
hesitate to openly communicate and exchange information (Geringer, 1988). Chen et
al. (1998) argue that culture not only causes individuals to be more or less cooperative
but also has an impact on the selection and the effectivness of intervention
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mechanisms aimed at increasing cooperation. Fedor and Werther (1996) suggest that
partners, whose scores differ significantly on the cultural dimension of individualist-
collectivist, require a considerable cultural understanding to build cooperation in
culturally responsive international alliances. Morris et al. (1998) found that U.S.
managers tend to use a competing strategy to resolve conflict more than Indian
managers.
Olson and Singsuwan (1997) claim that more successful outcomes were expected to
be characterized by higher levels of constructive negotiation strategies. Friedmann
and Beguin (1971) suggest that open problem-solving and compromising strategies
enable negotiating partners to get away with deadlock or conflict situations which, in
turn, lead to successful JV operations. Similarly, Campbell et al. (1988) suggest that
problem-solving behaviour, e.g. cooperative strategy, tends to lead JV partners to
achieve successful relationships and outcomes. According to Ganesan (1993), positive
evaluations of overall performance are more likely to ensue as partners strive to
balance the needs and concerns of both parties. Butler (1999) contends that "purely
competitive behaviours can lead to isolation and further mistrust, which in turn can
undermine long-term performance." According to Killing (1983) and Lewis (1990),
severe conflict between partners is more likely to result in misunderstanding, distrust,
anxiety, reduction in cooperation and less efficient integration of activities, which in
turn lead to deteriorating joint venture performance. The above arguments lead to the
following proposition.
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Proposition 4: When symmetric bargaining power exists, along with mutual trust and
cultural understanding, JV partners tend to cooperate rather than compete against
each other. This in turn will result in a favourable performance (outcome).
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Antecedents
Relative Bargaining
Power
- Alternative choice
- Strategic importance
- Resource contribution
Trust
- Past experience
- Reputation
National Culture
- Individualism/Collectivism
- Power distance
- Uncertainty avoidance
- Masculinity/Femininity
Negotiation Behaviour
- Collaborative
- Competitive
- Compromising
- Avoiding
- Accommodating
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Outcomes
- Performance
* Satisfaction
- Over all JV business
* Objectives achievement
* JV business
relationships
Chapter 4
Research Methodology and Propositions
In this chapter, firstly, a conceptual model of JV negotiation is presented in Figure 4-
1. It depicts the relationships between relative bargaining power, trust, national
culture, negotiation behaviour and (performance) outcomes. This will be followed by
discussions of the following spheres of research methodology:- research design and
general approach, unit of analysis and sampling frame, planned data collection, pilot
study, case selection, conduct of case study interviews, data coding, case analysis
technique and reliability and validity of research.
A conceptual model on negotiation was given in Figure 4-1 as follows.
Figure 4-1
A conceptual model
i
The above conceptual model has been adapted from Yan (1993); Lin (1996); Lin and
Germain (1998).
The relationships between bargaining power, control and performance were depicted
in Yan's (1993; p.2 and p.82) model. Yan's (1993) model shows a direct relationship
between bargaining power and performance and an indirect relationships between
bargaining power and performance mediated by the control variable. Yan (1993) used
both context-based components (alternative choice and strategic importance) and
resource-based components (technology, management expertise, global service
support, local knowledge, product distribution, material procurement and equity) as
measures of relative bargaining power. The performance measure used in his study is
the extent to which the- JV partners have achieved strategic objectives. The indicators
of strategic objectives are profit, market share, growth, local sourcing, learning,
credibility, technology, export, management, import substitution and up-stream
technology.
In Lin's (1996) model. The negotiation strategies and behaviours are predicted by
relational context variables. This relationship is moderated by national culture.
Relationship commitment, trust and relative power were used to represent the
relational context. The negotiation behaviours were characterized by multiple
strategies. They include problem-solving, compromising, forcing and legal course.
Lin and Germain's (1998) model was developed further from Lin's (1996) model by
expanding to the interaction effects (performance outcome) of various relational
variables on negotiation strategies. Lin and Germain's (1998) study used cultural
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similarity, relative power and relationship age to represent relational context variables
in predicting performance. Performance was measured using financial performance,
market performance, objective achievement, personal relationship and the overall IJV
relationship. Relative power was measured by the resource contribution of each
partner.
The models of Yan (1993); Lin (1996) and Lin and Germain (1998) were adapted in
the present study, which aims to examine the relationships between relative
bargaining power, trust, culture, negotiation behaviour and performance outcome.
Strategic importance, alternative choice and resource contribution represent measures
of relative bargaining power in the study of Yan (1993). These seem to be more valid
than the measurement of resource contribution alone, used in past studies such as
Inkpen and Beamish (1997); Lin (1996) and Lin and Germain (1998); Mjoen (1993).
Reputation and past experience are used as indicators of trust. Negotiation strategies
(i.e. competing, collaborating, sharing, avoiding and accomodating) developed by
Thomas (1976) is applied to the present study. To achieve a more valid and accurate
assessment of JV performance, both objective and subjective measures are used in this
study. They include the achievement of partners' objectives, IN partner's
satisfaction and N partners' business relationship. Four cultural dimensions of
Hofstede (1994) are examined as national culture variables.
4.1 Research design
Quantitative methods of research are the collection and analysis of data using
positivist assumptions on a subject already understood and categories which are
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isolated and well defined prior to survey. This method is used when questions can be
uncomplicated and unambiguous and answers can be provided without explanation.
Questions are likely to be closed or having a limited choice of answers. The sampling
frame tends to be large e.g. a representative sample of a large population. The most
common methods are formal questionnaires, standardised or structured interviews,
controlled observation and statistical analysis of secondary data. Data is collected
from a large sample and is easily recorded and analysed but it can be costly and
omission of any detail may lead to failure of the survey. The restricted definition of
the questionnaire may lead to omission of relevant data and analysis may not indicate
anomalies within the averages or generalisations.
According to Van Maanen (1983), qualitative methods are "an array of interpretive
techniques which seek to describe, decode, translate and otherwise come to terms with
the meaning, not the frequency, of certain more or less naturally occurring phenomena
in the social world." Qualitative methods are more exploratory and without precise
definition. Data is not generally organised, as categories may be expected to change
during the study. The sample is usually small. The method is best used in the
following situations:-
• when answers to questions are likely to require explanation and where they cannot
be easily predicted
• when carried out before a quantitative study in order to form conceptual
frameworks, provide background information, verify assumptions and provide a
guide as to the type of responses to be expected
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• after a qualitative survey to probe further an issue of particular interest and allow
serendipity
• where research is furthered by interviews with groups.
Methods include participant observation, case studies, oral and life histories,
interviews and group discussions. There is greater potential depth, flexibility and
collectable information and this method can be used to augment existing information.
However it is more difficult to record data, interviewing requires greater skill and
results are more subjective, relying on the researcher's interpretation. Field notes are
very important and if the field diary is not written up immediately and regularly,
important observations may be forgotten and left out of findings.
Qualitative case study strategy was considered the most appropriate and was therefore
used in this study. It was considered appropriate because it could enrich and clarify
research on JV negotiation in greater detail as well as capturing the complexity of the
concept. Most researchers tend to focus on statistical based analysis dealing with the
broad range of concept and data, without examining the concept in depth. Also, there
was insufficient population to conduct a quantitative study of the JV service industry
in Thailand and the response rate was very low. Parkhe (1993) suggested that "a case
study would permit researchers to get close to the action of the formation, structuring,
and stability of IJVs." Glaser and Strauss (1967) support the use of the qualitative
approach, especially the case study, rather than the use of the quantitative approach
where
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"Because of the changing conditions of everyday situations, it is not necessary
to use rigorous research to discover precise, quantitatively validated, factual
knowledge upon which to base the theory. "Facts" change quickly, and precise
quantitative appproaches (even large-scale surveys) typically yield too few
general concepts, and relations between concepts, to be of broad practical use
in coping with the complex interplay of forces characteristic of a substantive
area..., the person who applies a quantitatively derived theory frequently finds
himself either guideless or trying to apply the inapplicable - with potentially
unfortunate human and organizational consequences."
According to Yin (1984), case study is an empirical inquiry that "investigates a
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context." It is particularly useful when
the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident (Heureux et
al., 1997). Porter (1991) reflects in his study that, because of the complexity of his
frameworks, a large number of in-depth case studies help him to be able to identify
variables and explore the relationship among them better than cross-sectional studies.
Parkhe (1993) suggested that the use of the qualitative method, especially case study,
regarding interorganisational relations in alliance, would yield a valuable contribution
to research.
Use of the case study method provides an opportunity to examine in-depth the roles of
trust, culture and bargaining power as they influence negotiation behaviour and
outcome (performance). In this study these factors are difficult to measure
quantitatively. In recent years, the case study has become one of the most popular
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methods of business research. It is "an extensive examination of a single instance of a
phenomenon of interest and is an example of a phenological methodology" (Hussey
and Hussey, 1997). Case studies can be recorded on single or multiple cases. The
challenge of theoretical sampling is to choose cases that are likely to replicate or
extend the emergent theory. Focusing on one or two cases might draw an invalid and
premature conclusion. Therefore, to reduce this risk, six cases studies were chosen for
this research. Yin (1984) suggested that case surveys or case comparisons are
appropriate, when applying cross-case evidence, to generalize patterns.
Yin (1994) noted that case studies are effectively used when dealing with "how" and
"why" questions, when events are difficult to control and when the study involves
some real-life context. The qualitative case study has been perceived as an approach
that yields a rich detail of activities not available through questionnaires (Yin, 1992;
Eisenhardt, 1989). Case study research may be characterized as seeking to define
specific questions of study ahead of time; to emulate logical positivism in developing
rival hypotheses and collecting external evidence bearing on these questions; to carry
out fieldwork in a targeted fashion (Yin, 1993).
Case studies can involve either single or multiple cases, and numerous levels of
analysis (Yin, 1984). According to Stake (1994), some case studies are qualitative
studies and some are not. Yin (1994) identifies that collecting data in multiple case
study methods may be both qualitative and quantitative. Gummesson (1991) places
an emphasis of case study on two areas of particular interest: general conclusions
from a limited number of cases and specific conclusions regarding a single case. Yin
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(1994) distinguishes three types of uses of case study research: exploratory,
descriptive, and explanatory.
On the downside, case study is inferior to methods that are based on random statistical
samples of a large number of observations (Gummesson, 1991). In addition, access to
a suitable organisation is often difficult to negotiate and the process of the research
may be time consuming. It is also difficult to decide on the boundaries of case study
research (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). Case study research can lead to overly complex
theories and sacrificing parsimony. It could also be pragmatic and derives not from
the method but from the institutional biases against it (Parkhe, 1993). There is also a
risk in case study interviews where interviewees may have forgotton important facts
happening at the beginning of the JV if the JV has been operating for a long period of
time. Furthermore, interviewees may reinterpret their experience according to recent
events. The evaluations of individuals are seldom made explicit in case studies
(Gummesson, 1991).
Therefore, interviewing with many individuals in the same JV firm as well as
gathering additional data from reports, news clippings, documents, memos and printed
material could also reinforce and/or validate any inconsistent data received. Parkhe
(1993) argues that
"no single approach to theory development, including case studies, is self-
sufficient and capable of producing a well-rounded theory that simultaneously
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maximizes the research quality criteria of construct validity, internal validity,
external validity, and reliability."
According to Denzin (1970), the use of different methods by a number of researchers
studying the same phenomenon should, if their conclusions are the same, lead to
greater validity and reliability than a single methodological approach. Chetty (1996)
argued that "the strengths of the case study method outweigh its weaknesses." Other
methods used in the present study include questionnaire surveys and histories.
Senior executive officers (e.g. senior managers, CEOs, or MD) representing parent
firms and/or JV firms were targeted for interview. Developing Hebert's (1994)
approach, this study gathered data from JV firms whose top management staff
represent both Thai and foreign partners. Pfeffer (1993) suggests that the ability of a
field to make progress and to attract resources requires some convergence among the
scholars in the area. For this reason, he states that "without some minimal level of
consensus about research questions and methods, fields can scarcely expect to
produce knowledge in a cumulative, developmental process." Beamish (1984) in
Hebert (1994) also argues that the use of multiple source approaches contributes to
more reliable and valid data. Furthermore, these approaches permit researchers to
handle missing data. Although multiple sources are considered to involve substantial
extra cost and resource requirements, they are believed to control and reduce potential
informant biases and threats to validity (Hebert, 1994).
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Informants might base their answers on their own perception. They may not be able
to report accurately about the phenomena or processes they observed (Nisbett and
Wilson, 1977). Also in complex phenomena and large organizations, the data
received from informants might not be adequate (Seidler, 1974). However in support
of this method, it has been tried and tested in previous studies by Campbell (1955)
and Hebert (1994). Data received from informants could be considered as a reliable
and valid method for business policy research (Pearce, Robbins and Robinson, 1987).
Geringer (1986) in Hebert (1994) suggested that prior research on JVs and pre-tests
with these key informants showed that they have been more involved in the formation
of the JV firms, and management processes, and have access to requisite data.
Moreover, additional information from secondary sources was gathered from JV firms
as much as possible to minimize risks of biases from the above key informants.
4.2 Study's unit and sampling frame
The selection of the study's unit and sampling frame must be considered alongside
proposition testing. To reduce any detrimental effect on the relationships explored in
this research, variables will be controlled and the scope will be limited as follows:
Firstly, this study is limited to negotiating partnerships of at least two members. Of
the two partners who are negotiating and operating a JV business in Thailand, at least
one should be of Thai nationality and one of foreign nationality. In addition, all
nationalities of foreign parents conducting their IV businesses in Thailand are
included as long as their headquarters lie outside Thailand.
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Secondly, the respective equity positions of either partner, whether Thai or foreign,
should range between 25 and 75 percent. Ventures where one of the parents hold
either more than 75 percent or less than 25 percent of the equity are considered
minority equity investments rather than genuine JVs (Hebert, 1994). Kogut (1988a)
and Killing (1988) also claim that minority equity investments are both legally and
conceptually distinct from joint ventures. Therefore, they will be excluded for the
purpose of this study. According to Geringer (1986) and Inkpen (1992) in Hebert
(1994) an ownership position inferior to 25 percent is also interpreted as a sign of
limited involvement and interest in the management of the JVs.
Thirdly, the study will be limited to the service sector to minimise any extraneous
influence (Eisenhardt, 1989) that might be derived from differences between the
service and manufacturing sectors (Chowdhury, 1988) in Yan (1993).
Fourthly, joint venture business negotiation must have taken place for a minimum
period of two years so that the company's data on performance and outcome will
already be available. Geringer and Hebert (1991) noted that the survival and duration
of JVs had been found to be correlated with subjective measures of performance, such
as satisfaction and business performance. Accordingly, non-surviving and recently
agreed joint venture negotiation (whose satisfaction is difficult to guage) have been
excluded to minimise bias. Hebert (1994) suggests that a mix of established and
recently negotiated JVs may reduce the observed variance of performance and
outcome constructs.
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Lastly, the nature of the participants has been restricted to inter-firm for profit joint
venture negotiation only.
4.3 Data collection planned
This study employed the data collection methods of document and printed material
review, observation, questionnaire and in-depth interviews with MD, GM, president,
senior managers, JV project manager and key members of staff of JV firms and JV
parent firms where possible. Chetty (1996) argues that multiple sources of data
collection help to prevent subjective bias and 'allow a more thorough examination of
each firm than a narrowly-defined quantitative study'. Gummesson (1991) suggests
that to understand the nature of action science, one needs to examine closely related
methods of access where qualitative, in-depth interviews and observation are
important and quantitative methods such as questionnaires or structured personal
interviews would be very useful.
The first part of the questionnaire, used in this study, contained general questions on
the JV firm's background, e.g. JV formation, turnover, percentage of ownership and
total capital investment. Also, the responders were requested to indicate their level of
involvement with the general JV background, i.e. competition, strategic importance of
establishing JV, authority and decision-making power. The respondents were also
asked to rate/indicate their level of agreement with statements about JV negotiation
and outcomes by circling a response in the second part of the questionnaire. The third
part of the questionnaire uses open-ended interview questions. The questionnaire and
interview protocol for this case study research were written in two languages: Thai
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and English. The English format was sent to foreigners representing foreign partners
whilst the person representing the Thai partner was given the format which contains a
choice of either Thai or English. The questionnaire and interview protocol were
designed and tested in English, and then translated into Thai by the author whose first
language is Thai. Afterwards, the double checking process (transfer back again to
English) was implemented by a skillful translator in order to enhance the quality of
the translation.
The questionnaire and interview protocol for this case study research was taken and
adapted from the format of the questionnaire survey on United States-Japan business
negotiation practices, procedures and outcomes used by Tung (1984); the format of
interview protocol for the case studies by Yan (1993); the format of management of
joint ventures research questionnaire by Hebert (1994); and the format of survey
instrument of Lin (1996).
Yin (1994) noted that the protocol is "an especially effective way of dealing with the
overall problems of increasing the reliability of case studies" and "a major tactic in
increasing the reliability of case study research". Some important reasons for the need
to develop protocol are as follows:-
• reminding the researchers what the case study is about
• anticipating several problems, including that of how the case study reports might
be completed.
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In the next stage a pilot case study was carried out. Pilot case studies help researchers
to refine data collection plans with regard to the content of the data and the procedures
to be followed, as well as to correct any weakness and defects in the initial protocol;
and to develop and enhance the quality of the interview questions. Yin (1994)
suggested preparation of desired skills and training for a specific case study are also
needed (in addition to the development of a protocol and the conduct of a pilot case
study) to achieve a high quality of case study. It seems that only a few case studies
will end up as planned, therefore, adaptability and flexibility need to be taken into
account. The maintenance of unbiased perspective is stressed when a shift in plan is
made. The pilot study also targeted firms in the service sector. The specific firms for
pilot study were chosen according to the convenience, access and geographic
proximity of researchers, i.e. around Bangkok. This allowed for a less structured and
more prolonged relationship to develop between the researchers conducting
interviews and interviewees, than might happen in the "real" case study situation (Yin,
1994).
Before conducting the real case study and collecting the evidence, the first
introductory letter requesting permission to conduct interviews, as well as the letter
identifying the significance and objective of this study, was sent to targeted firms in
service sector. Afterwards, the firms who agreed to participate in this case study
research were then given a registered letter promising to share the results and
providing a summary of comparative results. These letters will also include major,
open-ended interview questions which will be used during the interview processes as
well as questionnaire questions. From here on, the data collection process begins.
154
This study used in-depth interviews as the major source of data collection. Other
methods used include observation, a questionnaire survey and gathering data from
secondary sources to provide supplementary data in order to enhance the reliability
and validity of results. The questionnaire response was received back from the
interviewee /respondent at the end of the interview or posted after the interview was
conducted.
According to Hussey and Hussey (1997), interviews make it easy to compare answers
and may be face-to-face, voice-to-voice or screen-to-screen. Interviews also permit
researchers to ask more complex questions and ask follow-up questions, which are not
possible in a questionnaire. Further, an interview may permit a higher degree of
confidence in the replies than questionnaire responses and can take account of non-
verbal communications such as the attitude and behaviour of the interviewees (Hussey
and Hussey, 1997). Qualitative in-depth interviews and methods of observation and
participation are a significant part of case study. However, quantitative survey
methods, e.g. questionnaires or structured personal interviews, may also be useful
(Gummesson, 1991). The interviewees or respondents don't have to answer some of
the questions if they prefer not to. They can also expand or add to the areas of inquiry
during a sequence of interviews.
The face-to-face in-depth interview was documented using rapid notes or shorthand.
This method is used in order that researchers can preserve the interview in its original
form without any form of editing or comment. Simultaneously, the conversation was
recorded on tape, if the interviewees agreed. The recorder was switched off whenever
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the interviewee wished to discuss confidential or sensitive information. This method
preserves the verbal part of the interview but the symbolic language (e.g. body
language) cannot be captured by this method. The researcher/author also wrote down
all the obvious data and then supplemented his own notes with reference to the
available documents. The participants/interviewees were informed that the
information and data received would be treated as confidential and would remain
anonymous if preferred. Therefore, a coding system was applied to individuals and
JV companies who were involved in this study and wished to remain anonymous.
4.4 Pilot study
After the initial questionnaire and interview questions were designed, a random
sample of twenty-five JV service firms was drawn from The British Chamber of
Commerce Book 1997, The American Chamber of Commerce Book 1998, The
German-Thai Chamber of Commerce Handbook & Directory 1997 and The Foreign
Companies in Thailand Yearbook 1998. Only one JV firm volunteered to participate
in this pilot study. Therefore personal connections were used to address the targeted
JV firms again. This time three more JV firms agreed to take part in the pilot study.
In the next stage, eight interviewees from the four JV service firms in Bangkok
participated in a pretest of these questions, aiming to assess data collection and
procedures as well as the development of the conceptual framework. The
participating JV firms operate in the shipping, construction, office rental and retailing
sectors. Yin (1994) suggested that "pilot case studies may reveal inadequacies in the
initial design or may help to articulate it."
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The interviewees were sent a questionnaire together with the interview questions and
asked to complete the questionnaire before the interview process took place. After the
follow-up telephone call to confirm that the questionnaire was completed and to
arrange an appointment time, the open-ended interview and questionnaire questions
began. The length of each interview varied from one to two and a half hours.
Interviewees were asked to comment on the appropriateness of the interview protocol
and questionnaire structure, format and content. Interviewees also suggested a few
changes to the questionnaire and interview questions. The ambiguous and irrelevant
questions found during the pilot test were deleted and revised.
These minor changes did not affect the results derived from the variables at the
beginning of the questionnaire and interview protocol design process. Tape recording
and rapid notes were also used during the interview. The pilot study allowed for
exploring the variables and enhancing the reliability of the interview and
questionnaire questions. The pilot study took place over seven weeks during August
and September 1998. This resulted in the redesigning and adjusting of the interview
and questionnaire questions so that they would effectively fit into this research study.
Taking into account minor adjustments in the questionnaire and interview questions,
the pattern emerging from comparison of responses showed the overall reliability and
efficiency of these questions. The findings from the pilot study contribute greatly to
the in-depth case study interview with regards to the role of trust and culture as they
influence negotiation behaviour and outcomes.. Trust was found to be a significant
factor in determining the success or failure of IJV business operation in Thailand from
this pilot study.
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4.5 The selected case samples
The joint venture samples based on the service sector were selected because of the
scanty amount of research carried out in Thailand on joint venture negotiation in this
sector. The joint venture firms data was built from The British Chamber of Commerce
Book 1997, The American Chamber of Commerce Book 1998, The German-Thai
Chamber of Commerce Handbook & Directory 1997 and The Foreign Companies in
Thailand Yearbook 1998. The exact number of JV service firms in Thailand is
unknown. While many books show the data about JV firms in the manufacturing
industry, there was no complete book obtainable in Thailand, which could specify the
information of JV firms in the service sector.
Therefore, the only method available was to search for the firms in the service sector
whose stake included both Thai and foreign firms. Although firms which indicate an
ownership split between Thai and foreign firms could be joint venture firms, many of
them seem to share ownership but leave all the management operation to one
partnering firm. According to Thai regulations, foreign firms operating JV business
in the service sector must enter into business with a Thai firm who must hold at least
51% of stake. This results in some foreign firms looking for a Thai partner just to
satisfy the law. In some of these JV finxis, the foreign firm has total management
control and they don't consider themselves as JV firms.
A list of about 270 potential JV service firms was identified from the books
mentioned above. The author then randomly chose 120 firms from the variety of
businesses whose stake includes both Thai and foreign firms. Telephone inquiry was
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used to confirm the equity structure and the status of the JV firms. Twenty-nine firms
considered themselves to be true JV firms. A participation request letter, which
included identification of the importance and objectives of the research, was sent to
twenty-nine firms shortly after the telephone inquiry. Only two firms agreed to
participate in this study. One JV firm was selected for this study. The other did not
meet the requirements of this research regarding the management and equity structure.
The main reasons, provided by JV firms, who did not participate in this research,
include an obligation not to participate in research study; the information is too
sensitive to provide for research; the pressure of work; time constraints; the length of
the questionnaire; busy at work; going abroad; too much demand for research.
Yin (1993) suggests three selection criteria for both single and multiple case studies as
follows:- feasibility and access, topical relevance and criticality for the theory being
tested. This study followed a selection criterion of feasibility and access. Because the
response to requests for participation in this research of the JV service firm was so
small, it was necessary to use personal connections. The owner of a high reputation
private Thai firm, high ranking executive officers from both private and government
bodies and a Thai MP all contacted their connections in the JV service firms known to
them, requesting that the companies contribute and participate, allowing the author to
conduct the interview and questionnaire research. More firms then agreed to
contribute to the research. Firms who agreed to participate in the interview process at
this time received a letter identifying the importance and objectives of the study and
also questionnaire and interview questions by either mail or fax according to their
choice.
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The results of Butler's study of JVs in the UK and Malaysia showed that there is not a
problem in practice in examining different sectors. He also argued that "other factors
were more crucial determinants of partner selection and joint venture performance."
Finally, six JV service firms from the construction, construction & engineering,
leasing, gas distribution, exporting and oil storage were selected and participated in
this research study. One joint venture has four partners and another has three partners.
The rest have two partners. The partner's nationalities were 6 Thais, 3 Japanese, 1
German, 1 Dutch, 1 British, 1 New Zealander, 1Belgian and 1 Australian. The total
number of all partners is 15. The selection of cases was also dominated by
considerations of access. This research has tried to highlight a range of business types
within the service industries. Accordingly, the use of a wide range of cases could
offer diversity and considerably enhance the chances that the effect of trust, culture
and bargaining on negotiation behaviour and outcomes observed would be
representative of the phenomenon.
Hussey and Hussey (1997) suggested that it is unnecessary to find a representative
case or set of cases because one would not be attempting statistical but rather
theoretical generalisations. According to Chetty (1996) "the case study data is
matched to theory and not analysed to make statistical generalisations." Similar cases
would help to show whether theory can be generalised, whilst dissimilar cases help to
extend or modify theory. Eisenhardt (1989) posits that there is no ideal number of
cases in the use of the multiple-case approach and suggests that the study works well
using between four and ten cases. She also commented that the theory is difficult to
generate where the study looks at fewer than four cases and that the volume of data is
160
difficult to handle where the study looks at more than ten cases. According to Yin
(1994) and Eisenhardt (1989), replication logic helps researchers to point out the
subtle similarities and differences within a group of cases and also inter-group
similarities and differences. Chetty (1996) contends that the use of the multiple-case
approach helps him to "better understand a firm's export decision-making process and
export performance." However, the multi-case approach was criticised by Dyer and
Wilkins (1991). They argue that the single-case method is a better way to form
theories whilst the multiple-case approach is a hybrid form which claims to generate
theory but actually includes many characteristics of hypothesis-testing research.
Eisenhardt (1991) responded to this argument by stating that the similarities of single
and multiple cases far outweigh the differences.
4.6 The conduct of case study interviews
Face-to-face, open-ended interviews averaging two hours were carried out during the
interview process. According to Gummesson (1991), most case study research in
management is based on interviews of one or two hours' length with each informant.
A total number of 22 interviewees were involved in this study. The .IV firms and
interviewees in each case study are disguised to maintain confidentiality. The
interviews took place on a one to one basis. Almost half of the interviewees had
joined the JV company and been involved at the beginning of JV negotiation. One
interviewee of company F firstly joined the foreign side and then later moved to work
for the Thai partner. Most top management executive officers, i.e. MD and board of
directors, who were involved in the JV firms since the start of JV formation, were
interviewed firstly for the general background such as motive of entering joint venture
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negotiation, personal experience and involvement with JY, the issues of negotiation,
JV strategic objectives and goals, JV problems and JV agreement. Then, specific
questions were asked regarding the issues of bargaining power, negotiation behaviour,
trust, cultural traits and negotiation outcomes (e.g. profitability and satisfaction).
The interviews with senior managers who joined the JV after the agreement was
signed, were designed to contribute general information about the JV, ongoing
negotiation problems and the methods used to resolve those problems, i.e.
management responsibility and decision-making, as well as their opinion with regards
to performance outcomes, i.e. profitability, overall satisfaction and the achievement of
partner's objectives. The international business experience of interviewees prior to
joining the IJV firm was an average of 10 years.
Table 4-1 summarises the title of the interviewees of each JV firm participating in the
research.
Table 4-1
Members of IJV firms interviewed
JV Company Thai partner Foreign partner
Company A 1 project manager
1 construction coordination
manager
1 construction manager
1 co-project manager (Japanese Y)
1 commercial manager (German)
1 quantity surveyor manager (Japanese Z)
1 finance and accounting manager (Japanese Z)
Company B 1 managing director 1 executive director (Japanese)
Company C 1 managing director 1 deputy managing director (Dutch)
1 former managing director (Dutch)
Company D 1 assistant managing director
1 quality assurance manager
1 managing director (New Zealander)
Company E lsales and marketing manager
1 deputy president
(employed by Thai parent firm)
1 business and development manager (Belgian)
1 engineering department manager (British)
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JV Company Thai partner Foreign partner
1 construction manager
Company F 1 senior manager 1 construction manager (Australian)
Generally, early interviews were arranged with the top executive officers, i.e. MD,
president and vice president of each IJV. Then these executive officers introduced
and arranged further meetings and interviews for the researcher/author with their
partners and subordinates, i.e. senior manager. After the first round of interviews, a
gap was discovered in the information and data collected. Then a second round of
interviews took place with the same interviewees to fill in the missing information.
Also, some additional interviews were conducted with new interviewees at this time
to fulfil and validate the information required. In addition, one telephone interview
was conducted with the former managing director of the Netherlands partner of
company C.
The questionnaire and interview questions were passed on to potential interviewees
during the early interview with executive officers. Most completed questionnaires
were received by the end of interview process. Some questionnaire answers were
mailed back shortly after the interview was conducted. In addition, at the end of
interview session the interviewees were requested to provide the company's annual
report, JV background and history notes, newsletters and other relevant printed
material where possible. Almost all of the interviews were conducted at the JAI head
office. Some were conducted at the site of the operation. When the interviewer is
allowed the opportunity to visit the JV operation, it may be possible to observe and
note further background information. The use of tape recording was implemented
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during the interview, if allowed, in order to preserve the interview in its original form
without any form of editing or comment. Where tape recording is impossible, rapid
note-taking was used. About three quarters of the interviewees allowed tape
recording. One example of the reason for objection to tape recording was given by
one Thai MD. He claimed that he wanted to relax during the interview process. The
total time spent contacting JV firms, requesting participation until the interview
process was completed was 7 months between October 1998 and April 1999.
All interviews with the foreign partners were conducted in English. The author,
whose first language is Thai, used Thai language during interviews with Thai partners.
The interview dialogue was translated to English by the author who has studied in
Britain for about five years. The author also asked for comment from a Thai
translator in relation to this translation and made some minor changes. Then the
content of this transcript was explained again to a friend of the author whose mother
language is English. Then the final corrections were made to this transcript.
4.7 Data coding
In this study, open and axial coding techniques, prescribed by Galser and Strauss
(1967), Yin (1984), Miles and Huberman (1994) and Hussey and Hussey (1997), were
used to analyse the verbal data. The reason for using coding techniques rather than
using other technical analyses that deal with numbers (e.g. repertory grid technique) is
that it enriches the notion of qualities and essential characteristics and renders more
meaning than do numbers (Miles and Huberman, 1994). According to Hussey and
Hussey (1997), open coding refers to "the process of identifying, analysing and
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categorising the raw data." It starts from "repeatedly going through the verbal data
and assigning labels to identifiable themes and recurrent patterns of responses
(Williams and Wilson, 1997). Similarly, Miles and Huberman (1994) observe that the
coding process begins with a line by line review of the data. Axial coding is a more
extended process of connecting categories and sub-categories together with the
intention of revealing links and relationships (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). Williams
and Wilson (1997) noted that these techniques combine the data from multiple
interviewees "to be continuously contextualized within the broader setting of the
organization, as well as within the theoretical framework of the study."
The verbal data from the interviewees was coded separately. It was coded on a set of
coding schemes identified in past literature and developed by the author. The coding
schemes were modified as each subsequent set of verbal data was analyzed and new
insights emerged (Williams and Wilson, 1997). The coding schemes were expanded
and refined throughout the process. Then the final set of codes was derived from a
long iterative refinement process. The actual data was firstly coded into the categories
specified as follows: partner's reason for entering JV; partner's strategic objective of
participating in the JV; negotiation contextual variables (bargaining power, trust,
culture, negotiation behaviour and performance); negotiation relationship between the
contextual variables; and JV management structure. Then, sub-categories were coded
using a classification derived from a previous study which was again further
developed by the author. They include equity structure of the JV, partner's alternative
choice in establishing the JV, partner's resource contribution to the JV, reputation and
past relationship and experience of JV partner, individualism VS. collectivism (e.g.
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staff promotion, management system, perception of contractual agreement), cultural
difference in negotiation style, negotiation tactics (e.g. compromising, collaborating),
partner's satisfaction in the JV performance, the extent to which each partner achieved
their strategic objectives, partner's business relationships. The use of multiple data
sources (data triangulation) yield a higher level of validity and consistency in
analysing the interview data.
4.8 Case analysis technique
There are very few complete explanations of how to analyse qualitative data (Hussey
and Hussey, 1997). The present study combines two analytic strategies for case
studies, suggested by Yin (1994). The data analysis in this study consists of
examining, categorising and combining the interview data to address the theoretical
propositions. The analytic techniques rely on initial theoretical propositions which in
turn reflect the research questions and research design. The first technique is "pattern
matching logic." Pattern matching is used to compare the actual pattern with the
expected pattern (Yin 1994; Chetty 1996). According to Yin (1994), if the patterns
coincide, the results can strengthen the internal validity of the cases. In the present
study, pattern matching was used to confirm the content of the JV negotiation model
adapted from Yan and Gray (1994); Yan (1993); Lin (1996); Lin and Germain (1998).
The main elements of content included a set of three variables (bargaining power,
trust, culture), one mediate variable (negotiation behaviour) and one dependent
variable (performance). Similar results were expected from the two main cases (case
studies A and E) and three mini-cases (case studies B, C, D) whereas contrasting
results but for predictable reasons were expected from one mini-case (case study F).
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Chetty (1996) claims that these cross-case comparisons could lead researchers to "go
beyond initial impressions and take a more in-depth, structured approach with the
data." Brian (1994) discusses that "cross-case comparisons are a less risky approach
of theory development, particularly for the inexperienced researcher." He also
suggests that without an analysis across cases, it is difficult to generalise theory.
Eisenhardt (1989) suggests three different tactics of cross-case comparison. The first
tactic is to "select categories or dimensions, and then to look for within-group
similarities coupled with intergroup differences." The second strategy is to "select
pairs of cases and then to list the similarities and differences between each pair." The
third tactic can be done by dividing the data by data source and analysing the data
individually. Then, compare the evidence from one data source with that from
another. When the evidence shows collaboration of pattern, "the finding is stronger
and better grounded" whereas if conflict of evidence is seen, the researcher can adjust
through deeper investigation into the meaning of the differences (Eisenhardt, 1989).
Yin (1994) refers to a situation that shows similar results within the same category as
literal replication. If the results of one case are different from the second group
(different category), he concludes that it is a theoretical replication. The cross-case
results could state the conclusion more assertively and more robustly (Yin, 1994).
The second technique is 'explanation building'. Explanation building is used to
explain why a set of causal links occur (Yin, 1994). According to Chetty (1996),
theoretical propositions about the causal links are developed by asking 'how' and
'why' questions. For example, for the relationship between bargaining power and JV
outcome, the question of 'how does bargaining power affect international joint
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venture negotiation outcome?' was asked. The development of research questions
allows the researcher to be more focussed on some specific data, thus overcoming the
overload of data that might arise during the data collection process (Chetty, 1996).
Eisenhardt (1989) suggests two steps in shaping the hypothesis. One is to refine the
definition of the construct as well as building evidence which measures the construct
in each case. The other involves "verifying that the emergent relationships between
constructs fit with the evidence in each case." These emergent relationships increase
the (internal) validity of the relationships (Eisenhardt, 1989). In the current study, the
explanation describes the causal link between a dependent variable and one or more
dependent variables mentioned above.
In addition, the data display techniques (e.g. matrix, table) of Miles and Huberman
(1994) were used in the present study. According to Miles and Huberman (1994) a
display is "a visual format that presents information systematically, so that the user
can draw valid conclusions and take needed action." The data display includes blocks
of text, phrases, abbreviations, symbolic figures, labelled lines, arrows, etc. (Hussey
and Hussey, 1997). Hussey and Hussey (1997) also noted that matrix display is
useful for helping to understand the flow and possible causality of events.
The results of the interviews and analysis were firstly presented from the aggregate
case studies of JV companies B, C, D and F. Then the case studies of JV companies
A and E were developed in great depth and used as a cross-case comparison.
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4.9 Research reliability and validity
Hussey and Hussey (1997) suggest that "reliability is concerned with the findings of
the research and is one aspect of the credibility of the findings." Gummesson (1991)
described reliability as when "two or more researchers studying the same
phenomenon with similar purposes should reach approximately the same results."
Reliability of research was obtained by providing a copy of case study protocol,
describing the interview process in order that subsequent investigators can repeat the
study. Hussey and Hussey (1997) note that "validity is the extent to which the
research findings accurately represent what is really happening in the situation." In
the present study, multiple sources of evidence were used (e.g. annual report, JV
background and history notes) and a chain of evidence (e.g. citing interview
dialogues) was carried out to establish the construct validity. The analytic tools of
`pattern-matching' and 'explanation-building' as well as a specification of the unit of
analysis were used to address internal validity. External validity was established
using replication logic applied to the six case studies.
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Chapter 5
The Aggregate Case Studies of JV Company B, C, D, F
This chapter presents the aggregate results of the case studies of companies B, C, D
and F. The chapter will proceed as follows: company background, JV strategic
objectives, reasons for establishing JV, bargaining power of partners, trust between
partners, culture, negotiation behaviour, JV performance and factors influencing JV
performance. As all four companies requested anonymity, a code has been devised to
disguise their real names.
5.1 Case background
5.1.1 Company B background
N company "B" is a service leasing company. After facing fierce competition in
Japan, due to the saturation of the leasing market, the Japanese parent sought an
opportunity to expand its business abroad. It was the first time that the Japanese
partner had entered N business with a Thai partner in Thailand, although they had
participated in JV business in other countries. The partner was identified twenty-one
years ago through the recommendation of the IFC (Industrial Finance Corporation).
Negotiation to form the JV company took six months. The N agreement was signed
in 1978. The N operation can last indefinitely. The core business of the Japanese
parent is leasing whilst the Thai parent operates in the financial sector. The salaries of
the expatriate managers are paid by the N. The organisation structure of the N
company is flat, top-down and informal. The boss makes a direct order to his/her
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subordinates. There are 52 employees working in this JV. About 98% of them are
Thais. There are no expatriates below management level. There are 7 members of the
Board of Directors. Three come from the Japanese side and four come from the Thai
side. The term of office for the Board of Directors is ten years. There is no limit to
the term of office for the General Manager. The JV has total assets of 4,000 Baht
million, up from 100 Baht million at the commencement of the JV operation. The
annual revenue is 350 Baht million. The company services the domestic market only.
5.1.2 Company C background
Company C is a service based oil and chemical storage company. The idea for the JV
initiated from the Thai government's call for bids for a concession to operate the
storage of oil and chemicals. The Dutch parent then approached the Thai parent
direct. The Thai parent also wished to diversify their business vertically. They
wanted to control and reduce new entrants into the oil and chemical storage business.
As a result, they decided to enter JV with the Netherlands partner. Both parent
companies are in related businesses. Negotiation to form the JV took one year and
nine months. This company spent more time in negotiations to form the JV than any
of the other companies studied in this research. The agreement was signed in 1992.
The core business of the Dutch parent is storage whilst the Thai parent's business is
olefines. There is no limit to the duration of the JV operation. The JV organisational
structure is flat, with centralised financial administration but decentralised
management in general. One main aspect of the JV contract is that, for the first six
years, the managing director must be a representative sent from the Netherlands parent
and the deputy MD will be appointed by the Thai partner. After this period, the
171
position of MD will be transferred to the Thais, with no time limit. The JV agreement
has not been renegotiated since the JV started operating. There are a total of 109
employees working in this .TV. 98% of the employees are Thais. The Thai and Dutch
partners had no previous relationship before the JV formation took place. Five
members of the Board of Directors come from the Thai partner and another five from
the Dutch partner. The JV has a total asset value of 4,047 Baht million, up from 557
Baht million at its inception. The annual revenue is 721 Baht million, up from 3.3
Baht million when the JV operation commenced business.
5.1.3 Company D background
JV company D is involved in both the servicing and manufacturing industry. They
produce steel and then market the products both domestically and internationally.
They also buy steel from other producers and supply to customers. Recently, due to
the economic crisis in Thailand, they began to expand their market abroad. They plan
to increase the amount of sales to international markets by about 50% in 1997/8, up
15% from 1996/7. The New Zealand partner approached the Thai partner to form the
JV business. They carried out market research in Thailand and discovered that the
Thai partner was a good potential partner. The Thai partner at that time was
expanding business vertically. After the foreign partner had made the approach, they
decided to join because of the good potential business that could support their core
businesses. Both parent firms are in the same line of construction and steel business.
They had never done business together before the formation of this JV. Both partners
also enjoy a good reputation in their own country. It took five months of negotiation
to form the JV agreement which was signed in 1994. There is no limited to the JV
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duration. The salaries of expatriate staff are paid by the JV. According to an
interviewee, the JV agreement was very simple. One main point in the JV agreement
is that the foreign partner has the right to supply the general manager (GM) whilst the
Thai partner has the right to supply the assistant/deputy GM. The N organisation is
more informal, flat and centralised, compared to both parent companies that are quite
formal, tall and decentralised. The company has a total of 104 employees. About
95% of the employees are Thais. There are no expatriates below management level.
There are three members of the Board of Directors from each side. The company's
annual revenue increased 266%, up from 35 Baht million at the first year of JV
operation.
5.1.4 Company F background
Company F is a service based joint venture whose core business is construction and
engineering. The Australian partner had never before done business in Thailand. The
Australian parent has a major construction business, whilst the Thai parent has
diversified their business into retailing, manufacturing, hotel, fast food, wholesaling,
etc. According to the interviewee, the managing directors of both companies initiated
the idea of entering N business. Both the Thai and the Australian companies were
able to choose from a number of partners. However the Australian partner preferred
to enter N with the Thai partner. The Thai partner also was looking for a company
who could assist them in their construction of a hotel. Then, after seven months of
negotiation, the agreement was signed in 1992. • There is no limit to the duration of the
N business operation. The N agreement is a twenty page document. The main
issues cover the director's management responsibility, management decision making
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power and financial support. Expatriate managers get their salaries paid by the JV.
Both Thai parent and the JV have a flat organisation whereas the Australian has a tall
and formal organisation. There are 310 employees working in this JV. About 97% of
them are Thais. The JV has total assets worth 580 Baht million, up from 150 Baht
million at the beginning of its operation. The annual revenue is 424 Baht million.
There are four members of the Board of Directors - two members from each side.
A comparison of characteristics of JV firms is shown in the following table 5-1.
Table 5-1
Characteristics of IJV firms in the case study
JV Company Company
A
Company
B
Company
c
Company
D
Company
E
Company
F
Nature of Service Construction Leasing and
Hire Purchase
Storage of Oil
and Chemical
Exporting Gas
Distribution
Construction
and
Engineering
Length of
Negotiation
(months)
1/4 6 21 5 6 7
Agreement signed 1996 1978 1992 1994 1996 1992
Total Capital
Investment
(Baht Million)
Start up: Now
2,000:2,000 20:200 600:1,350 10:15 125:500 150:150
Equity
(% Thai/Foreign)
25/75
(Foreign:
25:25:25)
51/49 51/49 51/49
(legal
contract:
50/50)
51/49
(Foreign:
27:22)
51/49
Duration 10 Infinite Unlimited Unlimited Unlimited Infinite
Service Market Domestic Domestic Domestic Combination Domestic Combination
Total Assets
(Baht Million)
At founding:
Now
1,671:3,871 100:4,000 557:4,047 10:60 500:543 150:580
Revenues
(Baht Million)
First year: Recent
year
11:5,197 n.a.:350 3.3: 721 35:128 18:200 n.a.:424
No. of Employees 2,282 52 109 104 46 310
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5.2 JV strategic objectives
Almost all the partners seem to have one main objective, i.e. profit. However, each
partner has their extra objectives which may be different from their partner. The
following are the views of some partners who share the same objectives with partners
and also additional objectives that each would like to achieve from their TV:
"Our main objective is business growth." (Quote MD company B, interview 4)
"The leasing market in Japan has been saturating and competition among
leasing companies in Japan becomes more and more severe and in order to get
the more business opportunities, we decided to go abroad from Hong Kong,
then move to Singapore, and then Thailand. When we pursue more growth or
more profit, we need to go abroad to expand the market. In the case of
Japanese companies like Panasonic or Sony, their parent companies are
expecting an increased market share. But our Thai [TV] company, says is not
selling goods or products which are manufactured by the parent company. We
are not importing. So, expanding or increasing the market share is not our
goal. Profitability is more important than sales or market share. Since the
Thai economy has slumped after 1997, this results in a lower or negative profit
of almost all firms in Thailand, so we are trying to sustain our joint venture
business rather than focusing on profitability and business growth. We now
have more time, so I want our salesperson to develop his knowledge of sales
techniques in order to increase our future sales." (Quote executive director
company B, interview 5)
"We want to expand and diversify our new line of business so that we can
reduce the risk of having new entrants. When our partner approached us
directly, we decided to enter joint venture business with them in the hope that
we can control the market by ourselves...stopping new entrants. As a result,
we are the only company offering oil and chemical storage in this area.
Profitability is our second objective. The first one concerns business
expansion and control is more important. Our partner seems to have set their
objectives on market share expansion and profitability." (Quote managing
director company C, interview 6)
"We set up the JV to target the market - the construction sector over the last
five years when it had been very very busy. So, when we set up the joint
venture we aimed to really grow the company and use the Thai joint venture as
a base for the whole of Southeast Asia. We do a lot of export to Indonesia,
Singapore, Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Taiwan and the Philippines.
We export manufactured products - steel. We buy in some product and sell
these along with our own munufactured goods. We provide the service too.
The main objective is to grow and make money. Obviously, to expand the
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market. Basically, really to bring the technology into Thailand, to develop the
whole technology within Thailand and to develop the whole technology side in
Thailand." (Quote MD company D, interview 7)
"The foreign partner would like to expand within the Asian market. They
have a JV in Thailand and operations in The Philippines, Malaysia and
Australia, as well as in any other country. The Thai partner wants to make a
profit. They have many JVs [with other companies]. They want to have a
building company [the foreign partner] to assist them in the development
programme." (Quote senior manager company F, interview 10)
"We would like to make money and grow the business. Our objectives are
quite similar to [our New Zealand partner]." (Quote assistant managing
director company D, interview 19)
"The most important objective is to make money. The rest of or .3*cticres
include management skill, growth and business expansion, credibility,
reputation and market access." (Quote former MD company C, interview 20)
Table 5-2 below gives the whole picture of JV partner's goals and objectives.
Table 5-2
JV companies' goals and objectives
JV Firm Goals and Objectives
Thai partner's
view point
Foreign partner's view point
Company A Profitability, fulfill the
obligation to complete
the project with client,
gain experience and
creditability
Japanese Y
Profitability,
experience of
doing business
with foreigner
and creditability
Japanese Z
Profitability
German
Experience,
profitability and
establishing the
relationship on a
long-term basis
Company B Business growth and
profitability
Profitability
Company C Business expansion,
control the market,
know-how transfer and
profitability
Profitability, credibility and reputation, growth and
business expansion, management skill and market access
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JV Firm Goals and Objectives
Thai partner's
view point
Foreign partner's view point
Company D Market share, growth
and profitability
Profitability, business growth, experience and market
share
Company E Sales, profitability,
experience to expand to
other markets,
technology transfer and
air pollution reduction
British
Profitability, sales,
business growth and
market expansion
Belgian
Profitability, sales, critical size
in the market, opportunity for
future business
Company F Profitability Expand in the Asian market, profitability
5.3 Reasons for entering JV
Almost all foreign partner firms have two common reasons for establishing business
with Thais. These reasons are "Thai government connection" and "market access".
Whilst almost all of the Thai partner firms in this research want to receive know-how
from their foreign partners. The following are quotations obtained from interviewees
highlighting their reasons for establishing JV in Thailand:
"The Thai partner wanted to have an association with the international
building and construction engineering companies which could assist in the
construction of the hotel and other facilities for the [Thai partner family
business group]...having a capital construction company and also building on
the infrastructure...that was about to take place. While the foreign partner
wants to facilitate rapid market entry and obtain expertise and tax, spread the
risk and obtain know-how." (Quote senior manager company F, interview 10)
"According to the Thai regulations we are unable to have a wholly-owned
subsidiary in Thailand. So, this is one reason to establish a joint venture with
a Thai partner. The second reason 	 our policy is OK. [The Japanese
partner] will provide the know-how or leasing. We need the cooperation or
know-how to do business in certain countries. So, we have been... expanding
our networks or joint venture business over the world. Mainly.. .mostly in the
style of the JV. We will provide the leasing know-how and the joint venture
partner will provide us...OK...the local knowledge of how to do marketing
and how to grow the manpower, or how to administer the company in general
as well as easing contacts with the government." (Quote executive director
company B, interview 5)
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"There will be more opportunity to win concessions if we enter joint business
venture with our partner. Therefore, we eventually decided to be a joint
venture partner. We also need "know-how" from our partner. Another reason
for entering joint venture with our partner is because they are one of the
biggest companies operating in the oil storage business. Because this project
needs a large amount of investment, we really need a partner who has a strong
financial background. Furthermore, our partner chose us because we have a
good reputation and the strength to win the bidding and could also be a
prospective customer too." (Quote managing director company C, interview
6)
"We are in the same sector of business [as the Thai partner]. We need [the
Thai partner] to get into the Thai market quickly. Everything else we have
done ourselves. Connection is very important. Also, we need [the Thai
partner] to help us to connect with the Thai government and also [provide]
finance - very important." (Quote MD company D, interview 7)
"We chose our Thai partner because they possess a good reputation. We can
save a lot of time. [The Thai partner] can help use to get into the Thai market
quickly. Also we want [the Thai partner] to ease us on taxation and
government connection." (Quote former MD company C, interview 20)
The summary of reasons for both Thai and foreign partners entering joint business
together is given in the table 5-3 below.
Table 5-3
Reasons for establishing JV
JV Firm Reasons for establishing joint venture
Thai partner's
view point
Foreign partner's view point
Company A Government
requirement,
strengthening
competitiveness, know-
how, spreading risk,
technology, marketing
skill
Japanese Y
Spreading risk,
cost reduction,
Thai
government
connection,
Taxation	 .
Japanese Z
Local
information,
Thai
government
connection,
market
access
German
Obtaining local
knowledge,
strengthening
competitiveness,
marketing skill,
spreading risk,
market access,
reputation
Company B Obtaining know-how
and expertise
Thai regulation, Thai government connection, local
knowledge
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JV Firm Reasons for establishing joint venture
Thai partner's
view point
Foreign partner's view point
Company C Know-how, financial
resource, reputation,
opportunity to win
concession/bidding
Reputation, reducing time, rapid market entry, taxation,
Thai government connection
Company D Know-how, expertise Government connection, market access, financial
resource needed
Company E Technology, reducing
cost and marketing
experience
British and Belgian
Access to Thai markets, government connection
Company F Know-how Facilitating rapid market entry, obtaining expertise and
tax, spreading risk, obtaining know-how
5.4 Bargaining power
The main indicators which could determine the bargaining power of each partner will
now be explored. These include: existence of alternative choices for firms entering
into IJV in Thailand; balance of resource contributions and the perceived strategic
importance of the JV to the overall business of the parent. These factors can
determine the bargaining power of a JV partner which, in turn, can influence their
business negotiation and decision-making. The bargaining power of the Thai partner
of company B is slightly higher than the foreign partner. The bargaining power of the
foreign partners of companies D and F seems to be a little bit more than their Thai
counterparts. Some partners' perceptions of the power used in negotiation is shown
below.
"The negotiating outcomes of bargaining power have shifted towards the Thai
partner more than towards the farang [foreign] partner. Because the farang is
doing business in Thailand, they are reluctant to go to court to take action
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under the law. It (the legal process) takes so long, they must negotiate."
(Quote senior manager company F, interview 10)
"We have equal power...and maybe because we both contribute equally to this
joint venture, we both respect one another." (Quote managing director
company C, interview 6)
"There is an imbalance in bargaining power between the Thai and New
Zealand partners.." (Quote assistant managing director company D, interview
19)
In JV companies B and C, the top management body came from the foreign side to
direct the companies. Then, over time, as the Thai partner learned and gained more
experience, this top position was replaced by the Thai partner. The two current Thai
managing directors of companies B and C used to work as deputy MD before taking
the position of MD. However, the top management positions of companies D and F
came from the foreign side and have remained unchanged since the start of the JV
business operation. The description of management responsibility in the management
group is given below.
"Really, it is a very simple structure. A flat structure! Me as a [general]
manager and then I have a finance manager who is Thai. I have [a Thai]
production manager and then I have a sales manager. He is farang
[expatriate]. I am also [the] marketing manager. So, there are four managers."
(Quote MD company D, interview 7)
"[A Thai] holds the position of managing director. My position is executive
director. All important decisions of this company should be decided by two
partners. Joint decisions by both parties are necessary. In principle, [the Thai
MD] and I share the all kinds of management responsibility. But practically
speaking, we are borrowing the money from a Japanese bank. So, it is better
for me, [being] Japanese, to negotiate with the Japanese bank. For the
personnel control, I do not speak Thai, so it is better for [the Thai] to manage.
So, we do not share exactly. All decisions have to be taken jointly, [the Thai
MD] and me." (Quote executive director company B, interview 5)
"The joint venture agreement allows the managing director to have the sole
right to make decisions. However, in practice, I pay them some respect by
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informing and asking their opinion before making a decision." (Quote
managing director company C, interview 6)
Almost all the JV firms make decisions on the basis of consensus. Only the written
contract of company C specifies the use of majority agreement but they never use this
in practise. One Japanese partner of company B said that "We will discuss until every
body agrees." Some more viewpoints of interviewees on management decision-
making power are quoted below.
"If there is an equal decision, the Chairman might make the decision. We use
consensus not majority rule." (Quote MD company D, interview 7)
"The Board normally make decisions by consensus. I have never seen a vote
taken on anything." (Quote senior manager company F, interview 10)
"We wrote in our agreement that we use the rule of majority in case we cannot
agree on any issue. However, we never use it in practice. Most of time we all
agree with each other. We have never had a problem regards making a
decision." (Quote managing director company C, interview 6)
5.4.1 Equity structure
All the JV companies consist of one Thai and one foreign partner. The nationality of
the foreign partners include Japanese (company B), Dutch (company C), New
Zealander (company D), and Australian (company F). The Thai partners hold a 51%
majority of shares whilst the foreign partners hold a 49% share. Generally speaking,
all partners seem to have equal bargaining power. The percentage of equity held by
each partner in the joint venture could be used as a source of power to influence the
joint venture business operation. The discussions of some JV firms regarding equity
structure are given below.
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"We decided that originally the foreign partner wanted a higher percentage
holding. At the end, it went fifty-fifty percent. .... The joint venture contract
is 50%/50% but our legal contract is ... 51% Thai and 49% foreign. The 1% is
held by our Thai lawyer. Basically, it works for us on 50%/50% structure. It is
only messy when you get into trouble." (Quote MD company D, interview 7)
"The structure of our joint venture is 51%/49%. 51% Thai and 49% foreign.
This is the requirement of the concession's owner." (Quote managing director
company C, interview 6)
"Ownership structure was decided by what was allowed by law, 51%:49%."
(Quote senior manager company F, interview 10)
"By Thai law, [The Japanese partner] has 49% and the Thai partner will share
51%. So, by the agreement we will not change this portion and we have
several directors. Three from Japan and four from [the] Thai [side].
And...Amm...for the first 5 years...say...we will appoint a Japanese MD and
after that if the Thai employees run enough [of the business] and they have
enough knowledge to operate, then, we will transfer the management to the
local Thai." (Quote executive director company B, interview 5)
All the joint venture firms have a Board of Directors arranged in proportion to JV
share/equity structure. Normally, the Board of Directors will make the decision on
any financial aspect that is outwith the responsibility of the MD/general manager.
Any decision that is outwith the responsibility of the JV management team will be
sent to the Board of Directors at their meeting. The Board of directors generally plan
JV policy and control the IV management team's performance and set the longer term
JV objectives.
"The parents are only involved in the Board of Directors. Six directors on the
board. Three from Thai parent and three from the New Zealand parent. So,
that represents the share structure 50%:50%. Any strategic decision...a big
decision like finance and banking, is the responsibility of the Board of
Directors. The Chairman of Board has always had a strong [influence]. Each
year it changes. One year a Thai chairman. One year a New Zealand
chairman." (Quote MD company D, interview 7)
182
5.4.1a Changes in equity structure
Some of the JVs mention that according to the contractual agreement, if one partner
would like to sell their share of the business, they need to offer it to the other partner
first.
"If ...we the partner would like to change the business or sell the business, one
partner must offer the other partner the share. That is what we wrote in the
joint venture agreement. It has to be that way. You know when you grow a
business over a period of time that is successful, you should offer it to your
partner first. If the partner has no money... cannot afford - then just sell to
others. Last year the amount of sales abroad was 35%. We may have changed
to 50% this year." (Quote MD company D, interview 7)
5.4.2 Alternative choice
The existence of a choice of firms with which to enter into joint venture business,
could be a source of power to that firm in negotiating the formation of joint venture
business and subsequent management with their [prospective] partners. All partners
of all the JV companies had alternative partners with which they could have entered
JV business. However the foreign partners said that their recent Thai partners were
the best choices for them at that time. Here are some comments regarding the choice
available to partners when negotiating joint venture business with their partner:
"We were just looking for one Thai company to do a joint venture business
with. So, we had a short list of Thai companies that looked suitable. We
approached a couple but we decided it wouldn't work. But when we
approached [our Thai partner], we decided it would work." (Quote MD
company D, interview 7)
"The Thai partner had many choices [to enter JV business]. Maybe [they]
made a wrong choice with [the Australian partner]. Our foreign partner talked
to quite a number of companies. However the current Thai partner seems to be
the best." (Quote senior manager company F, interview 10)
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"We had quite a few choices to enter business with other Thai and foreign
companies. We didn't consider other options e.g. wholly-owned subsidiaries
or licensing -only JV." (Quote former MD company C, interview 20)
"Our partner approached us to enter the JV and we thought that it would be
possible to make profit. So, we went through the bidding process with our
partner and we won the project from the Thai government." (Quote managing
director company C, interview 6)
5.4.3 Resource contributions
Resource contributions are another source of power, potentially leading to a better
bargaining position. Almost all of the foreign partners have provided a major
contribution of know-how, marketing skill and marketing service. All the Thai
partners provide non-technical personnel and the local knowledge needed by the
foreign partners. Both Thai and foreign partners contribute management expertise and
technical personnel to their JV companies. Generally, all Thai and foreign partners
seem to contribute the resource needed by their JVs, equally. The following show the
resource contribution that each partner provides to their joint venture firm:
"When we set it up, we structured the joint venture so that both parties supply
equal amounts of money to the equity. With the equity, we paid for the
machinery that we supplied from New Zealand. The foreign partner would
provide advice and their trademark - tradename. Know-how and technology
were also supplied by the New Zealand side. Management expertise was also
supplied from the New Zealand partner. Technical personnel were supplied by
the New Zealand partner. Non-technical personnel were obviously supplied
by the Thai partner. Marketing became a joint responsibility between the New
Zealand and Thai sides. The marketing service was really started off from the
New Zealand side. There was perfect growth and the company started using
the Thai side more and more to deal with marketing. Marketing in Myanmar -
using the foreign side and also some of the contracts in the market place.
When we started, the joint venture was probably 90% from the New Zealand
side and 10% from Thais for resources. And then as the company grew, the
Thai side developed more experience. Therefore, now the New Zealand
partner doesn't play an equal role because the joint venture runs itself."
(Quote MD company D, interview 7)
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"Both partners in the joint venture put up both tangible and intangible
resources. Tangible is basically money. Intangible resources from the Thai
point of view would be knowledge and access to people and bank. That would
be about it. From the Australian viewpoint...management expertise,
technology and know-how transfer. That would be about it." (Quote senior
manager company F, interview 10)
"We provide funds while the Japanese partner contributes the know-how
regarding leasing." (Quote MD company B, interview 4)
"[The Japanese partner] provides the know-how of leasing and knowledge of
leasing structure and leasing business, e.g. accounting. Everything about
leasing. We are still transferring the know-how up to now. It is our major
resource contribution. At the beginning this is a [JV] company that does not
have any credit. So, this is just a start-up company and no bank would lend
the money because they do not have any credit record - trust record. The new
company, new joint venture has to borrow money from [the] parent company
or from the bank with the guarantee of the parent company. But after a period
of business, if the joint venture is profitable, they have a net worth. Then the
joint venture no longer needs any financial support from the parent company."
(Quote executive director company B, interview 5)
"We both contribute financial resources and expertise. Financial contribution
is our main concern in this joint venture business. We also support the aspects
of government connection regards licensing and work permit whilst our
partner is responsible for technical construction and insurance. Our partner
also contributes know-how for business operation and successfully provides
the marketing service. They have been operating the same kind of business for
many years so they have lots of experience and knowledge. At the beginning
of the joint venture, the managing director, the terminal manager, the project
manager, and the construction manager came from the foreign side. Now, we
have only one expatriate, the deputy managing director, that comes from the
foreign side." (Quote managing director company C, interview 6)
"We contribute money and local knowledge whilst our foreign partner
provides technology and marketing skills." (Quote assurance manager
company D, interview 18)
"We contribute technology, technical personnel and know-how. Also, we
provide a marketing service and knowledge management. Our Thai partner
provides local knowledge and information, non-technical personnel, money
and management expertise." (Quote former MD company C, interview 20)
The overview of bargaining power, as it relates to respective stakes in the JV company
(i.e. the perceived strategic importance of the joint venture to the overall business of a
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parent), partner's resource contribution, alternative choice of JV partner and overall
bargaining power can be seen in table 5-4 below.
Table 5-4
Bargaining power of the JV partners (company B, C, D, F)
Company B Company C Company D Company F
Partner's
nationality
Thai Japanese Thai Dutch Thai New
Zealander
Thai Australian
Strategic
importance
(stake)
pretty
high
moderate pretty
high
pretty
high
pretty
high
high moderate pretty
high
Alternative
choice
moderate moderate moderate moderate high high high high
Resource
low
---
moderate
n.a.
high
low
moderate
high
high
approx.
equal
high
---
---
high
n.a.
low
high
high
low
low
approx.
equal
low
---
---
high
moderate
high
---
moderate
high
high
approx.
equal
high
---
---
high
high
low
---
high
low
low
approx.
equal
low
no
---
low
low
high
high
moderate
high
high
equal
high
high
yes
high
high
low
high
high
low
low
equal
low
low
---
moderate
low
high
---
---
high
high
approx.
equal
high
high
---
high
high
low
---
---
low
low
approx.
equal
contribution
Know-how
Technology
Trademark---
Manage-
ment
expertise
Technical
personnel
Non-techni-
cal
personnel
Marketing
skill
Marketing
service
Local
knowledge
Government
connection
Equity
Overall
bargaining
power
high pretty high high moderate/
high
high pretty high high
high balance
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5.5 Trust
Trust seems to be one of the most important characteristics required by all partners in
order to successfully operate joint venture business together. Trust between the
partners of company D was very low at the beginning of the JV operation. Over time
as the relationships developed and the outcome of JV business showed a high
performance, trust increased to a higher level. Trust between the partners of
companies B and C was moderate at the beginning of their JV business because of the
lack of past experience together. However, trust increased dramatically as the
business grew and the relationship become well developed. Presently, there is a high
level of trust between the partners (company B and C). Trust between the partners of
company F was very good at the beginning of the JV. Over time it has developed
badly because of cultural misunderstanding and the low performance of the JV.
However, both partners still hope to develop trust again because they realise that it
would be a good opportunity for their future business performance.
5.5.1 The importance of trust
The concept of trust seems to be a critical factor for the Thai partner of the JV
business operation and negotiation. However, some foreign partners seem to put more
emphasis on the JV contract rather than operating their business on the basis of trust.
The following are some viewpoints regarding the issue of trust:
"I don't think the contractual [agreement] has much strength at all. That is
[the case for] most agreements in Thailand. It depends on people's integrity,
honesty and trust. However, the foreign partner may have difficulty accepting
this. The Thai partner says 'Mai Phen Rai' (no problem). The general
manager of the joint venture is an expatriate and the finance manager is Thai,
appointed by the Thai partner. So, control of the money and the accounting
187
process is watched firmly by the Thai partner." (Quote senior manager
company F, interview 10)
"We had never worked with our partner before forming this joint venture. But
they do believe that they could trust us and let Thais sit on the top
management position after 6 years of joint venture operation together. This
concept was offered by our partner at the beginning of the joint venture
formation process." (Quote managing director company C, interview 6)
5.5.2 Developing trust between partners
Trust between partners has been developed over time. It is difficult for partners to
trust each other at the beginning if they have never known each other, nor had a
business experience together. But once they understand and trust each other without
behaving opportunistically, their confrontation seems to disappear. Some companies
even trust their partner right from the beginning because of past business experience
or relationships. However, trust between partners could develop in both forward and
backward directions. The interviewees' comments on the development of trust are
given below.
"But I also think that when we negotiated, the management was supplied by
the New Zealand [side]. [It] took a long time for [the] Thai partner to trust the
New Zealand management. So, there was a lot of negotiation. Once it was
finalized, it worked well, because of trust." (Quote MD company D, interview
7)
"It [the level of trust between JV partners] is very good now. When we first
set up, there was not much trust at all. But now we have been going six years
and it [the company] made a profit every year, so now there is a lot more trust
on both sides." (Quote MD company D, interview 7)
"There was a high level of trust originally. I think it is probably OK now but
maybe a little bit less. Maybe a little bit because of the economic crisis."
(Quote senior manager company F, interview 10)
"The level of trust [is] very high at the moment. If the management in the
joint venture don't perform then the trust level changes dramatically. So, if
188
the management underperform the two partners will have problems
negotiating trust." (Quote MD company D, interview 7)
"I believe twenty years ago, the bank had not yet been internationalized. So, I
believe that [the Thai partner] is the only internationalized company [within
leasing sector] and the Thai economy has now become internationalized. This
has raised the rating of Thais themselves and [the] IFC has been getting better.
So, our trust is increasing." (Quote executive director company B, interview
5)
"We have trusted our partner since we started negotiating joint venture
business together due to their reputation and attitude. They never tried to take
advantage or trick us when we were forming the joint venture agreement. And
we believe we need each other to perform this joint venture successfully.
Trust between us has now been increased dramatically." (Quote managing
director company C, interview 6)
"As we got to know more about [them], it was a lot easier to negotiate with
them. And probably took less time because, if we try to change or negotiate
things, we know how they will behave/react. We know what [the Thai
partner] wants. It works more easily now. Because of ...the relationships.. .we
have worked together for nearly six years now, trust increases dramatically."
(Quote MD company D, interview 7)
"When we set up the JV, there was a strong lack of trust between both parties.
We didn't know each other. There was quite a high risk, probably on both
sides. But that changed over the years because we realised that both parties
contribute to JV firm. It works very well." (Quote MD company D, interview
7)
"Currently, there is a high level of trust between the Thai and New Zealand
partners." (Quote assurance manager company D, interview 18)
"Trust between us and the New Zealand partner increases over time. We trust
them more after working together for nearly six years. One reason is because
both of us try to adapt to each other' way of doing business. Without trust, it
seems difficult for our business to grow." (Quote assistant managing director
company D, interview 19)
5.5.3 Individual vs. organisational trust
Many interviewees refer to the importance of trust at the individual level. It takes
time to build trust if an individual leaves the JV. Some of them even say they cannot
trust the organisation, but rather the individual. In Thailand, individual trust
189
relationship seems to play a significant role. However, a few partners interviewed
during this research, both Thai and also Westerners, still believe that trust between
partners should be applied to the organisation rather than the individual. Here are the
observations of interviewees on individual and organisational trust.
"I think right now there is a lot more trust for the individual. Now just say for
instance, I leave...I go somewhere else...and the New Zealand partner brings
in a new [general] manager. It will take sometime for that New Zealand
manager to develop trust from [the Thai partner]. [the Thai partner] trusts me.
Bring in a new manager and they may not trust him. And also we had a
problem when I employed the Thai manager. They [The Thai partner] said the
Thai employee was not trustworthy. It doesn't matter whether they are farang
[foreigner] or Thais. If the top management at [the Thai partner] ...trust the
right people, it doesn't matter who he is, then you get a good relationship. If
they don't trust you, then that makes it harder. At the moment, I don't
negotiate with anyone else ... but [the] managing director or owner of [the Thai
partner firm] and another guy, Vithun, who sits on the Board of Directors
[representing the Thai partner firm]. Apart from that, we don't work that close
to [the Thai partner firm]. We try to keep it very simple for joint venture.
And the same with the New Zealand side, I only talk to the director and
owner." (Quote MD company D, interview 7)
"A lot of trust depends on [the] individual. That is there. The farang [foreign
partner] has said maybe four or five managers. You can trust only the
individual. You cannot trust [the] organization. Because it is made up of
individual shareholders and individual managers. Even though the
shareholding in the farang company [foreign partner] is owned by the
company, it is represented by director and managers. So, you need to trust the
individual." (Quote senior manager company F, interview 10)
"In my viewpoint, the president of [the JV] may be changed in next several
years. So, trust is more on the organization." (Quote executive director
company B, interview 5)
5.5.4 Past experience
Having past experience of partners before establishing the W tends to help the
partnering firms to understand each other's way of doing business more quickly and
also to reinforce trust between them. As a result, they can decide to enter joint
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business without much problem or disagreement. They also tend to spend less time
negotiating their business. The following demonstrates the experiences of partnering
firms before they entered joint venture business together:
"The [foreign partner] company didn't have experience [of doing business
with Thai firms before the joint venture firm was created] but I have some
experience. The [foreign partner] company has had international joint venture
experience in America, Australia and Europe. But the businesses are not in the
same line [of business as] we do here. Different line of business." (Quote MD
company D, interview 7)
"The [foreign partner's] staff from Australia and Germany wanted to build a
significant business here with assistance from [the Thai partner] but has been
unable to do so. This foreign company has never done business with any other
Thai company before. It was their first time doing business in Thailand but
they have been in Canada, Africa, Australia, [The] Philippines, Malaysia and
many other countries. The partner hasn't achieved their objectives and goals
in any way at all." (Quote senior manager company F, interview 10)
5.5.5 Reputation
Firms who have never had a past business relationship with one another normally try
to choose and trust the prospective partners through business reputation. None of the
partners of the JV companies had ever had past business experience with each other
before; they relied on the company's reputation to choose and trust their partners.
"So, if we cannot trust each other, it may be very difficult to discuss. They
don't believe us, we don't believe them. So, it is very difficult. So, [the
Japanese partner] relies on the IFC (Industrial Finance Corporation). [The
Thai partner] relies on the IFC. So, through the IFC, we can rely on each other
from the beginning. As long as the IFC introduces us, the [Thai] partner
should be good. We have not had past business experience with [a Thai
partner]. But we found a company with a good reputation." (Quote executive
director company B, interview 5)
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5.6 Culture
Many interviewees commented upon the need for understanding ways of doing
business with their partners. They reasoned that understanding will help them to solve
conflict more easily. Some argued that cultural similarity can help them to reduce
negotiating time. However, a few of them said that although culture plays a very
important part in JV business operation, it is not a major factor influencing the success
or failure of the joint venture. Also, they said that it does not influence their partner's
negotiation behaviour. One foreign partner commented that the Thai owner made a
decision to complete the deal after he had eyeballed with the foreign partner and could
see that he could trust them. Their arguments on the aspect of culture are as follows:
"They were concerned about negotiation with regards to differences in culture
and style. But I think by employing some people who understood the cultural
differences, the negotiation was a lot easier to solve." (Quote MD company D,
interview 7)
"I mean it was the culture that was very dissimilar. So, it was important to
have someone involved.. .to understand both sides.. .have experiences. This is
vital." (Quote MD company D, interview 7)
"There were differences in the way both companies negotiated. A lack of
understanding of the Thai way of doing business. It is probably more legalistic
to establish a joint venture with a comparable culture. If you have an
Australian joint venture with an Australian company, it is just a matter of
putting together a document and you hold on to the document to refer to. Here
you have a joint venture document and you put it in a drawer and you forget
about it and then you progress on personal basis." (Quote senior manager
company F, interview 10)
"Our foreign partner has tried to learn and adapt to the Thai culture quite
well." (Quote assurance manager company D, interview 18)
"In Asia, we [as an] Asian people have been sharing a very similar culture -
same religion - and we believe we can better understand their culture and the
people - compared with Western people. And when Western people come to
the Asian market, there will be some culture barrier." (Quote executive
director company B, interview 5)
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"The more we understand the partner, the shorter the negotiation time we
spend. It is easier for us to make a joint venture with an Asian company who
shares the same/similar culture. It may be more difficult, say, to have a joint
venture with, for example, Indian people or some Islamic people. Ways of
thinking may be different. But our [Japanese] corporation has joint ventures
with some Islamic partners like Pakistanis, Indonesian or Egyptian [partners]
and also we have a joint venture with India. The managing directors of the
Indian and Pakistani [JV] companies are very good. And they are educated in
England and they have, say, an international sense of business. So, they are
much more capable than us. They have a broad vision." (Quote executive
director company B, interview 5)
"I negotiated with...another Thai guy.
 ...not Dr _Mese was OIly one guy
[from the Thai side] who negotiated and in the end...can't remember the guy's
name...Hmm...but in the end the final deal was when our New Zealand
managing director met the Thai managing director to agttt Vat deal.
Basically, he wanted the eyeball. He is a Chinese-Thai. He wanted to look at
the New Zealand partner and see whether he liked him or not. That is
Chinese-Thai style. [This style is] good because really a lot of people can read
[see through] people in [a face-to-face] meeting. You can read someone's face
and you can decide whether you trust them or not. According to the Thai and
Chinese style ...you talk...always meeting with someone...really you gonna
do business with them. You have to see them yourself to decide whether you
can trust them. I means.. .1 suppose.. .bargaining in this style is really more
discussion in our negotiation. So, both partners need to work together. So,
when they have problems ahead...they solve together." (Quote MD company
D, interview 7)
One foreign parent firm chose a person who has a lot of experience of Thai culture to
work as the MD in their joint venture firm, in order to minimize any problems that
might arise due to the cultural clash during joint venture negotiation and operation.
"There were some problems when we were negotiating and really it was ...
distinct from culture- the owners rather than...Arnm...The management was
OK. The [Thai] owners set up problems for a while, but they solved them.
Often Western management hit back while Asian or Thais don't hit back.
[Thais] sort of go around. You [Thais] work to solve it. The New Zealanders
management is.. .this is what we want.. .take it or leave it. I have a lot of
experiences in Thailand so they used me to make sure that they didn't cause
problems with the Thai partner. (Quote MD company D, interview 7)
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5.6.1 Individualism vs. collectivism: Perception regards JV contractual
agreement
A majority of JV partners are satisfied with their JV agreement. Most of the Thai
partners commented that an agreement should be flexible. Foreign partners should
learn to be more flexible in Thailand. Foreign partners seem to perceive the JV
agreement as a rulebook that they should refer to when they have problems.
However, one MD of company C suggested that "It is very important for the JV firm
to think ahead about future problems that might occur and then write an agreement to
cover as much detail as they can." Additional points of view of interviewees
regarding their perception of JV agreement are quoted as follows:
"Oh!! I think the [JV] contract is pretty strong because it [is] done by law. But
it was a very simple agreement. So, you know!! The contractual agreement
becomes important when the partner disagree with each other. When you
don't fight, it is not necessary." (Quote MD company D, interview 7)
"The foreign partner was satisfied with the negotiation outcome. Yes,
initially. Outcomes were generally OK. with negotiation on an ongoing
basis." (Quote senior manager company F, interview 10)
"So, not only in Asian countries, but even in Japan, the written contract does
not make sense. Their understanding stays behind the lines - border. So, if an
issue occurs which is not written into the agreement, you can support each
other. It is different from American or European [in which] the joint venture
agreement is fixed. [The] joint venture agreement in this [JV] company is
very thin. If the problems arise and the agreement did not [spell out] what to
do or how to solve problems, we just sit and talk together and we also allow
some more flexibility to renegotiate agreements than [in] the West." (Quote
executive director company B, interview 5)
"We tried to write our agreement fairly. No partner can take advantage over
another. To be able to achieve a successful joint venture agreement, one
should specify the aspects of written agreement in as much detail as they can.
They need to think ahead as regards what major problems could happen in the
future, then mention the ways to solve these problems. Our joint venture
contract was written in detail. We are satisfied with both the joint venture
agreement and the joint venture operation so far. We also feel that this joint
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venture agreement provides lots of benefit to Thai partner." (Quote managing
director company C, interview 6)
5.6.2 Individualism vs. collectivism: Staff recruitment and promotion
Most general staff in the JV firm were recruited in Thailand. Expert and technical
personnel will come from both sides. Many Thai partners complained that it is so
expensive to keep expatriates here. So, they send them back as soon as their work is
completed. Regarding the process of promoting employees, there are apparent
differences of approach between Thai and Foreign companies. Most Westerners want
to promote employees on the basis of performance and capability. However, Thai and
Japanese seem to share the same logic. They promote not only on the basis of
performance but also seniority. The opinion of interviewees regarding recruitment
and promotional strategy is quoted below.
"Usually both-if I am looking for management people. I will work with Thai
staff. We both interview [the] person involved. For general staff, I usually let
my Thai people choose. But I obviously have the same remuneration package
- how to pay the salary and so on." (Quote MD company D, interview 7)
"The company has recently downsized. Previously, specialist technical people
probably came from Australia; estimators and quality surveyers and
commercial people. They taught the local people here." (Quote senior
manager company F, interview 10)
"We promote people on performance and seniority. Mainly on performance.
We only promote once in any financial year and then have a discussion
between supervisers and managers. We get together and they advise me who
they think should be promoted or not promoted. We have a meeting and
discuss together." (Quote MD company D, interview 7)
"Basically promotion is based on performance, performance related. A person
should not be promoted because they are more senior than another person. It
has to be performance related. Otherwise why should they bother to have a
joint venture. The joint venture has to make money, it is not a government
organisation." (Quote senior manager company F, interview 10)
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"We recruit our staff according to the capability and appropriate qualification
for work. In general, we prefer to recruit a person who has an undergraduate
degree. We promote employees on performance basis as well as seniority."
(Quote executive director company B, interview 5)
"Most Thai firms tend to promote and recruit employees according to their
performance, level of education and seniority. However, when we want to
promote our employees, we also evaluate their competency and behaviour at
the same time." (Quote managing director company C, interview 6)
5.6.3 Cultural difference in negotiation style
Each nation seems to have their own negotiation style. If they only behave and do
according to their mind set, without studying their partner's behaviour and style, this
could lead to problems by misinterpreting the meaning of behaviour and style of
expression during the negotiation process. From the Thai interviewees' viewpoint,
generally, Western partners seem to have an aggressive, attacking and confrontational
style of negotiation. They also need a quick decision and are very demanding.
However, some Western interviewees commented that Thais hardly give a straight
answer and work slowly on their decision-making process. The following is the
opinion of interviewees on the style of negotiation:
"Like...Hmm...the New Zealand partner's [negotiation style] was very strong,
very confrontational. So, when they would demand something, they expect an
answer then....where [the] Thai side never gives a straight answer. They
would say "yes" or "no". Yes could mean no. I think in the end you have a
gut feeling.. .you know.. .so, I mean...Amm...the New Zealand's head had to
tell the New Zealand side not to be so confrontational. To relax a bit
more...be a bit more polite.. .just be open to a little change that may affect
joint venture so. But then in the end... we set up a very simple JV. So, there
really weren't many problems." (Quote MD company D, interview 7)
"The negotiating style of the Australians are much more they want to make a
decision quickly. They want it now. Here are the facts.. .make a decision.
The Thai way of operating is much slower. They want to know not only what
the facts are, but they want to know why, they want to think about it, they
don't want to make a decision straight away. This is the Thai way of doing
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businesses. It is a business that is done by consensus. To get a straight
answer, they need a non-confrontational society. This is perhaps difficult for
the farang [foreign partner] to understand. They try to adapt to Thai ways of
doing business but it is difficult for them because they have a mindset that has
a different logic. The joint venture has a foreign general manager and a Thai
deputy general manager. So, the Thai and the farang maybe use some cross
cultural movement. They expected their partner to adapt to the same
negotiating style, but came to realize that it would not happen." (Quote senior
manager company F, interview 10)
The table 5-5 below summarises the negotiation style of JV partners.
Table 5-5
The style of negotiation (company B, C, D, F)
Country The style of negotiation
Thai Gentle, polite, defensive, no straight answer, work
slowly on decision-making
Australian and New Zealander Strong, confrontational, demanding, need a quick
decision
Japanese Gentle
5.6.4 Cultural difference in managerial style
To better understand the influence of cultural differences in bargaining style, one
should learn more about the business management system and managerial style of the
partners. In this study, the foreign partners generally need the Thai partners in order
to ease the way with the government through their local partner's good connections.
Also, Thai and Japanese partners tend to realize the importance of socialization to
business management. There are some different ways of thinking regarding profit
management. One Thai partner needs to get a dividend whilst the Japanese partner
wants joint venture profit for further investment. The following are interviewees
descriptions of business management and managerial style:
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"So, the bottom line is that the parent company is expecting the Thai company
to contribute to the consolidated financial statement of the company. That
means they are expecting higher profit - net income from the joint venture.
They are expecting a higher profit but they don't expect a higher dividend.
That means instead of paying the dividend, say, they want the Thai company
to retain the profit in the company." (Quote executive director company B,
interview 5)
"The Japanese partner seems not to care much about dividend payment. We
hope that we can get a dividend payment every year. We are very happy to put
in more of our financial resources to expand the joint venture business
whenever our Japanese want to and if it is reasonable. However, we need to
get a dividend paid every year. So, we still have a little bit of a problem with
them on this issue. However, we have already solved this problem now. We
are responsible for the credit marketing and our Japanese partner contributes
funding and takes care of our Japanese customers. We have the authority to
allow credit to customers but with a limitation of 40 Baht million maximum.
If more than this is required, we need to have approval from the board of
directors. We need to co-sign/agree together for any of our important business
transaction." (Quote MD company B, interview 4)
"Our strategy to operate overseas joint venture is, if we find a good person to
manage the company,...Amm...we will appoint him as [the] MD. We are not
insisting in keeping the position of the president of the joint venture. But
some Japanese companies want control...conservative...the Japanese have to
control the subsidiaries. So, we believe the native person in that country
knows better than us - better than [the] Japanese. So, if we can rely on them,
there is no reason to keep [the] Japanese management. If he could be trusted
enough, let him do it. Yes.. .so, we have already transferred the presidency in
Singapore, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Malaysia, Korea, and Brasil. .... We
still send a Japanese representative but the MD or president's positions are
held by native people." (Quote executive director company B, interview 5)
"The American way, they would like to write down the manual or
international regulations. It is written in detail. But in Thai way, they don't
like to write down the details. The American or Western people want to write
or stipulate the details and say they want to form these regulations into the
agreement. But...and...Amm...they have the organisation chart and when we
see that organisation chart, it shows who is the boss ...and who is reporting to
whom, who has authority, it is very clear. In Thai company, it is vague. I
counted down who is reporting to whom or who has what authority in this
joint venture at the level lower than me and Thai managing director." (Quote
executive director company B, interview 5)
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5.7 Nogotiation behaviour
Most partners of companies B, C and D tend to cooperate and help each other, rather
than trying to disagree or compete with one another and create problems, because they
all have the same objective of a successful JV. Compromising strategy was used at
times by all partners when they had conflicts or differences of opinion and decisions
could not be reached or agreed by all members.
5.7.1 Problem solving approach
When problems arise, each partner seems willing to help each other to solve those
problems from apparently deadlock situations. One Thai partner used his reputation
and connection to help the foreign partner to borrow money from the Thai bank.
Although it is unavoidable for a partner from a different culture and country to
disagree on business management and decision-making, most partners try to talk and
discuss openly when conflicts or problems arise. The following are some examples
where partners try to help each other and cooperate:
"And they [JV partners] believe whichever partner has more experience on
their side, uses their experience to ease the problems. For example, the New
Zealand partner was not able to borrow money from the Thai bank in Thailand
but with assistance from the Thai partner they could borrow the money. The
Thai partner provided the guarantee and the New Zealand partner need to
repay the debt and provide guarantee. That little thing helped us a lot."
(Quote MD company D, interview 7)
"Generally, they try to create harmony during the negotiation process. There
isn't any knock-down, drag out. I had one major issue when we negotiated
with the [Thai owner] over some outstanding financial matter. It took maybe
three months of ongoing negotiation to [reach a] result and in the end we
agreed to split it down in the middle; 50%:50%." (Quote senior manager
company F, interview 10)
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"We tend to be cooperative with our partner. We also try to avoid conflicts
that might arise with our partner as much as we can." (Quote assurance
manager company D, interview 18)
"We don't have any big problems. Because first, our president is not
appointed by our [Thai] partner. He has been working for a long time and he
has grown the company. So, he [does] not represent the Thai partner. He
represents this company. So, there is not any problem. So, he wants to, and I
wants to, reach profitability and we are expecting the growth of this company.
So, there is no problem. Our methods of achieving our objectives are similar."
(Quote executive director company B, interview 5)
"Our partner tends to be very helpful and cooperative. We have been working
very close to each other. When we have a difficult problem which needs to be
solved, I will inform to Thai shareholder whilst our foreign partner reports to
the foreign share holder. Then we discuss and try to solve it cooperatively.
Our partner gives us a lot of respect." (Quote managing director company C,
interview 6)
5.7.2 Compromising
Although some partners do have power to exercise, they don't necessarily try to use it
and they tend to compromise and learn to understand their partner's needs. One
foreign partner tried to signal to their partner when compromising in order to get
something in return later. The following is the view of partners who implement the
compromising strategy:
"I mean when you [are] negotiating a joint venture, it is really important for
both sides to work with each other. Because otherwise it is such a waste of
time. Starting a joint venture so, it has to be a win-win situation on both sides.
Take and give.. .has to be take and give.. .for example, if I say the foreign
partner wants a sixty percent share holding. We simply learned that the Thai
partner would need to ask for the same. So, it had to be...they realize we only
get 50% share holding. So, 50% is better than nothing. Because the New
Zealand partner could walk away and say 'no, I would find another Thai
partner'. But it wasn't the case. You know.. .you have to.. .when two
different partners meet each other, they will.. .they try to find out. So, you
must test the partner to see whether they accept it or not. If they don't you
need to try another way to negotiate." (Quote MD company D, interview 7)
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"At this stage many foreign companies will come to Thailand. So, the Thai
partner do not need to compromise because they have a lot of companies
coming all the time. Many many. So, in the end the New Zealand partner
probably has to compromise." (Quote MD company D, interview 7)
"It might be [a] different [story if the New Zealand partner is the same size or
bigger than the Thai partner]. It might be a lot different if the Thai side wants
something from the foreign side. Like.. .for example...McDonalds...the Thai
McDonalds partner...would probably...have to compromise with the demands
of the foreign owner. McDonalds, which has such a very strong worldwide
company. For example, [if] General Motors or Ford [were to] come to
Thailand, the Thai partner [would] have to compromise a lot I think. When
you are a small company, and you come to Thailand, then you have to work
closely with your Thai partner." (Quote MD company D, interview 7)
"We have exchanged our opinion freely in the Board meeting and, of course,
there is a point [which] we cannot accept anymore. But in other points we can
be open about other points. So, for example, the Thai [side] has a majority in
the number of directors, by the number of the share[holding]. So, if there is a
conflict between [the] two partners, [then] if the Thai partner says [he] wants
to do it, then, [he can] go ahead without Japan. They can do it but they did
not. They respect the relationship. So, the style is that if there [are] the
differences in the opinion, continue discussing until we understand each other.
For example, in 1995 this company has a Thai partner [who] wanted to list the
company in the Thai stock exchange but the Japanese did not want it. No
need. But finally we compromised. OK. We are prepared to be realistic.
Unfortunately, the Thai economy is not good. So we postponed that plan. The
strategy we implement is not win-win, not give and take, no. It is cooperative
and says discuss until understanding is reached." (Quote executive director
company B, interview 5)
"The style of negotiation of our foreign partner tends to be more aggressive
and tough than us. We try to compromise where possible. When our partner
would like to compromise, they will try to signal to us that this is a difficult
thing for them to do, but they will do so that later they can get something in
return. It is a take and give strategy they use." (Quote managing director
company C, interview 6)
"We prefer to compromise with the New Zealand partner and try to avoid
conflict with them as much as we can." (Quote assistant managing director
company D, interview 19)
5.8 JV performance (outcome)
The main concern in establishing a joint venture business between Thai and foreign
partners is performance. Although there are many aspects involved in JV
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performance, this research will be limited to the exploration of three aspects, namely;
JV satisfaction, JV achievement of objectives set and JV partner's relationships. In
general, the interviewees who participated in this research seem to be happy with the
results of their joint venture business operation. Only a minority seem to be less than
pleased.
5.8.1 Satisfaction
The following quotations highlight the comments of interviewees as regards their
satisfaction in joint venture firm performance. A majority of interviewees in this
research have been satisfied with their joint venture overall performame. They aiso
understand the implications of the Asian economic crisis where this has resulted in the
JVs performing less well than expected. But they still hope that the situation will
improve soon and they will be ready to benefit from that profitable opportunity again.
However, a few partnering firms feel dissatisfied with their joint venture performance.
They commented that the joint venture should have performed better than this. They
need a better result.
"I think in the end it was a good outcome. Both partners satisfied. Initially
the Thai partner thought...realized...it would be a bigger investment. But
when we finally did the deal, it was quite a small investment for them
which...I think they are very happy, at the end, because it was very easy for
them. ,They provide us [with] an investment - money - and really as long as
there was a profit, they are very happy." (Quote MD company D, interview 7)
"Oh.. .Yes, it has been a very good JV. But it [is].. .the way we set it up that
makes us successful. Very important -- [the] initial structure. And the main
factor [is that the JV business] should be totally stand alone because then each
partner cannot accuse the other one of doing something [wrong]. You know!!
It has been very successful." (Quote MD company D, interview 7)
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"No, the company has been unable to penetrate the local market and therefore
the overall joint venture performance has suffered. It has made losses and run
up large debts which are the responsibility of the [foreign] partner." (Quote
senior manager company F, interview 10)
"I am satisfied with the overall joint venture performance. However, our
Japanese partner is not satisfied with our service marketing. But we cannot
expect a lot of profit in the situation of economic crisis like this. We both
know. So, we just need to keep our business going and hopefully when the
economic situation becomes better, we can regain our position and remain
number one in the leasing business as well as making a lot of profit as we used
to." (Quote MD company B, interview 4)
"We are satisfied with the overall 3V performance." (Quote assurance manager
company D, interview 18)
"I think that the JV performs quite well. I am satisfied with the financial
performance and also the overall performance." (Quote former MD company
C, interview 20)
5.8.2 Achievement of JV objectives
In addition to the comments regarding JV satisfaction, some interviewees also
evaluated their JV outcome in connection with the achievement of their objectives.
The main concern of the JV partners in terms of objective achievement seems to be
profit. Most JV firms are still able to make good profit, although they earn less than
they did a few years ago, due to the economic downturn. However, a few partners are
not satisfied with the profit the JV firm achieved. They demand more. One of the
Thai firms feels disappointed with the profit they achieved, they expected their foreign
partner to perform better. Another Thai firm even said that they probably made the
wrong choice in establishing JV with their foreign partner.
Other main objectives, apart from profit, seem to be achieved successfully. Know-
how has been transferred successfully to the Thai partners of almost all the JV
companies. Market access and business growth look promising. However, partners of
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company E seem not to have achieved any of their objectives, apart from know-how
transfer. The following highlights the remarks of interviewees regarding their
objective achievement:
"The economic downturn in Thailand has caused the company to go into
decline for the last two and a half years. The company has not made a profit
for five years. The foreign partner believed they could make a profit in the
early days but they were unable to. Basically, the strategic objective has not
been met for either parties. So, the whole joint venture has been rethought at
this stage because of the lack of profitability and the lack of [the] foreign
partners ability to access the market here. So, I think that has been a problem.
Maybe [we] made [the] wrong choice with the [foreign partner]." (Quote
senior manager company F, interview 10)
"Our partner has achieved their objective after our success. The many Thai
commercial banks made a leasing joint venture with other foreign companies
and the number of the leasing companies has been increasing and the leasing
industry in Thailand has been growing. So, [our Thai partner] succeeded [in]
develop[ing] the market. We [are] the largest company in Thailand so far and
we [were] profitable until 1997. And we have been paying dividends. So, it
does seem that [the Thai partner] has achieved their objectives - development
of the new industry - and they received the return - dividend. We profited
from our operation but we lost from the foreign exchange. So, I am not
satisfied with the profit we got... No, I don't think so. We are the fastest
leasing company. We have been do[ing] the business [for] more than 16, 17 or
18 years. And [our Japanese parent was] expecting more growth that [they]
achieved. So, it should be better." (Quote executive director company B,
interview 5)
"We are satisfied with almost all the results of our objective achievement.
Know-how has been transferred successfully from our partner. And now we
can manage the joint venture more efficiently. However, we earn less profit
than we have planned and owe more to our foreign creditor as a result of the
economic crisis and volatility of currency exchange in Thailand. Our foreign
partner seems not to be satisfied with this achievement but they understand the
effect of this crisis quite well." (Quote managing director company C,
interview 6)
"We are happy with the profit we [have] achieved. We also achieve cost
reductions, business growth, creditability, as well as gaining more market
share and experience." (Quote assurance manager company D, interview 18)
"We have [made]a great achievement on business growth and expansion as
well as credibility and reputation. Profitability and the management skills we
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[have] received so far are quite good. However, market access is just
moderate." (Quote former MD company C, interview 20)
5.8.3 Business relationship
Joint venture partners try to develop their relationship through a variety of social
activities, i.e. sharing a meal, playing golf Many of them have recognised the
importance of relationship building with respect to their business operation. Almost
all of the partners are very happy with their inter-partner relationships. Only company
F has a worse business relationship, the result of the JV's low performance, due to the
economic debacle in Thailand. However, a few partners don't consider the business
relationship as important and don't see that they should develop a relationship with
partners. According to their view, only business matters count during their JV
business negotiation and operation. Here is the expression of some partners on
relationship building:
"I have a good personal relationship with the New Zealand partner. I probably
don't have as strong a relationship as the Thai partner. But then at the firm
level, we probably both have an equal relationship." (Quote MD company D,
interview 7)
"The relationships [between partners] change completely (100%) because you
work with your partner over the years. It's taken time to do that. You can't do
that at the beginning. I've been JV with another company before (for a
different business) and it was horrible but this one [is] very successful."
(Quote MD company D, interview 7)
"Our business relationship with the New Zealand partner is very good at the
moment." (Quote assurance manager company D, interview 18)
"We are very happy with the relationship between us and the New Zealand
partner." (Quote assistant managing director company D, interview 19)
"Our business relationship with [the Thai partner] has developed quite well.
Now, they make a really good partner." (Quote former MD company C,
interview 20)
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"Relationship building was very very important. Business matters were less
important. Now, I think they understand a little more about it and they put
relationship building high on the list of priorities. It is a maintenance situation
rather than relationship building. The negotiation at the actual partnerships is
very fast compared to some existing ones which take much longer. The joint
venture relationship with the partner is very cordial. The formation of the joint
venture was very cordial but now some of that cordiality has disappeared and
has become a more commercial relationship." (Quote senior manager
company F, interview 10)
"We knew our partner before entering joint venture together but we never had
a business relationship, e.g. buyer-customer relationship. Our relationship has
developed over the period of our partnership. We have quite a good
relationship with our partner now. During the joint venture negotiation, we
normally talk business matters. Then after we have finished, we sometimes
have a meal or go somewhere together. I think the relationship between
partners is also quite important. We need to know their attitude, knowledge,
skill and so on, so that we understand them more." (Quote managing director
company C, interview 6)
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The table 5-6 below summarises the level of JV partner's satisfaction, objective
achievement, business relationship and overall performance.
Table 5-6
JV performance (companies B, C, D, F)
Company B Company C Company D Company F
Partner's
nationality
Thai Japanese Thai Dutch Thai New
Zealander
Thai Australian
Satisfaction high moderate pretty high pretty high high high low low
Objective
moderate
high
---
high
high
moderate
moderate
---
moderate
---
---
moderate
high
low
moderate
---
high
---
---
moderate
high
---
moderate/
high
---
high
moderate/
high
high
moderate
—
---
high
moderate
high
---
---
pretty high
moderate
moderate
high
moderate
high
---
--
pretty high
high
moderate
low
---
low
n.a.
---
low
moderate
--
low
---
low
n.a.
---
low
high
---
achievement
Profitability
Market---
share
Business
growth
Manage-
ment skill
Credibility---
and
reputation
Market
access
Know-how
Service
marketing
Business
relationship
good good good good good good moderate moderate
Overall
performance
pretty
high
moderate pretty high pretty high pretty high high low low
5.9 Factors affecting JV performance (outcome)
The most significant factor influencing the JV performance of all the JV companies is
trust. Both Thai and foreign partners of some JV companies regard culture as a factor
affecting JV performance. However, they do not believe culture is a main factor
influencing the performance of the JV. The balance in bargaining power of the JV
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partners seems also to have an impact on JV performance. But it seems not to be a
major factor.
5.9.1 Bargaining power as it affects JV performance
All the IV partners seem to have roughly equal positions in their equity structure. The
existnece of a choice of partners with whom to enter IV with seems not to have an
effect on the power each partner holds because all of them had plenty of choice to
establish JV business with other companies. The resources needed have been
contributed approximately equally, even though each partner possesses different
resources. One interviewee commented that one reason for achieving a successful
performance is because of the balance in the bargaining power of both Thai and
foreign partners.
"Equality in power leads the JV to achieve a successful performance and
outcomes. Both parties invested the money and then they bought everything,
the land and the building. So, it was a very even IV. Not like some other JVs,
where some of the Thai get pretty good bargaining power." (Quote MD
company D, interview 7)
5.9.2 Trust affecting JV performance
Trust was considered to be the most important factor influencing the performance of
the IV company. All partners try to develop a relationship of trust over time. At the
time of interview, trust between the partners of all the IV businesses was quite high.
Only company F showed a decrease in the trust relationship between partners. The
remarks of interviewees in relation to the impact of trust on IV performance were as
follows:
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"Trust makes a successful JV performance. When you put two groups of
people together, the person managing the company, the JV, has to be able to
get on with the staff, the management and Directors." (Quote MD company
D, interview 7)
"Trust is the most important factor leading our companies to achieve a
successful performance." (Quote former MD company C, interview 20)
"I believe that trust has a significant impact on the JV performance." (Quote
managing director company C, interview 6)
"Trust between partners has a great impact on the success or failure of JV
performance." (Quote senior manager company F, interview 10)
"Trust is quite an important factor leading our JV to perform successfully."
(Quote executive director company B, interview 5)
5.9.3 Culture affecting JV performance and partner's relationship
Misunderstanding in culture seems to incur JV negotiation and management decision
making problems. Almost all partners try to understand their JV problems when these
are due to cultural differences. One foreign partner even sent the top management
staff, who understands Thai culture and had worked in Thailand for a long time, to
direct the JV company. They believe that this could reduce the conflict that might
arise because of the differences in cultural myth. Although culture has quite a
significant impact on JV performance, it was not considered as a main factor by many
interviewees. The highlights below quote the comments of interviewees regarding the
influence of culture on JV performance.
"I think there were problems with bidding against [the] Thai firm. One is [a]
farang [foreign] firm. Since the bidding, they have a bidding philosophy and
maybe wanted to put too many costs in. [When it] first started, the company
had many farang in it. Maybe 20-25 in it. [There were] very high overheads
and [the business] was unable to compete. Some projects are very good but
[the] majority of projects have been less satisfactory. And I think this is
particularly severe over the last two and a half years when the economic
problems in Southeast Asia have come to the fore. However, they still want to
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keep [the] business running due to the future because soon Thailand will start
[to] come out [of] this problem. It is starting now and there [soon] will be
opportunity around. "(Quote senior manager company F, interview 10)
"The understanding of culture is important to successful joint venture
business. Our ex-managing director understood how to work with us quite
well although he never worked with Thais before. He used to work in Europe
and Singapore. So, I think the understanding in culture and behaviour of the
partner and team work is very important issues leading the joint venture firm
to become successful." (Quote managing director company C, interview 6)
"Culture is not the main factor influencing the success or failure of joint
venture. However, in my viewpoint, having cultural similarity doesn't help us
to increase or reduce the joint venture negotiation problems. It only helps us
to understand the way our partner thinks, his approach, and so on." (Quote
managing director company C, interview 6)
"I don't think culture is the main issue [influencing JV performance]. Culture
is important but really you have to be a team and try to find partners in a
similar type of business. 1 see a lot of joint ventures where...say for example a
company is...Amm... a manufacturer and then they get into a business
running a restaurant. To go from a steel factory to set up a joint venture to
make McDonald, Pizza Hut or a video company. It is very dangerous to do
this. And ...Amm...I see a lot of Thai companies diversify. You know! They
used to make up plastic and they set up a joint venture to do real estate and
they set up a joint venture with finance company and they have been in the
restaurant business." (Quote MD company D, interview 7)
"Our partner wants the joint venture firm to be independent and able to run by
itself. They don't want the parent firm to dictate/control the joint venture
management decision-making when conflicts of interest regarding joint
venture objectives or operation occur between the share holders and the joint
venture firm. However, the Thai parent needs to be concerned about the
effects of the joint venture management decision to the Thai industry, the Thai
government body, the Thai parent, and so on. We try to avoid these effects.
However, our partner wants to be concerned only about the benefit of the joint
venture firm itself. Therefore, they don't want any parent firm to dominate
joint venture management decision making. They want the joint venture firm
to be autonomous. This is the difference between our perceptions in relation
to the joint venture management concept. There is no effect to our
relationship." (Quote managing director company C, interview 6)
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Chapter 6
A Case Study of JV Company E
This chapter presents the results of the case study of JV company E. First, the
bargaining power between JV partners will be explored. Then trust, culture and the
negotiation behaviour of JV partners will be examined. Next, the factors affecting
negotiation behaviour and JV performance will be discussed. The chapter will end
with an examination of factors affecting JV performance.
This case study focusses on company E, a service based joint venture distributing
natural gas. JV company "E" is a code devised to disguise the identity of the gas
distribution company, as requested by the interviewees, to preserve anonymity. The
idea of joint venture was firstly initiated by the foreign partner who foresaw the
potential of operating a natural gas distribution business in Thailand after they had
conducted a long feasibility study of the natural gas distribution network in and
around the Bangkok Metropolitan Area. This research commenced in 1988 with
funding from the Belgian government. According to Thai regulation, unless there is a
Thai shareholder, companies of foreign nationality are not allowed to operate gas
distribution in Thailand. They (Belgian and British) then approached the Thai partner
who has a monopoly of the gas business in Thailand. The Thai partner agreed that
this proposal offers high potential profit and could help the Thai nation, in terms of
preserving the environment, through the reduction of air pollution. Therefore, they
decided to form a JV with them. Initially, one Japanese firm was interested in
entering JV business with the Thai partner but the technology they possess (i.e. steel,
211
not plastic pipe) would have incurred a high investment cost. As a result of their
assessment of that cost, they withdrew from entering JV business with the Thai
partner. One British manager commented that:
"The outcome of [the] feasibility study [on natural gas distribution] was that
'yes, there is some business and yes, [we] could develop into something big.
And therefore, [the Belgian partner] said 'we can help you [the Thai partner]'.
[the Thai partner] said 'yes', we are OK with this and [the British partner]
became involved at the same time." (Quote: engineering department manager
company E, interview 11)
In considering whether to enter JV, neither the Thai nor the foreign partners felt that
finance was an issue. However, both partners wanted to combine their skiRs ard
resources so that the areas which were lacking in each of their individual businesses
would be filled and they could offer a more reliable and consistent service.
Establishing a joint venture business seemed the best way to go about this. As a
result, the JV agreement was signed in 1996 with the service operation initiated the
following year. It took six months until agreement was reached. Currently, there are
46 employees working in this JV company, of which almost ninety percent are Thais.
There are no expatriates below management level other than advisors on technical
issues, who are working on a short-term basis, as required. The JV had annual
revenue of 200 Baht million, up from 18 Baht million at the first year of its operation.
The JV has total assets of 543 Baht million, up from 500 Baht million at the
commencement of the JV business operation. The company only services the
domestic market.
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The following are the comments from the JV partners regarding the reasons for
entering joint venture business:
"We entered a joint venture with our partners due to the need to develop poly-
ethylene and gas pipe technology. If we didn't need this technology, we
would not have established a joint venture with them. We were already in this
business before joining business with our partners. But because we would like
to reduce our operating costs, using plastic pipe instead of steel pipe, we do
need the high technology provided by our partners." (Quote sales and
marketing manager company E, interview 8)
"It was not until the result showed the potential to operate this business in the
Thai market, that we entered joint venture business with our recent partners.
The reason we chose them is because they possess the scarce resources
needed, i.e. technology, and also they have good experience in the gas
distribution market. Obtaining financial resources does not concern us
because this project is quite small. Our partner joined us with the hope that
they can use us as a gateway and privilege to access other Thai market areas.
To expand to other market areas, we will need to have consent from the Thai
government first. Unfortunately, the Thai government policy is trying to
liberalize the market. So, it is unlikely that this joint venture can monopolize
the whole gas distribution market in the near future." (Quote deputy president
company E, interview 9)
"We have no choice [to work with other Thai firms]. [We] want to have a
position in Thailand which involves developing and expanding [the] natural
gas distribution market. [We] also have a financial involvement in producing
natural gas in Thailand with [another firm in which our Thai parent also has a
share]. So, [we] not only distribute gas, we also produce gas in the gulf of
Thailand." (Quote engineering department manager company E, interview 11)
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A summary of reasons for the Thai and foreign partners entering business jointly are
given in the table 6-1 below.
Table 6-1
Reasons for establishing JV
IV Firm Reasons for establishing joint venture
Thai partner's
view point
Foreign partner's view point
Company E Technology, reducing
cost and marketing
experience
British and Belgian
Access to Thai markets, government connection
All the parent firms in this JV case have a background in the same type of industry,
i.e. gas. Fundamentally, all partners seem to have common objectives in relation to an
increase in sales. However, it seems difficult for JVs to have all objectives met by all
partners. These unmet objectives can lead to conflict. Their viewpoints on objective
setting are as follows:
"Sales are our main objective. We also want to reduce the air pollution caused
by the use of bunker/fuel oil. Profit is our third objective. Profit is not an
important objective, if we could reduce air pollution for our country. Just
avoiding a loss would be enough. We have planned to achieve these
objectives within four years." (Quote sales and marketing manager company
E, interview 8)
"Our objective is to study and operate in one market area first to find out the
proper structure and experience [how] to operate further in other [market]
areas. So, we want to gain some more experience and [find out] how we can
apply this pilot study, regarding marketing strategy, to use as a format to
expand into other market areas. So, we then plan the new strategy, regarding
the directions we should go in order to become successful in the market. It is
too risky to start many projects at the same time. So, we start from one project
area first. Profit is the main objective of our joint venture. There is a conflict
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between our joint venture objectives and our parent's objectives." (Quote
deputy president company E, interview 9)
"[The] strategic objective is not only [to] become but [to] remain the primary
natural gas distributer in Thailand and to continue to expand and develop the
use of natural gas into upper markets. Safety and environmental integrity is
also important. Profit is not the issue here because we are talking about
increasing [the] volume of gas that we sell. We may be looking at an order of
magnitude between 50 and 75% growth per annum. It is a large percentage
[increase]. It is achievable because we have the ability to grow." (Quote
engineering department manager company E, interview 11)
"In the long term, there will be a liberalisation of the energy market. I suppose
that, at this time, it will be possible for us to operate a private company to
supply natural gas to industry. Our short-term objective is to make profit. The
long-term objective is to take a position in the open market. This means to
make [the] JV firm become [such a] critical size to be recognised as a gas
distribution company. Another main objective is to promote natural gas [as] a
beneficial energy in the energy market. We also have our long-term strategy
that is different from the British and Thai partner. We try to develop systems
(such as developing interconnection between each country) taking different
energies, e.g. gas for power-electricity. In the long-term there can be a win-
win solution between [the Belgian and Thai partner]." (Quote business and
development department manager company E, interview 17)
Table 6-2 below summarises the objectives and goals of the JV partners.
Table 6-2
JV companies' goals and objectives
JV Firm Goal and Objective
Thai partner's
view point
Foreign partner's view point
Company E Sales, profitability,
experience to expand to
other markets,
technology transfer and
air pollution reduction
British
Profitability, sales,
business growth and
market expansion
Belgian
Profitability, sales, critical size
in the market, opportunity for
future business
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6.1 Bargaining power
JV company E comprises one Thai and two European partners. The two European
parents hold Belgian and British nationality. The Thai partner holds a 51% majority
shareholding. The Belgian and British partners hold 27% and 22% equity
consecutively. The Belgian parent has a very large energy distribution plant in
Europe. The British parent has operated the largest integrated natural gas distribution
network in the world. One reason that the Thai side decided to have two partners was
given by a high ranking officer from the Thai parent. He said that it would be too
risky to rely on the technology and know-how transfer from only one foreign partner.
The Thai side perceived that it would be better to obtain scarce resources, e.g.
technology transfer, from two foreign partners so that they can keep balancing their
bargaining power with their foreign partners. The bargaining power of the Thai
partner seems to be reinforced as a means of holding the majority of the equity. Some
viewpoints were expressed by the JV partners as follows:
"The power rests with the Thai partner. They own 51% of the shares in the
JV. So, if [the Thai partner] says "sorry, we are no longer committed to the
approved master plan, we want now to stop this [IV] project and we want to
do something with somebody else", they could develop that line of reasoning.
But we would have ways of dealing with this within the IV agreement."
(Quote engineering department manager company E, interview 11)
"One cause of our conflict is because we have an imbalance of power. The
Thai partner holds a majority share, 51%. Thus if they want to vote on the
board we cannot [change] the result. We have no bargaining power compared
with our [Thai partner]. However we can build the relationship with some
people [from the Thai parent firm]. That is the only way [we can operate]
because we don't have any position to force [our Thai partner] to go in another
direction. We just build the future on relationships. That is what I call an
imbalance of power. Because if [the Thai partner] wants to vote, we cannot do
anything. They hold the majority [of equity]." (Quote business and
development department manager company E, interview 17)
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Belgian parent (27%)
British parent (22%)
	
Thai parent (51%)
"We hold a high bargaining power position over our partners. We possess a
privileged right to operate in the market. Although we want their technology,
we can get it from other sources. We don't need to be strict with our partners.
So, generally we have quite a high bargaining power. It is just a matter of
whether or not we want to exercise it." (Quote deputy president company E,
interview 9)
Figure 6-1 below shows the nationality of the parent companies and their equity
holdings in JV company E.
Figure 6-1
Key organisations in the JV company E
JV companyD
E
There are 5 people in the management team of this JV. When the JV operation
commenced, the MD was provided by the foreign side. After 2 years of business
operation, the top management post (MD) was handed over to the Thai side, as a
result of the selection process where the Board of Directors is dominated by the Thai
side. There is no deputy MD position in this JV firm. At the department level, the
power or authority rests with four management team managers. Two managers from
the foreign side are responsible for engineering (British partner) and planning &
development (Belgian partner). Another two managers from the Thai side control the
marketing and finance & administration. Six board members are from the foreign side
(2 British and 4 Belgian) and seven board members are nominated by the Thai parent.
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6.1.1 Alternative choice of entering JV
The Thai partner had more choice to enter JV with other foreign firms, whilst the
foreign side did not have any choice at all if they wanted to be involved and operate
gas distribution in Thailand. One foreign partner would have liked to have had a
majority in the JV but they cannot because Thai law prevents this and therefore they
also have little bargaining power with the Thai partner. One senior manager
concluded that because his company consider that they have lots of experience in the
gas business and are renowned worldwide, there was no need to waste too much time
thinking about alternative choices. "They also seem to be capable enough. So, we
went for this choice" (entering JV business with the foreign partners). The following
are the viewpoints regarding the options the foreign partner had when establishing JV:
"First of all there is the gas supply [from Thai parent]. So, without them, we
could not function. We could not have [any] company." (Quote engineering
department manager company E, interview 11)
"We had no choice, no alternatives. The only [way] if we want to do natural
gas business in this country. We can only do it with [our Thai partner]. [Our
Thai partner] has many options. There are many [foreign] companies like [us]
who could offer [a] similar facility and similar support. The one thing that
[the British partner] can demonstrate is that we have, for some years now,
operated the largest integrated natural gas distribution network in the world.
It's a fully integrated high pressure and low pressure natural gas system. [The
British partner] has a lot of experience and [the Belgian partner] also in
Europe has a very big plant in energy distribution. So, there is natural link
between the British and the Belgian partner in the eyes of [our Thai partner]
but [the Thai partner] could have gone with other companies who offer similar
services. [But they are] not as experienced as [us- the British partner]." (Quote
engineering department manager company E, interview 11)
"We didn't have any choice because [the Thai partner] is the only gas supplier.
Currently, if we want to operate gas business, we need to be with [the Thai
partner]. At this time, it's not allowed [for a foreign firm to operate the gas
business alone] in Thailand yet. It will be in the future when there is
liberalisation of the market." (Quote business and development department
manager company E, interview 17)
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"[The Thai partner] might not want to say to us [that] we can develop only in
the supply zone that we have. [If they say,] "you cannot develop on the
eastern seaboard because we are going to do that with somebody else." We
should understand that. We should accept that." (Quote engineering
department manager company E, interview 11)
The Thai partner also perceived a similar viewpoint to the foreign side as regards
alternative choices of establishing JV. They expressed their opinion that:
"Unfortunately, the gas distribution business is a monopoly. Foreign partners
will not be able to operate gas distribution business alone in Thailand.
Therefore, they have no option to choose another Thai partner besides us, even
if they had enough financial resource to do it by themselves. Before our
partner approached us, there was a Japanese company with steel pipe
technology who would like to enter joint venture business with us but later
they quit because of the high investment cost." (Quote sales and marketing
manager company E, interview 8)
"We have known the companies for some time and we thought both of our
partners were qualified enough for this job. We didn't offer choices to other
foreign firms. We don't know them. Also, we can save time and this job is a
pilot project. It will take too much unnecessary time for the partner selection
process if we keep trying to search for partners." (Quote deputy president
company E, interview 9)
6.1.2 Resource contribution
Financial resource has been contributed by all partners in relation to their equity
structure. At the commencement of the JV, the Thai and foreign partners reciprocated
interdependency in terms of the scarce intangible resources each contributed. The
lack of scarce resources of the Thai partner has been fulfilled by foreign partners.
These include technology and know-know transfer. The Thai partner provides a
significant contribution in terms of local market access, brand name and government
connections. Over time, it seems that bargaining power through resource contribution
has shifted towards the Thai partner as their dependence in terms of resources needed
219
from the foreign partner has reduced. However the foreign side believes that the Thai
partner still cannot do the business alone whilst one Thai officer said that he believed
they had received most of technology transfer and know-how that they need and that
they are capable of doing it all. Without the help of the Thai partner, regarding local
market access and government connections, there is no chance for the foreign partner
to survive in this gas business at all. Expertise is not an issue to be concerned about in
relation to the bargaining power held by each side because all partners contribute this
resource as needed. The JV comes up with high barrier costs to exit. However, since
there was no requirement for financial support from the foreign partner, it seems that
the Thai partner can walk away from their partners easily if they want to because the
project is very small. Some viewpoints with regards to resources provided by JV
partners were given below:
"We generally contribute the local market access and the brand name. We
also provide the government connections to get a licence to construct the gas
pipe in government restricted areas. If we did not do this work, they would
not be able to get through this process alone. Management expertise has been
provided by both parties. We are responsible for marketing and financial
management and their obligation is in the engineering and business
development departments. Money has been pooled by both of us. Technology
has been contributed by our foreign partner. They provide technical personnel
and expertise for us. We provide non-technical personnel. We arrange that
our Thai technical personnel and engineers train and understand the
knowledge and know-how from our partners during the transfer process.
Actually, we control the whole gas distribution market. If we didn't enter into
joint venture with them, they would not have been able to access to this market
at all. However, this market will be liberalised soon. Additionally, we didn't
define how much resource each partner should contribute. We just try to do
our best to help each other." (Quote sales and marketing manager company E,
interview 8)
"The second thing we get from [the Thai partner] is local knowledge, local
understanding and access to a lot of information and data that exists in
Thailand but it remains with [Thai parent company]. We also have to use their
name to get access permission. We contribute technology transfer, the
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technical transition between building and operating the natural gas distribution
system which they don't have. Additionally, we provided expertise." (Quote
engineering department manager company E, interview 11)
"We brought the experience (e.g. gas distribution, gas safety at international
standards) we had in Europe to [the Thai partner] who doesn't have this
experience. We [also] provided money and know-how. Our Thai partner
doesn't [have] the know-how to use polyethylene for distribution in Thailand.
Another thing [we] need is the local understanding of the market. For
example, the relationship with the customer and [the Thai] government. That
is why we need a local partner." (Quote business and development department
manager company E, interview 17)
A list of resources provided by each JV partner is given in the table 6-3 below.
Table 6-3
Resource contribution
JV Partner Resource Contribution
Thai Finance, local market access, brand name, government connection, management
expertise, non-technical personnel, local knowledge, local information
British Technology transfer, know-how, management expertise, money
Belgian Technology transfer, know-how, management expertise, technical personnel,
money
6.2 Trust
Trust was regarded as being important for all JV partners. Trust is likely to be
enhanced with low opportunism. It was also seen in both personal and organisational
terms. Two Thai officers remark that trust is a crucial factor on both a personal and
an organisational basis.
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"In my viewpoint, trust on a personal basis tends to be more important than on
an organisational basis. We trust them more if they never try to trick us."
(Quote sales and marketing manager company E, interview 8)
"Trust should be directed to the organisation first. Trust for the individual is
of secondary importance. However, we can still change the individual at the
negotiating table if we don't like them." (Quote deputy president company E,
interview 9)
The Deputy President of the Thai parent company considers trust, as opposed to
opportunism, as the most significant factor in JV formation and operation.
"Trust is the most important aspect of forming a joint venture business with
partners. Partners should not try to take advantage of one another. They need
to show their intention and sincerity to work for the benefit of the joint
venture, not for themselves. However, our partner seems not to follow our JV
written agreement. For example, they want us to expand the business to other
areas which are not possible due to Thai regulation. Because we are not happy
to rely on technology transfer from only one partner, (fierefore \Ne kVANt ente-ted
joint venture business with two foreign partners in order to keep balancing the
bargaining power regarding their technology contributions." (Quote deputy
president company E, interview 9)
Trust between partners has increased over time as relationships develop. Generally
speaking, there was a high level of trust between partners at the beginning of the JV
operation and negotiation. Partners also tend to rely and trust each other more as their
relationships develop over time. The following two comments showed how trust
between partners develops over time:
"We trust them because of their sincerity and integrity. The more we get used
to their style of negotiation and the more we trust each other, the less
confrontation we have. As trust develops, our partner adapts and implements a
more similar kind of negotiation behaviour and style to us." (Quote sales and
marketing manager company E, interview 8)
"Our foreign partners seem not to believe in us, regarding a suitable location
for the gas piping. However, over time, since we have been talking on the
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basis of facts and reality, trust between partners has increased over time. It
can be seen that they seem to understand and follow our comments and
recommendations with regards to piping construction work in this JV." (Quote
construction manager company E, interview 12)
"If we misunderstand how they [the Thai partner] manage the IV, then we
don't have any trust. Generally speaking, yes, we trust [our Thai partner].
The only problem now is that we understand effectively how [the Thai partner]
is working. What is the decision making process inside [the Thai partner's
organisation]. So the trust again, [we and the British partner] want [to have] a
long-term commitment with a local partner. We don't want to invest for a few
weeks or a few months. We want to invest long-term. For us long-term is 15
years or even 20 years. To do that gong-term commitment] we need some
trust because we can't go into a JV if we cannot trust our partner." (Quote
business and development department manager company E, interview 17)
Since there has been a conflict in terms of long-term goal achievement by the foreign
partner, trust between partners is still in doubt. The foreign partner argued that the
Thai parent hesitates to supply and accept what has been approved in the IV master
plan since the JV formation. On the other hand, the Thai partner reasoned that it was
that the foreign side which tried not to understand what had been agreed in the JV
agreement, regarding the limitation of the service area in the gas distribution business.
The Thai partner also emphasised that their foreign counterpart tends to behave
opportunistically to demand that the area of service be expanded beyond the
contractual agreement. As a result of this conflict over the long-term objective of the
foreign partner which remains unmet, trust between them is considered to have
declined dramatically. However, one foreign manager said that it wouldn't affect
their JV performance at the moment because they try to understand what is realistic in
terms of target achievement. Additionally, that manager also expressed the view that
they still intend to continue developing their relationship with the Thai partner and to
ensure that the Thai partner understands the issues and unresolved problems. The
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following give a clearer idea of the problems/conflicts that the Thai and foreign
partners are currently debating:
"To illustrate that point I would say that approximately two years ago, a
master plan was developed inside [the JV]. We projected that over the next
five years, we [would] take gas into between 9 and 14 new industrial zones. A
budget was very broad. Basic budget was discussed and agreed. And the main
boards of [the Thai, British and Belgian partners] approved that master plan.
It was challenging and [we] have had some very great difficulties now with
[The Thai parent] in getting them to accept and continue to supply gas to us
within the structure of that approved master plan." (Quote engineering
department manager company E, interview 11)
"The problem is that at this time we have some questions about [the Thai
partner]. I think, at this time, we try more to survive - not to live. Then,
maybe trust in the partners could change. We could leave or walk away from
the JV. But it's too early to confirm that. We don't want to do that because
we expect some changes in the long-term." (Quote business and development
department manager company E, interview 17)
Although JV conflict seems to reduce trust between partners, both foreign partners
still intend to resolve the problems and develop trust further. One foreign interviewee
commented:
"We still have trust in the JV. I believe that, in the short term, in a few
months, we need to clarify and try to simplify the discussion." (Quote
business and development department manager company E, interview 17)
Key indicators of trust between partners at the beginning of the N formation derived
from both past experience and reputation. The two foreign partners are very well-
known worldwide. The Thai partner maintains a high reputation and controls the
whole gas market in Thailand. The Thai partner chose to enter N business with their
foreign partners because of their reputation and their unique capability to support the
gas business. Whilst reputation reinforces trust when firms have never known or been
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involved in business with each other before, good past experience and previous
relationship lead to fewer ambiguities between partners who consequently trust each
other more.
"We have never done any business with our partners before. However, we
knew one of them for nearly 7 years before entering this joint venture business
together. They have been selected by the World Bank to do research on the
distribution networks of gas nearby the Bangkok metropolitan area. After
finishing their job, the result showed good opportunities to operate a gas
distribution business in Thailand. Seeing this opportunity, they approached us
because we are the only company who controls this market in Thailand.
Because they can provide us with the technology needed and also they are
from a world class country, with a high reputation as well as being a leader in
the gas distribution industry, so we agreed to enter joint venture business with
them." (Quote sales and marketing manager company E, interview 8)
"We have had a long-term relationship with the Belgian partner for the last ten
years. They assisted our Thai parent firm, regarding the technique of piping
construction and distribution into the gas operation unit in Chonburi. Even
though we never worked together as a firm at that time, our relationship has
developed since that time." (Quote construction manager company E,
interview 12)
6.3 Culture
Both Thai and foreign partners seem to understand the importance of culture
associated with JV management and negotiation. The British partner was even
prepared to learn the Thai culture before coming to Thailand. The following shows
the intention of the British partner in trying to understand the Thai culture:
"Before going abroad, we spent time talking about cultural differences and
understanding what you should do or should not do in that country. There are
number of things I remember very clearly about what I should and should not
do in Thailand." (Quote engineering department manager company E,
interview 11)
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However, understanding culture without trying to adapt to the other side would not be
very useful. One Thai manager stated that they had been trying to help them (the
foreign partner) to understand more about Thai culture. "We even bought some books
regarding Thai culture for them. Over time they seem to understand Thai culture
more and more." According to one Thai interviewee "But they only understand it. It
is difficult for them to change or adjust their way of doing things and their Western
mind-set to us." Cultural differences in ways of doing business and negotiation styles
tend to incur a JV conflict and may also influence the performance of the JV.
National culture, rather than organisational culture, seems to play a significant role in
JV. According to one foreign manager, "[The Thai] culture [means] talking,
negotiating and developing some compromise where our main culture, I think, [is]
more in the form of a nationalistic view." The viewpoints regarding management
conflict between partners due to cultural differences are given below.
"My personal view on the cause of conflicts or differences [in business
negotiation and operation] is initially cultural. There are quite large cultural
differences. The Thai way of negotiating is very similar to other countries
which I have worked in." (Quote engineering department manager company E,
interview 11)
"Another cause of conflicts is cultural dissimilarity. Because I think that
between European culture and Asian, certainly Thai culture, there are a lot of
differences. The first big difference for me is the time notion. When we want
to do something in Europe, we try to implement our objectives as soon as
possible. I don't believe that, here in Asia, time is also of a concern. I think
everybody [the Thai partner] says 'we have a lot of time and so if we are slow
that is not a big issue because we have time'. That is the first huge difference.
When we make a deal, we like to do it as soon as possible. I don't feel the
same will [come] from [the Thai partner].
The second difference is I don't believe that in Asia something is black or
white. Everything is grey because when you ask somebody if this is good or
bad. They say that's 50% good, that's 50% bad. I think that in Asian culture
everything can be good or bad. I suppose that is the influence from Buddhism
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and Chinese culture. When you take a decision, there is something good in
everything and something wrong. It takes more time to make a decision.
The third difference is that the decision making process is also different, I
think. I have been working in a JV with Canadian people. There is a huge
difference because to make a decision everybody is there. [They all] agree. A
decision is made in a few minutes and the direction the management takes is
understood. And here the process is slower. You need to discuss it with
different people. You need to understand the sensitivity of the people. Then
after that maybe you can try to find some compromise. It's difficult [to make]
a decision by voting here. Because, when you vote, in some way the people
who won't win will lose face and it is difficult for Asian people to lose face.
To [get it accepted], you need to prepare the decision before going to the
board. That's my feeling, I don't know if it's right." (Quote business and
development department manager company E, interview 17)
"The [multi]national organization or [multi]national spirit accept that working
with foreigners naturally is [the] norm. In [the] UK or in Europe generally [or]
in the States, many companies, many large corporations are owned by
Japanese, by foreigners outside of the company, and there is no concern or no
worry about that [cultural differences] at all. There seems to be what I have
seen. There is a view that, in Thailand, that is not something that people are
happy with generally. That is a general nationalistic view." (Quote
engineering department manager company E, interview 11)
"Another difference [in culture] is that within an organisation such as [Thai
partner]. Because it's a very large, bureaucratic organization, there is very
often a difficulty in getting a change of direction, a change of emphasis
implemented - change in the way the organisation works or organisation
thinks." (Quote engineering department manager company E, interview 11)
Partners whose cultures are similar tend to understand each other more and have less
conflict. The Belgian and British partners seem to agree and have the same opinion
regarding business operation and direction whilst the Thai partner often perceives
things differently from their foreign partners. The viewpoint of [the] foreign partners
regarding the cultural distance is shown below.
"[We] and [our Belgian partner] are very aligned. We have similar views,
very similar approaches to what we want this [JV] company to do" (Quote
engineering department manager company E, interview 11)
227
"We have been involved in a few problems; a dispute with [the Thai partner].
What I feel is that [the Belgian and British partners] are more or less on the
same level/view in defining short-term objectives." (Quote business and
development department manager company E, interview 17)
As foreign partners get to know each other and work together with the Thai partner
over a period of time, they tend to understand and accept more the Thai ways of doing
business in Thailand. But this doesn't mean that it is the right way to do business
according to their judgement. People from different cultures tend to judge things
differently on the definition of right or wrong. According to one Thai manager, "to
get the job done, sometimes we need to send a gift to the Thai government. It is our
custom. We can also save time." The reason foreign partners cannot operate the Thai
way in respect of giving gifts is that in most Western cultures it is considered to be
bribery and therefore wrong and can get people into trouble, both with their company
and with the law. The foreign partner also seems to understand more about the Thai
ways of doing business. The remarks regarding partner's view on the traditional Thai
ways of operating business are given below.
"I am not suggesting for one minute that there is corruption because I've never
seen any evidence of it in Thailand. There are business ways in Thailand
which would not be acceptable in UK. That [is] not the same...as wrong. It
may be that it is very right and very acceptable for Thailand." (Quote
engineering department manager company E, interview 11)
"Our foreign partners don't use personal connections to get the job done.
They don't understand that. Over here, [connections] are very important to get
the job done. So, we just tell our partner to wait and then, we just do it for
them. You can never reach the top of Thai officialdom if you have no
connection in Thailand. In the early days, they don't really understand at all in
this regard, the Thai custom/etiquette of sending a gift to senior Thai staff.
They have now learned and understand more. They did not study the Thai
culture before, even though they understand it afterwards. But because of their
own cultural habits/behaviour, they do not try to operate the Thai way."
(Quote sales and marketing manager company E, interview 8)
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6.3.1 Individualism vs. collectivism
There are some cultural differences in the dimension of individualism/collectivism.
The Thai partner tends to belong to a collectivistic group whilst the foreign partners in
this JV incline to be individualist. The Thai partner prefers flexibility and an informal
system. The foreign partner tends to stick to their management style and perceive that
the contractual agreement should be rigid. The following are the descriptions by the
Thai partner regarding their perception of JV management system:
"It is not going to work in this joint venture with Thais, with regards to
implementing a formal management system all the time as foreign parent firms
do in their own countries. In the situation of fierce competition in Thailand,
we need to employ an informal management system. The foreign way of
doing business will never work in Thailand. Flexibility is also important to
make things work here. So, the foreign partner needs to start thinking, and
changing their thought, if they want this joint venture business to become
successful." (Quote deputy president company E, interview 9)
"Our organisational structure is flat. We have 4 departments, namely:
marketing, finance and administration, planning and development and
engineering. Each department has only one division manager. We don't have
a head of department. Broadly speaking, we have 3 levels in the organisation:
general manager, department manager and division manager. We manage
using both top-down and bottom-up styles. We are happy for everybody to
express their own opinion. We tend to implement an informal business
management system. However, anything regards money management, it must
be formal." (Quote sales and marketing manager company E, interview 8)
"We allow some flexibility to renegotiate our contractual agreement. If we
want to make some changes in the joint venture contract, we will raise this
issue during the share holding meeting. If all partners agree unanimously to
make changes, we will do it. If not, we implement the rule of majority." We
also specified that in some aspects of an agreement that there must be a
minimum of three quarters of the vote to make changes and some issues only
need half of the vote." (Quote sales and marketing manager company E,
interview 8)
"Thais perceive that the joint venture agreement should be flexible while the
foreign partner want the agreement to be rigid. We would like the agreement
to be written in very broad detail and be able to make some changes if
necessary." (Quote sales and marketing manager company E, interview 8)
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"I would say the contractual agreement is just a framework or rules for share
holders to follow in order to make the joint venture move forward. However,
it is no good at all if partners want to follow the agreement strictly and
perform everything as the agreement says. There will be a negative/bad result
rather than a good one." (Quote deputy president company E, interview 9)
"Our relationship with our foreign partners is fine. Generally, I am happier
with the Belgian partner because they are more flexible. Our British partner is
rigid and conservative. But this doesn't mean, we don't like to work with the
British partner. Our former general manager whose nationality is Belgian was
very adaptive. We could understand each other very well. Trust was very
good at that time." (Quote sales and marketing manager company E, interview
8)
"There can be a different approach with [the Belgian partner] to resolve
conflict. Maybe [the Belgian partner] is more soft, more flexible than [the
British partner]. That is my feeling. The only difference in culture between
the foreign partner, I think, is that [the Belgian partner] is more
straightforward than [the British partner]." (Quote business and development
department manager company E, interview 17)
"I also have the feeling that when a contractual agreement was signed, the
value, the commitment is not the same as for us. When we sign something it
is a long-term commitment. I don't feel here that a commitment is long-term.
Every commitment we've had they have tried to change it after a few months.
I can accept that [some] things can change but not everything." (Quote
business and development department manager company E, interview 17)
Cultural difference regarding Thai ways of promoting employees still cannot be
totally agreed by the foreign partners. Foreign partners prefer to promote employees
according to their performance. However the Thai partner is concerned not only
about performance but also seniority. Differences in the partner's evaluation systems
results in both Thai and foreign partners experiencing a bitter feeling. It is difficult
for Thais to be promoted to sit in a high position, if they are still young, because there
are issues of maturity and morality. The Thais' belief has a close link to Confucian
thought about filial piety and respect for elders. This seems to have a significant
impact on how young people relate to older people and vice versa and on their ability
to hold a more senior position than someone older than them.
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Two different viewpoints regarding employee's promotion from both the Thai and the
foreign partner are given below.
"Staff recruitment is based on the level of education and ability. In addition,
we consider the family background. We promote staff according to their
performance. At the same time, we also consider seniority. We consider that
if they have been qualified in terms of performance but still not reaching
maturity [too young], we wouldn't promote them yet. So, sometimes we argue
with our foreign partner regarding this issue. You know if we promote
someone who is younger, the person who has been working here for a long
time and has the same kind of performance won't be happy and he may not
wish to stay with us. Promoting someone at a younger age might be OK in
Western countries but it is not applicable to Thailand in general." (Quote sales
and marketing manager company E, interview 8)
"[We] and [the Belgian partner] have a very [strong] cultural similarity but
[have] a big difference with [the Thai partner]. There is a very clear hierarchy,
certainly, in [the] Thai parent firm and also in Thai business. There is a clear
hierarchy of seniority and in the way that decisions get made. In European
companies, and certainly in the British parent now, there are some very young
managers, very young people carry a very big responsibility and make very
big decisions and it is not [necessarily] a feature or function of age for that
matter. The number of years doing their job is function of 'Are you capable?',
'Are you knowledgeable?' That is the relationship that, certainly, [our British
parent] would like to see in [this JV company]. The involvement of [the Thai
partner] influencing those cultural directions does hold [things] up. It is hard.
I have two very young engineers working for me. One who I've been allowed
to call 'operation manager' because he is 37or 38 years old.. And there is
another engineer who is managing another group. Because he is only 24 years
old, I'm not allowed to call him 'manager'. He is called a senior engineer and
it was a battle getting [that title for him]. If he was working in [our British
parent firm] he would be managing a department and would be called a
manager and he would carry a burden of responsibility as a manager. I've no
doubt in mind that he could do it. I have faith in him. Unfortunately, I
definitely cannot set it up inside this iv. It is stupid I think, because the risk is
you'll never perform at full potential. Because you're not given responsibility
but come with responsibility, you must also accept that if you don't perform
[well] you can be criticised, you can be directed or redirected. But my belief
is that certainly I've seen it in my career in the British parent firm, if you give
the right person the responsibility at the right time, the organisation is so much
better. You'll get fresh ideas, fresh enthusiasm, fresh drive, fresh direction.
But getting that to change is difficult." (Quote engineering department
manager company E, interview 11)
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There was cultural misunderstanding at the beginning of the JV business operation.
The foreign partner tried to negotiate with and persuade the Thai partner to accept and
do things in the foreign way. They wanted the Thai partner to try their way and
expected that experience would show that it should be this way. However, over time,
as the result proved, the way things work in Thailand is what the Thai partner
recommended. Finally, they (the foreign partners) trusted and agreed with the Thai
partner.
"When we deal with the Thai government, we need to build up relationships
and approach them in a friendly manner. Negotiating only on the basis of
reasoning and facts won't work well in Thailand, nor will letters. I tried to
explain to them but they seemed not to understand. They trust us more now,
after events appear to ratify the recommendation of our Thai partner.
Accordingly, afterwards they just comment and offer us the idea, and the
possible plans, but leave all dealings with the Thai government for us to
finally decide on the best approach." (Quote sales and marketing manager
company E, interview 8)
6.3.2 Cultural difference in negotiation style
Some interviewees really don't care much about the negotiation style of their partner,
they are very open-minded. However, one Thai employee pointed out that their
foreign partner tried to take an advantage of them.
"In my opinion, there is some dissimilarity between our two European partners
and the American. Our partners are not so aggressive, compared with the
American way of negotiating business. They are quite conservative and open-
minded. I had experience of doing business with an American too. The
British are very polite, the same as the Thais. Unlike the American style,
during our negotiation process, we discuss gently... never raising the voice,
scolding, yelling or showing inappropriate behaviour, for example thumping
the table loudly. However, we also have some cultural differences with the
Europeans. Europeans tend to produce arguments based on reasoning, logic
and fact and I think it is good. Regarding Thai culture, most Thai people don't
like to argue with anybody. Sometimes they [Thais] argue on a personal basis.
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They don't want to lose face. If they are not really open-minded people, they
won't let you argue with them. However, at our business negotiating table, we
are allowed to express our own opinion freely and make whatever argument
we like. After finishing it, nothing is really personal. In practice, it is still
difficult for some Thais to accept this thought/principle. Sometimes we have
an argument regarding this type of expenditure [e.g. gifts to Government
officials]. Our Belgian partner is quite frugal about spending money in this
respect. After a few years of experience, they have learned and know more
about the Thai style of negotiation. They now know that when Thais smile, it
doesn't mean that we agree with them all the time. Also, they perceive that
when the Thai partner doesn't make any argument during the negotiation
process, this doesn't mean that we agree with them. They have become less
aggressive in terms of the wording used. So, now they don't speak
straigthforwardly and outspokenly as they did before when they don't agree
with our opinion. Additionally, the Japanese style of negotiation is very gentle
and smooth. I negotiated with the Japanese when I worked at the Thai parent
company. However, I know them only from one side, as being theiI
customers. If the role changes to being joint partner, I don't know whether it
would be the same style or not." (Quote sales and marketing manager
company E, interview 8)
"I think they (the foreign partner) make a good partners. The British style of
negotiation tends to be conservative and inflexible. They follow
[procedures]strictly. Whilst I feel that the Belgian partner is more flexible."
(Quote sales and marketing manager company E, interview 8)
"There are a lot of differences in culture and style of negotiation between
partners. I do believe that Thai negotiation style is quite gentle and smooth,
not so aggressive. We try to solve problems and end up with an acceptable
agreement. Foreign partners tend to use an attacking negotiation style and try
to take advantage where possible. Our Thai partner prefers to use a defensive
style of negotiation. (Quote deputy president company E, interview 9)
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Table 6-4 below summarises the negotiation style of each JV partner.
Table 6-4
The style of negotiation
Country The style of negotiation
Thai
Gentle,	 polite,	 defensive,	 no	 straight
answer, compromising, slow to make
decisions
European
English Polite, less Aggressive
Belgian Less aggressive
6.4 Negotiation behaviour
The partners in this JV prefer to use a compromising strategy. Even though there
were conflicts between Thai and foreign partners, each partner seems to understand
where they stand, how they should behave and what they should implement during
both the negotiation of forming the JV and ongoing business negotiations. The
foreign partners also understand about the cause of conflicts when partners from
different countries come to work together. This is why they (the foreign partners)
tend to compromise where possible. They don't believe that there is a win-win
situation all the time at the negotiating table. In reality, there must be one side win and
one side lose. They thought that it is not too bad to compromise for mutual benefit,
even though they don't feel that is the best strategy to implement. Many issues were
discussed and compromises were made before the formal negotiation took place. This
shows the intention of both partners to work cooperatively for the success of the JV.
Fundamentally, the Thai partner tends to be collaborative if they have no doubt about
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the result of implementing the action. They also value the long-term relationship.
Avoiding tactics were used sometimes when both Thai and foreign partners perceived
that agreement could not be reached prior to and during the negotiation process.
There were only a few times when foreign partners implemented a competing tactic,
e.g. when they believed that those issues were very important and should be accepted
by the Thai partners. As they (foreign partners) negotiated on the basis of reasoning
and facts, these were eventually agreed by the Thai partner. However, one conflict
regarding an issue about long-term objectives is still unresolved and both foreign and
Thai partners still keep arguing or competing over it. The quotations below are the
viewpoints of a Thai interviewee on the use of the avoiding tactic.
"We never use the rule of majority. We will discuss and ask our partner's
opinion as to whether they agree or not. If they disagree, we will postpone this
issue to be discussed later." (Quote sales and marketing manager company E,
interview 8)
Some more viewpoints from both foreign and Thai partners' about negotiation
behaviour regarding the most frequently used compromising strategies are quoted
below.
"I have never yet seen anybody exercising their power by forcing others [to
compromise] during Board meetings in this joint venture. We try to
compromise and talk cooperatively to one another. Our joint venture can be
compared to a married couple. So, sometimes there must be a verbal fight
between us but we never think about divorce." (Quote sales and marketing
manager company E, interview 8)
"We try to negotiate until an agreement has been reached between all partners.
If we get to the end of negotiation but we still cannot agree on those issues,
then we tend to compromise." (Quote deputy president company E, interview
9)
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"We certainly try to debate the issues. We certainly try to reach an
understanding where [the Thai partner] has difficulties and we try to reach
some compromise. However, there are certain points in those discussions and
in those negotiations when it becomes apparent that [the Thai partner] is in
great difficulty in giving us access to gas supplies or having difficulties in
understanding what our business is." (Quote engineering department manager
company E, interview 11)
"We tend to compromise with our foreign partners as much as we can. They
[foreign partners] are very open-minded. They told us when they agree or
disagree. Generally, in meetings with them, we often understand and negotiate
on the basis of reasoning logic and tend to reach agreement half way." (Quote
construction manager company E, interview 12)
"There are losers within the agreed contract. In any conflict or any dispute,
there has got to be compromise to resolve it." (Quote engineering department
manager company E, interview 11)
"The method we use to handle conflict with [the Thai partner] is to find a
compromise. We don't want to force the issue. By compromising and also by
discussion, I think, that is the best way." (Quote business and development
department manager company E, interview 17)
6.5 Factors affecting negotiation behaviour
6.5.1 Bargaining power affecting negotiation behaviour
There was a balance in bargaining power at the beginning of JV formation and
operation. However, over time the bargaining power has shifted to the Thai side.
There was only one time when it was clearly seen that the Thai partner exercised their
dominant power by selecting Thai staff to sit at the top of the management team
(MD). It seems that all partners prefer not to bargain on the basis of power they hold.
They (Thai and foreign partners) quite understand how the result would worsen if they
compete seriously rather than trying to compromise with each other. Even though the
bargaining power has already shifted to the Thai side, the Thai partner hardly
exercises their power at all. The foreign partners are also competing against the Thai
partner on the issue of service area extension. However, they seem to argue on the
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basis of facts and reasoning. Two expressions of foreign and Thai partners regarding
bargaining power in relation to the negotiation tactics used are as follows:
"The JV company is continuing to develop and continuing to expand natural
gas distribution in Thailand but unfortunately this is set against a backdrop of
constant arguing with our [Thai] JV partner and having to battle every step of
the way. There is no willingness to allow us to proceed. And it might be that
the success of our company is an indication that we did not perform before. Or
they may feel that now they can do this project totally on their own.
Eventually they will be able to [do the project on their own] but at the moment
we believe that they cannot." (Quote engineering department manager
company E, interview 11)
"There were only a few times when we said 'we should do this, there is
nothing better than this' so that we can end it and start discussing some other
issues. Normally we discuss and negotiate business based on fact, reasoning
and logic and we always have an unanimous result. We never count the vote
using the rule of majority at all." (Quote sales and marketing manager
company E, interview 8)
6.5.2 Trust affecting negotiation behaviour
The level of trust between partners seems to decrease as the Thai partner could not
agree to an objective the foreign partner wanted to achieve. There was also a
problem of the Thai partner losing face when negotiation took place. Foreign partners
try to be careful and compromise with them where possible. However, there are some
issues on which the foreign partners cannot compromise. The foreign partners were
concerned about the issue of safety at the warehouse. They don't trust the Thai
partner who allows the use of an inadequate machine like a pallet truck for lifting and
moving heavy objects that might catch fire. Although purchasing the electric forklift
truck increased the cost by 50%, the foreign partner wouldn't compromise and
discussion was very heated. Finally, the Thai partner compromised and agreed.
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Below is the quotation given by the foreign partners for the concern about safety in
the gas distribution warehouse:
"I think the problem is not someone to trust in the context of what we say and
what we do. It's the level of trust associated with [the Thai partner's losing
face]. Trust, for me, is very important for all partners, in both negotiation of
the way the work developes and particularly with regards to operations
aspects. I think, without an understanding of what we're trying to achieve and
of the issues that we're going to face, we could end up in the situation where
we were arguing about safety issues without full understanding and safety is a
very important feature of natural gas distribution activities." (Quote
engineering department manager company E, interview 11)
The following quote is the comment of a Thai interviewee regarding the above issue:
"We had a long discussion about 3 weeks ago on the conflicting issue of
buying a new electric forklift with our foreign partners. They tried not to
listen to us. We normally need to use a truck for lifting and moving objects
just a few times a month. There was no need to buy a very expensive electric
forklift. The maintenance cost is also high. It is only suitable for indoor use.
Our foreign partner seems to be concerned only over the environment issue
without judging the logic of reasoning about what is the best scenario in this
respect. However, as we are a partnership, I try to be as cooperative as I can.
If we cannot agree, we tend to compromise." (Quote sales and marketing
manager company E, interview 8)
6.5.3 Culture affecting negotiation behaviour
The Thai culture regarding losing face seems to affect the way that the Thai partner
negotiates business with the foreign partners. The foreign partners seem to
understand the Thai culture regarding losing face quite well. However, they
continued to debate with the Thais when they felt that they were right. The remarks
of one foreign partner regarding the way Thai national culture influences the Thai
partners in their use of compromising strategy are as follows:
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"I've never seen any aggression in meetings, which tend to managed by Thai
people. There is always a desire to seek compromise and I think that desire for
compromise always end up with a weak solution rather than a strong solution.
But to seek a strong solution means some people have to withdraw or to
change their views. And the Thai problem of losing face affects many people.
Very often, I debate the point and, at the end, if the view of the group is that
they don't want it, or they're not happy with it, or they want it changed, so, I'll
have to accept it. I don't feel that I have lost face. I'm unhappy because what
I think was right, others don't think is right. But I also recognise that I live in
the democracy and if the democratic view is that they don't want to do
something then, fine, we don't have to do it. Then, I obey the instruction. I
don't personally feel that I lose face and I certainly would not seek the
compromise to avoid me losing face - if it made me have to compromise the
better interest of the JV company, or the organisation, or the decision." (Quote
engineering department manager company E, interview 11)
The quotation below shows the Thai interviewee's comment regarding the effect of
culture on negotiation behaviour:
"At the beginning of our business negotiation we argued and competed against
each other every week. I think one reason for the conflict is because of the
cultural differences. I and [the British manager] seem to come from different
disciplines. Our company is very small. We don't need to spend money
unnecessarily. However, we tried to compromise with them more. And they
tend to understand and trust us more afterwards." (Quote sales and marketing
manager company E, interview 8)
6.6 JV performance
The foreign partners seem to be satisfied with the profit achieved. However, financial
performance is not the only indicator of JV outcome. In this JV firm, the foreign
partners also want to achieve a long-term objective in addition to objective measures.
The foreign partners have an unmet objective regarding the extension of business,
which has been monopolised by this JV firm, to other locations. The foreign partners
would view this as commitment from the Thai partner. Whilst the Thai partner
reasons that the foreign partner seems not to understand what the agreement says.
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They (the Thai partner) also added that the Thai government is trying to privatise this
gas distribution market. Accordingly, the conflict of the Thai partner's reaction in not
trying to understand the issue of sharing the foreign partner's goal must still be
resolved between the JV partners in the future. The following shows the quotation of
one foreign manager regarding an unmet objective which may lead to a lower
performance by the JV in the future:
"It [JV performance] is less than planned. But it is something that we are not
uncomfortable with. We have accepted that. We should be performing better.
We could have been performing better but it is not something which is causing
us great concern. We are continuing to work to develop and get the
performance of the company back on track. If the problem [of delaying and
the reaction of the Thai parent regards continuing, and accepting, to supply gas
to the JV within the structure of the approved master plan] continues, the
performance, the morale and the view in the company would change
dramatically. And it is certainly of concerned to [the British and Belgian
partners] if that happens." (Quote engineering department manager company
E, interview 11)
6.6.1 Satisfaction
Although the economic crisis and recession in Thailand has affected the JV company
so that it performs less well than it should, all partners were satisfied with the profit
which the JV company has made so far. The JV performed quite well, even though
the business has only been operating for about 3 years. The Thai partner is satisfied
with the overall JV performance. One Thai manager stated that:
"The gas business is a heavily capital intensive industry. It takes time to reach
breakeven point. At the moment, we are nearly there. Hopefully at the end of
this year we will reach this point." (Quote sales and marketing manager
company E, interview 8)
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Both Thai and foreign partners are satisfied with the relationships developed over
time. One foreign manager reckons that the JV relationships between partners are still
young and still need time for further development. The Thai partner seems to be more
satisfied with the JV performance than the foreign partners. Both Thai and foreign
viewpoints as regards their evaluation and satisfaction with the JV performance are
quoted below.
"I am satisfied with this joint venture performance outcome. The Board of
Directors also expressed their high level of satisfaction with this joint venture
performance." (Quote sales and marketing manager company E, interview 8)
"Even though our company's growth is quite slow due to the economic crisis,
I am quite satisfied with the overall JV performance." (Quote sales and
marketing manager company E, interview 8)
"We are satisfied with our relationship with the foreign partner. Even though
we have had some conflict with them [foreign partner], there is nothing
personal really. It is good to discuss ideas with them. They are very open-
minded." (Quote construction manager company E, interview 12)
"There are some successes [in this JV] but we are not happy with the
performance because the progress of the company is too slow." (Quote
business and development department manager company E, interview 17)
6.6.2 Objective achievement
The Thai partner has achieved technology and know-how transfer at the level they set
but it took them longer than they expected. They are very happy with this success.
They (Thai partner) have learned and understood a considerable amount regarding the
technique of pipe welding and gas service marketing. According to the Thai partner,
the JV has successfully supplied and serviced gas to the area, as set in the master plan.
Air pollution has reduced as the level of natural gas, instead of fuel oil, used by the
factories for their production has increased. The level of sales, a common objective of
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both Thai and foreign partner, has also been achieved successfully. There is only one
long-term objective, regarding an extension of the service to other areas which have
not been reached by either of the foreign partners. The Belgian partner has an
additional objective, i.e. gaining a critical size. This is different from the other
partners but has not been achieved yet. In short, the overall objective achievement
perceived by the foreign partner is moderate. The following are remarks obtained
from interviewees highlighting their objective achievement:
"In terms of technology transfer, I think we have achieved a lot. At the
moment, Thais can understand and do pipe welding on their own. The foreign
partner needs only to watch and supervise us during that process. The more
we can persuade customers to use gas instead of fuel/bunker oil, the better it is
for air pollution. So far, we have already accessed 50% of the market. It is
looking good. So, we are quite happy with these achievements. Our partners
also seem to be satisfied with these results." (Quote sales and marketing
manager company E, interview 8)
"To date, we think we have achieved some of our objectives, if we don't take
into account the effect of economic downturn in last two years. I think it is
looking good, at a certain level. We learn and experience more from our
partner in the way they access the market, approach the customer and offer a
marketing service. Our partner is also satisfied with this achievement."
(Quote deputy president company E, interview 9)
"We are now generating profit, considering the investment we had, which is
good for a young start-up company." (Quote engineering department manager
company E, interview 11)
"I am happy with the level of the technology transfer and know-how received
from our foreign partner so far. However, we still would like to learn as much
more from them as we can." (Quote construction manager company E,
interview 12)
"we consider that the objective of providing gas as the energy of our present
area has been achieved. But we haven't [achieved] what I call 'critical size',
we are still too small." (Quote business and development department manager
company E, interview 17)
"Profitability [is] OK. Market [is] as expected. Sales [are] too low. Service
marketing [is] appropriate. Technology transfer [is] good. Know-how transfer
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[is] happening. Costs are reducing. Growth [is] not enough. [It is] too small.
Learning and experience, I think, are very good. Creditability [is] too small
because we haven't reach what I call 'critical size' ...When we discuss about
the corporate image of [our JV], [the Thai partner]' s executives don't
understand it is a must. We should define [our JV] as one company and not as
a small sister of [the Thai parent firm]. In general we can say that it is correct.
For me 'correct' means 'could be better' or 'could be worse'. I don't believe,
taking into account the economic crisis, it could have been much better. It
could be worse because with the crisis we could have reached a lower
penetration rate." (Quote business and development department manager
company E, interview 17)
6.6.3 Business relationship
Broadly speaking, the relationship between partners has developed at the average
level so far. There was only one Thai interviewee who emphasised that the foreign
partners tend to behave opportunistically. Therefore, the trust based on the partners'
relationships in the eye of this Thai interviwee is still in doubt. Simultaneously, the
foreign partners are still questioning the commitment the Thai partner has given them.
The interviewee also discussed the view that when both the Thai and foreign partners
agree that they do not need each other anymore, e.g. for resource contribution, it is
possible that this might be the time to say good-bye. One foreign partner also thought
that it would be possible for their firm to operate their own gas business when the
market is liberalised. The British partners feel that their relationships with the Thai
partner have developed quite well in the past. There was some problem over long-
term objectives (e.g. business expansion to a new location, achieving a critical size in
the market) that haven't been reached by the foreign partners and this lead the foreign
partners to temporarily freeze developing their relationship with the Thai partners.
However, they still wish to keep developing it in the future. The positive and negative
views regarding partner's relationships are expressed by interviewees below:
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"We normally discuss only business matters during our negotiation process.
When we have finished, we go to socialise and have dinner together
sometimes. We mainly discuss business on very broad terms and general
principles. We currently understand each other more. To conclude, they make
a very good partner for us even though they are sometimes fussy." (Quote
sales and marketing manager company E, interview 8)
"Sometimes we discuss business while having a meal together before the
meeting takes place. Then, at the meeting, we already know what issues our
partner seems to find difficult to discuss. Normally, I will lobby our partner
first, before the board meeting takes place, so that we will know roughly what
they think/feel about the agenda we are going to discuss. Then, when the
meeting starts, we know what our partner wants and we try to compromise
where possible. However, if there seems to be a problem regarding some
issues during negotiation, we will have an informal meeting before the real
meeting begins. We never experience any use of veto power during our board
meeting at all." (Quote sales and marketing manager company E, interview 8)
"Our relationship with the foreign partners, compared with the early days, is
not so good. We have had a terrible conflict, recently, regards sharing a
common objective and borrowing money. However, I do believe that we can
still increase trust and build up our relationships in the future." (Quote sales
and marketing manager company E, interview 8)
"I think the relationship is difficult. It could be good if we could agree on the
long-term strategy of the company. But if we need to keep fighting for the
expansion of the company, if that is the future, I think the relationship will
become worse and worse." (Quote business and development department
manager company E, interview 17)
"One of our partners seems to be too demanding. They ask our help without
considering whether what they ask of us is fair or not. It is such a waste of
time to try to do things that are impossible for us to do. However, our foreign
partner seems to be presumptuous. They should consider that this joint
business is not like buying or selling products, do it once and say goodbye. It
is a long-term business." (Quote deputy president company E, interview 9)
"We are satisfied with our business relationship with the British partner, but
not satisfied with [the Thai partner]. We would like to have a smoother
relationship with them [the Thai partner]." (Quote business and development
department manager company E, interview 17)
In short, this JV seems to perform quite well. All partners achieve their main and
short-term objective even though some conflict as regards long-term objective, still
exists. The relationships between partners are just at the moderate level.
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6.7 Factors affecting JV performance (outcome)
Two critical factors that seem to have a significant impact on JV performance are trust
and culture. Trust was described by both the Thai and British partners as the most
important factor. Trust is perceived to have a considerable impact on JV performance.
However the Belgian partner believed that cultural misunderstandings between
partners has the greatest impact on the JV performance. They also believed that the
imbalance of power of TV partners has had some influence on TV performance but is
not a major issue. The Belgian partner did not consider that trust influences TV
performance. The following quotations emphasise the factors that were described by
an interviewee as important variables to influence the IV performance:
"I believe the most important one [major cause leading to successful or
unsuccessful JV performance] in here, very clearly emphasized, is trust. There
has got to be trust between all partners. There has got to be an open, honest,
frank discussion of these issues. And in that open, honest and frank
discussion, we need to understand why things cannot be done, e.g. they might
not be done because of culture." (Quote engineering department manager
company E, interview 11)
"I think trust and understanding cultural issues are the most important factors
leading to W performance." (Quote engineering department manager company
E, interview 11)
"If, we [do not get involved in] any dispute, this can hasten the progress of the
company. Because of those factors [culture and an imbalance of power
between partners], there are some misunderstandings, some discussion. That
will have an impact on the performance of the company." (Quote business and
development department manager company E, interview 17)
6.7.1 Bargaining power affecting JV performance
There is an imbalance in bargaining power between the TV partners. The Thai partner
has more bargaining power because they hold a majority of shares and could choose
other partners. All partners seem to contribute the required resources equally. The IV
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performance might be different if one foreign partner could successfully negotiate to
have a majority of shares. One foreign partner expressed their bitter view on the
power they hold and the JV performance they received below:
"[We] would like to have the majority and we are not happy with this result
because progress [of business] is too slow." (Quote business and development
department manager company E, interview 17)
6.7.2 Trust affecting JV performance
Trust between partners is still moderate but has become less strong as relationships
between them tear apart. The Thai partner couldn't trust the foreign parents'
negotiator and requested a change. The foreign partner also commented that trust
based on relationships may be reduced dramatically in the future if the Thai partner
still tries not to understand their needs and continues to hesitate before negotiating.
The descriptions below, regarding the impact of trust on JV performance, were given
by both Thai and foreign partners:
"The performance of the JV has been affected by the delays and the reaction of
[the Thai partner]. The staff members, within the company, see that one of the
three partners is creating barriers. The morale and the enthusiasm within the
company can suffer. I personally don't see examples of that happening. It is
very rare problem. We believe it could arise if this relationship continues the
way it is at the moment." (Quote engineering department manager company E,
interview 11)
"The time spent on negotiation depends on the person who is coming to
negotiate with us. Sometimes, if the person who comes to negotiate with us,
has a bad impression of Thais before, then this person may lead to a worsening
of the climate of negotiation and the situation will become even worse.
Accordingly, we would need to ask for a change in terms of the individual
who comes to negotiate with us. Otherwise it would be difficult to achieve a
successful negotiation outcome. We found out that some of the foreign
negotiators tried to take advantage of us without realizing that we, the Thai
partner, knew about this. This is a kind of patronising behaviour. Also, at the
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negotiating table, each party should bring in a person who has the power to
make a decision." (Quote deputy president company E, interview 9)
The effect of trust on JV performance has also been mediated by negotiation
behaviour. The comment below shows how trust lead the foreign partner to
implement a compromising strategy that in turn affected JV performance:
"Trust has an influence on JV performance. Without understanding, and that
relationship inside the JV, it can only [negatively] affect the performance. It
can make things worse. It can make things more difficult. There will be less
potential for understanding problems. One illustration is that at the training,
we as a TV partner put into IV, there was a view by the Thai partner that
training has been completed by certain groups. However, it was the view of
the European partners that more work was still required. We had to
compromise. And [we] understood that meant a change in the level or
quantity of training that we would undertake. But the low level of training
was not unsafe." (Quote engineering department manager company E,
interview 11)
6.7.3 Culture affecting partners' relationships and JV performance
Cultural differences in negotiating style influenced the partners' relationships at the
beginning of the JV. Over time, as cultural misunderstanding has been experienced
by the Thai and foreign partners, their relationships have improved.
"According to my personal opinion, it was uncomfortable to negotiate with the
foreign partners whose styles are quite different from us. It was very difficult
for them to understand and agree the Thai way of doing business. We
perceived that some issues were much less important but they still kept
discussing with us. After working with them for nearly three years, they
understand and accept us more. Our relationships are now much better than at
the commencement of the IV operation." (Quote construction manager
company E, interview 12)
However, partners' relationships rely not only on cultural aspects but also on
bargaining power. As the resource contribution from the partner who is depended on
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becomes less, their relationship seems to develop more slowly. The discussion below
shows the bitter remark of the foreign interviewees regarding the effect of cultural
misunderstanding on the JV relationship and performance.
"The relationship between the two foreign partners has always been good.
The relationship with [the Thai partner] at the beginning, I think, was very
good, very constructive and very productive. The relationship today has
changed to one of misunderstanding and lack of acceptance of the common
goals. I think [the Thai partner] relationship needs to be clarified and
rethought for the future. So, I think at the beginning it was good. At the
moment it's not so good. It requires some clarification." (Quote engineering
department manager company E, interview 11)
"We are not happy with the JV performance because of the difficult
relationship with [the Thai partner]. We have inside internal competition.
There is competition with [the Thai parent]. They understand differently.
What we don't understand and have difficulty accepting is that there is
competition [between the Thai parent and the JV firm]. We are losing
millioins of Baht due to this competition. [It is] just because strategies inside
[the Thai parent] are not clear. We are losing time and money. Even though
this problem is theoretically solved, practically, I don't know, because there is
still some resistance inside [the Thai parent firm]. It's a huge thing." (Quote
business and development department manager company E, interview 17)
"If we cannot accept and try to understand each other's cultural differences
(for example the process of the company is slower than we expect), then it is
difficult to live in a JV. I understand it is certainly one of the concerns of [the]
British partner [too], because they want to push. [Accepting that], they
understand progress could be better, results could be better. We try to
understand the culture of the [host] country [and] never try to impose our
Belgian culture. We try not to impose but to provide some support. So, it is
necessary for us to adapt our culture [and] mingle with the local culture.
Otherwise it's impossible to make some business and to have a correct
relationship." (Quote business and development department manager
company E, interview 17)
The impact of culture on JV outcome can also be mediated by negotiation behaviour.
Both the Thai and foreign partners commented on the influence of cultural differences
on the tactics used during JV negotiation, which in turn affects the success or failure
of JV outcome.
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"I do believe that, during the negotiation process of forming the joint venture,
if potential partners don't try to learn the other's culture, it would be difficult
for them to achieve successful agreement outcomes. Now we have not had
much problem since forming a joint venture with our partners. Thais are very
concerned about the issue of dignity and face. So, foreign partners should be a
bit more careful in this respect when negotiating with Thais. Trying to take
advantage of the Thai partner wouldn't do any good at all for them because, at
the end you will not see a successful result. Therefore, the foreign partner
should try harder to learn Thai culture and implement a win-win situation
rather than showing their opportunistic behaviour during the negotiation
process. So, the joint venture partners should try to compromise where
possible in order to reach a successful outcome." (Quote deputy president
company E, interview 9)
"There is a lot of compromise being undertaken by foreign companies with a
view to avoid Thai people losing face. And it's not something that generally
they would like to do. They find [it is] unacceptable but they recognize that
culturally they have got to do it. Because if you put somebody into a corner to
have to make the decision and then they have to back off with lost face, you
have made an enemy and you'll not succeed." (Quote engineering department
manager company E, interview 11)
The negotiation tactics used during JV negotiation did have some effect on the
performance of JV in the perspective of objective achievement. Although all partners
seem to frequently compromise and accommodate each another when conflicts arise,
unless both sides genuinely try to understand the real cause of the underlying
problems and cooperate fully to resolve those problems, there will always be a barrier
to prevent the JV from achieving the objectives set and developing the relationship.
However, it is unlikely, especially for firms whose national cultures are different, to
perform collaboratively in every possible conflict, as their ways of doing things and
perceptions regarding the ideal option to solve those problems are very different. The
following shows the root of an unimpressed foreign interviewee's opinions:
"I put a figure of 50% [on objective achievement]. [The] reason was that (that
is very subjective comment) my 50% figure is based on us having full and
complete help and cooperation from [the Thai partner], we would be on target
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on our plan and we would have more customers and more gas being consumed
on our networks. The achievement of our strategic objectives really needs to
be monitored over a longer period of time. We could be more successful with
strong support from [the Thai partner]." (Quote engineering department
manager company E, interview 11)
"I don't think we have solved the problems [of achieving objectives and
performance]. What we've done, we have tended, at the moment, to
accommodate the problems. But we continue to develop the relationship with
[the Thai partner] with a view to both understanding the issues (understanding
the problem) and making sure that there are no longer problems with regards
to our performances and our objectives. We haven't resolved them yet. They
still exist. You must remember that this company is only three and a half
years old. It's a very young company and we are still developing our
relationships." (Quote engineering department manager company E, interview
11)
6.7.4 Negotiation behaviour affecting JV performance
Negotiation behaviour mediates the context variables; culture, trust and bargaining
power in influencing JV performance. The following is the comment of an
interviewee regarding the influence of negotiation behaviour on JV performance:
"I don't believe that the [negotiation] approach is a big issue. It doesn't have any
direct impact on the result [of the JV]. I also don't think negotiating style has an
influence on [JV performance]." (Quote business and development department
manager company E, interview 17)
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